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Firms frequently decide to invest in foreign countries and projects. These international projects 
involve various actors called stakeholders, who can have a positive or a negative influence on 
the firm. The aim of this research is to examine the opposition that arises in international 
projects and how this resistance is practiced, analyzing the firm-stakeholder and stakeholder-
stakeholder relationships that emerge during a conflict in a foreign direct investment.     
 
The theoretical framework is based on stakeholder theory. In previous literature, only few 
studies have examined the behavior and the existing relationships among stakeholder groups. 
In addition, opposition has been analyzed as exerted against the firm, and there is lack of 
exploration on how resistance can be shown against other stakeholder groups, leading to 
complex relationships during a conflict.  
 
The research is conducted through the analysis of Botnia case. Data consists of newspaper 
articles, and they are analyzed using qualitative content analysis as a method. Results show that 
stakeholders can develop supportive or opposing relationships with other groups, and that these 
relationships are usually dynamic and changeable. Besides, the analysis identifies several 
opposition tactics, which can be utilized at both direct and indirect levels. These tactics are 
further examined utilizing Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) classification of tactics. 
 
The study contributes to stakeholder literature by showing how previous research on opposition 
can be utilized to understand resistance among stakeholders, and how stakeholder relationships 
can emerge as a method to show resistance. In addition, it highlights the importance of 
understanding stakeholder behaviors in international projects, so managers can learn how to 
identify and anticipate opposition tactics in order to ensure the project success. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The importance of stakeholders in international projects 
 
Nowadays, it is common for big companies to locate their subsidiaries and factories abroad, in 
order to expand their markets and obtain competitive advantage. However, the 
internationalization of companies’ activities and projects is not an easy task. Firstly, 
globalization has increased the concerns about the effects of the international projects and 
activities of global companies on the host countries, particularly regarding social and 
environmental consequences. Thus, the firm performance will be carefully controlled, 
analyzed, scrutinized and criticized by the firm environment (Kolk & Fortanier, 2013; Hendry, 
2005). Yaziji and Doh (2009) already affirmed that the internationalization and the expansion 
of big corporations to different countries have consequently boosted an increment in the number 
of non-governmental organizations (referred to as NGOs) analyzing their activities. Secondly, 
when organizations make the decision of going international, in turn, it implies that their 
projects will need to face different cultures in different countries with multiple institutional 
environments (Aaltonen, 2013). In addition, international projects include numerous different 
actors, called stakeholders (Hendry, 2005). These groups may have different values, interests 
and stakes regarding the organization and its projects, and also different socio-economic 
backgrounds. In many occasions, they differ to the stakeholders the company is related to in 
the home country (Aaltonen, Kujala, Lehtonen & Ruuska, 2010). Thus, these international 
projects are usually the main targets for these stakeholder groups, which try to persuade foreign 
organizations to act in a sustainable way (Kolk & Fortanier, 2013) and try to ensure that 
companies protect and respect the stakeholders’ own interests.  
 
Organizations carrying out international projects are likely to be affected by these stakeholders, 
which can use different strategies and tactics to influence and put pressure on the company, and 
to force the firm to respond to stakeholders’ request (Esley & Lenox, 2006). Thus, 
understanding and managing the multiplicity of existing stakeholders implies several benefits, 
but it might also represent a complex task for the organization, and in turn, difficulties for the 
international project success.  
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On the one hand, as advantages, these new actors might mean an opportunity for the company 
and its success, as they have knowledge about the host country that, in hands of the firm, might 
help the project to succeed (Aaltonen et al., 2010). In addition, if the company manages to 
successfully engage and establish relationships with new local stakeholders, consequently, 
these relationships also lead to project success due to more project support and legitimization 
(Aaltonen et al., 2010; Aaltonen, 2013). Companies need to strive to influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions and get acceptance of the project by the surrounding environment and actors. In 
other words, organizations need to establish project legitimacy inside the environment and 
network of the project (Aaltonen, 2013). Besides, the acceptance of an international project 
leads, in turn, to the acceptance of the organization involved in the project (Aaltonen, 2013). 
 
However, on the other hand, these actors might also mean an important handicap for the project, 
especially when they show high levels of opposition and perform actions against the firm’s 
operations and practices. Stakeholders can create conflicts and harm projects through numerous 
different tactics carried out in order to show opposition against the firm and its practices, 
affecting critically its projects and activities. In other words, international projects and their 
related surrounding stakeholders may mean a source of problems for multinational enterprises 
(Aaltonen et al., 2010). Therefore, it is of paramount importance for organizations to learn how 
to identify and understand these groups, establishing effective relationships with them to 
anticipate their behaviors, and avoid and solve possible conflicts. Consequently, this will 
enhance the possibilities of project acceptance and success, and it will improve the company 
performance (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Bourne & Walker, 2008).  
 
Even though previous studies recognized the importance of understanding stakeholders, there 
is scarcity of research oriented and focused on stakeholder opposition. Previous literature has 
traditionally been firm-oriented and based on stakeholder-organization dyadic relationships 
(Rowley, 1997). On the one side, studies have addressed how companies can identify, manage 
and develop engagement strategies with stakeholders (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008); and on 
the other side, how these actors can affect these companies and their activities (Laplume et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, recently, some studies have addressed the topic of stakeholder behavior. 
For instance, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) identified interest and identity as drivers of 
stakeholder mobilization. Other researches have addressed the topic of how stakeholder groups 
behave, demonstrating that stakeholders do not relate only to the company, but also to other 
stakeholders, creating collaborative groups (Bunn, Savage & Holloway; 2002) and networks 
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(Rowley, 1997) with different linkages and relationships affecting the organization. These 
relationships are mainly based on the premise that stakeholder groups tend to collaborate 
together in order to influence and improve their salience and alter their attributes of power, 
legitimacy and urgency towards the firm (Neville & Menguc, 2006; Aaltonen, Kujala & Oijala, 
2008; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Therefore, it would be important to deeply analyse and 
understand the interactions between the multiple stakeholders inside those stakeholder 
networks (Neville & Menguc, 2006), especially in the framework of international projects, 
where these stakeholder networks may present more complexity. It would be useful to examine 
how stakeholders behave and why stakeholders relate and establish positive and negative 
relationships with each other (De Bakker & Den Hond, 2008), especially in groups creating 
strong opposition against the firm’s international projects and the surrounding environment. 
However, just few studies refer to stakeholder interactions and how stakeholders relate together 
(Neville& Menguc, 2006), and these researches barely mention the possibility of stakeholder 
interactions and relationships with the objective of showing opposition and resistance. In 
addition, the topic of stakeholder opposition tactics has not been examined frequently, and there 
is lack of understanding on all the different strategies that stakeholder groups can utilize to 
show opposition and influence not only the firm, but also other actors (De Bakker & Den Hond, 
2008). Therefore, a niche in stakeholder theory has been identified, and as a result, this study 
will further address and examine the following: opposition in stakeholder relationships.  
 
1.2. Research objective and research question 
 
There is scarcity of research based on opposition in stakeholder relationships. This study will 
address this interesting phenomenon by examining stakeholder relationships and interaction, in 
the specific framework of a foreign direct investment project (referred to as FDI) and its ensuing 
conflict. The research will analyse and explore the Metsä-Botnia case (from now on referred to 
as Botnia case). The study will provide new insight on this topic and will contribute to the field 
of stakeholder theory. 
 
The overall aim of this research is to examine stakeholder opposition in a foreign direct 
investment environment. Especially, the focus is on the relationships that emerge between 
stakeholders when opposing and showing resistance against other stakeholder groups, and how 
this opposition is practiced during the escalation of a conflict.  
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This research will answer and investigate the following research question and sub-questions 
through the analysis of the Botnia case.  
 
R.Q: How is opposition practiced by different stakeholder groups during a conflict in an 
international foreign direct investment? 
R.Q.1: Which are the stakeholders’ relationships that emerge during an international conflict 
when showing opposition, both against the firm and against other stakeholder groups? 
R.Q.2: Which are the tactics utilized by stakeholders in order to show resistance and opposition 
during an international conflict, both against the firm and against other stakeholder groups? 
Regarding the case, Botnia decided to establish a new pulp mill in Uruguay, close to the 
Uruguay River, which is the frontier between this country and Argentina. While Uruguay soon 
supported the decision, Argentina opposed this project fearing negative environmental 
consequences on the Uruguay River, and in turn, on the tourism and economy of the country. 
Consequently, a conflict started around the project. Even though at the beginning the conflict 
only involved Uruguay and Argentina, soon other actors were included too, becoming a 
politicized and mediatized conflict and attracting several and diverse stakeholders.   
 
The study will follow two different approaches: stakeholder-firm opposition and stakeholder-
stakeholder opposition. Firstly, the research focus will be on analysing relationships between 
stakeholders during the conflict, especially those addressed to show opposition. Secondly, the 
research will identify all the tactics utilized to show that opposition, especially through 
stakeholder collaboration. Therefore, the key focus of this research will be on examining and 
classifying the different strategies and actions developed in order to show discontent and 
dissatisfaction in a conflict caused by an international project; especially focusing on 
stakeholder relationships and collaboration emerged as a method to show opposition.  
 
Firstly, after analyzing all data available, a description of the Botnia case will be provided. A 
list with the key stakeholders involved in the international project of Botnia will be created, 
together with their particular interests during the escalation of the FDI conflict. Key 
stakeholders relevant for this study will be chosen as a next step. Later, these groups will be 
categorized as opponents, supporters or as showing neutral positions with regard to the 
international project during the conflict; and additionally, their relationships with other groups 
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of stakeholders will be examined. Secondly, the research will focus on the stakeholders showing 
opposition during the FDI conflict. The study will analyze the possible tactics and strategies 
used by those actors with the objective of showing resistance against the firm, and also against 
other stakeholder groups. In addition, the stakeholder opposition will be compared and applied 
to previous existing literature on the topic. To finalize the research, the study will try to identify 
differences between the specific tactics chosen and utilized by every stakeholder group during 
the conflict.  
 
Thus, the study will deeply examine opponent stakeholders. The paper has been designed to 
provide better understanding on stakeholder opposition in international conflicts and 
environments, together with a better insight on stakeholders’ relationships and behaviors with 
the objective of showing opposition towards different actors. By answering the research 
questions mentioned above, the thesis will explain how stakeholders mobilize and decide to 
show resistance, and how stakeholders decide to relate and behave in a context of an 
international project and a conflict.  
 
However, in this research, it is important to take into account the fact that data will consist of 
newspaper articles, so all the conclusions will be based on the articles found in media. 
Therefore, the findings will depend on how media presents all the information collected during 
the escalation of this FDI conflict in Uruguay. 
 
1.3  Botnia case  
 
1.3.1 Botnia case background 
 
This study examines an interesting case of a real FDI project of a Finnish company; the Botnia 
case. Even though the case started as a simple FDI project in Uruguay, it soon developed into 
a mediatized and politicized conflict. Therefore, this case attracted numerous and diverse 
stakeholders (for instance, Botnia, the Uruguayan and the Argentinean Government, 
Argentinean and Uruguayan local people, NGOs in both countries, and other higher 
institutions), all of them with different interests and attitudes towards the project, and relating 
to each other within the frame of a FDI conflict with different purposes (Kujala, Heikkinen & 
Lehtimäki, 2012). Due to all these characteristics, this Botnia case is quite valuable and 
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provides a perfect, diverse and complex environment to be investigated in this research, 
allowing a focus on various different stakeholders involved at the same time in the same conflict 
and reacting in different ways.  
 
The case has been previously studied through various perspectives and approaches, and being 
analyzed through the points of view of companys’ corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
stakeholder theory, and the roles of dialogue and media in conflicts. Previous research covered 
issues such as corporate responsibility activities and commitments of the company (Lotila, 
2009; Lehtimäki, Kujala & Heikkinen, 2011a); stakeholder salience analysis and classification 
(Kujala, et al., 2012); stakeholder salience strategies (Aaltonen, Kujala & Oijala, 2008); 
stakeholder relationships (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015; Kujala, et al., 2012); stakeholder dialogue 
(Laasonen, 2010; Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015; Heikkinen, Kujala & Lehtimäki, 2013); project 
legitimation (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009); the role of media in international FDI conflicts 
(Pakkasvirta, 2008); the role of media in CSR (Kujala, Toikka & Heikkinen, 2009) and the 
relationships between multinational enterprises, host governments and NGOs (Skippari & 
Pajunen, 2010).  
 
Table 1 shows a summary of previous studies developed around Botnia case and their key 
contributions. 
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Table 1. Summary of previous studies on Botnia case 
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The previous literature on the case may be divided on two different approaches: a realistic 
approach, based on the study of strategies, relationships, interests and roles of the actors 
involved in the conflict; and a discursive approach, addressing communication strategies and 
the roles of dialogue and language used by the actors involved during the conflict. In addition, 
previous articles have analyzed the conflict under the perspective of the two main actors 
participating in the conflict: on the one hand, Botnia; and on the other hand, stakeholders 
involved in the project (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015).  
 
1.3.2 Main events on Botnia case 
 
The investment decision (March 2003–March 2005) 
 
Forest industry has traditionally been one of the most important and beneficial sectors for the 
Finnish economy. However, during past years, this sector has been suffering difficulties due to 
lower sales and higher production costs in the country (Heikkinen et al., 2013). This is the main 
reason why the Finnish forest industry group Botnia decided to relocate its activities in Latin 
America. In 2003, Botnia started to develop studies on the possibility to build up a pulp mill in 
Fray Bentos, Uruguay (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). The company officially decided to locate a 
pulp mill in Fray Bentos in 2005. During that year, Uruguay immediately accepted the project, 
mainly due to the many future advantages and benefits of the project on the economy of the 
country: the project meant creating 8.000 jobs and a growth of 1.6% in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the country. Soon, the country tried to ensure the investment and the 
Uruguayan government granted an environmental permit to the project (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 
2015). 
 
The beginning of the conflict (May 2005–December 2005) 
 
However, the pulp mill was designed to be built close to the Uruguay River, which represents 
the border between Uruguay and Argentina (Di Martino, 2009; Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).  Soon, 
Argentina started to fear future negative effects on the environment (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010), 
especially on the river, and in turn on the tourism of the country. As a consequence, it was 
during 2005 when the first protests appeared in Argentina against the construction of the pulp 
mill. Environmental activists and local people started demonstrations and roadblocks in bridges 
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connecting both countries (Di Martino, 2009), and the Argentinean government claimed that 
Uruguay had not asked for permission to build the plant, as stated in the bilateral agreement 
signed between both countries on the use of the river (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). All 
demonstrations claimed that the pulp mill should be relocated.   
 
At the same time, during the same year, the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation 
(referred to as IFC) started its Cumulative Impact Study (referred to as CIS) about the project 
(Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). Argentina requested the World Bank to suspend the funding for the 
project until this CIS was done, and consequently, Uruguay cancelled the bilateral negotiations 
between both countries (Kujala et al., 2012). At the end of the year 2005, the World Bank’s 
IFC concluded through its Cumulative Impact Study that the pulp mill did not mean any harm 
to the environment (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). However, the Argentinean government declared 
that the report was incomplete and inadequate (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a), as they feared that 
Uruguay had not provided all the existing information on waste treatment and air pollution. 
Consequently, permanent long-term roadblocks were established on the border bridge between 
both countries.  
 
A politicized and mediatized conflict (January 2006–September 2006) 
 
The conflict soon escalated into a politicized and mediatized public conflict between two 
countries: Uruguay and Argentina. In 2006, Argentina finally brought the case to The Hague 
International Court of Justice (referred to as The Hague ICJ), stating that Uruguay had not 
respected the bilateral agreement signed by both countries in the past, and thus, the pulp mill 
project violated the bilateral pact and should be cancelled and relocated (Kujala et al., 2012). 
Uruguay defended the project claiming that initial negotiations between both countries on the 
construction had been held without opposition from Argentina. Therefore, in order to calm 
down the situation and solve the dispute, presidents from both countries urged Botnia to stop 
the construction work for 90 days, until an independent environmental impact study could be 
developed, with the compromise from Argentina to consequently stop the roadblocks 
(Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). However, Botnia only agreed on stopping the construction work only 
for 10 days instead, and relationships and negotiations between the Argentinean and the 
Uruguayan government were definitely broken off. Consequently, the Argentinean Citizens 
Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (referred to as CEAG), a local group consisting of 
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citizens of the city of Gualeguaychú, established roadblocks again on the key bridges 
connecting the countries (Di Martino, 2009; Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).  
 
The Hague ICJ resolution (October 2006–July 2009) 
 
The Hague ICJ definitely voted against Argentinean request of suspending the construction 
work and supported Botnia project to continue. The IFC and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (referred to as MIGA) released the final Cumulative Impact Study on the 
project (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b), claiming that the pulp mill was following the existing 
environmental standards and generating real benefits for the economy of Uruguay. Finally, at 
the end of this year, the World Bank approved a loan to Botnia, and MIGA approved a political 
risk insurance for the project (Kujala et al., 2012). 
 
As the conflict continued, in 2007, the Argentinean and the Uruguayan governments tried to 
negotiate to solve this dispute supported by the King of Spain and his representatives, but this 
intent was unsuccessful, and more demonstrations were organized (Kujala et al., 2012). 
Consequently, the Uruguayan government installed a fence and set police around the pulp mill 
to protect the project. Additionally, as a way to support the project, Uruguay built the ONTUR 
harbor in Nueva Palmira City, in charge of Botnia pulp deliveries. This harbor meant a great 
strategic advantage to Botnia. Finally, in October 2007, the investment project was finalized, 
and in November 2007, the pulp mill started to operate with the permission and close 
cooperation of the Uruguayan authorities (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015). 
 
During the next years, the activists continued the protests, even though with lower intensity. 
However, the pulp mill was soon in full operation. In addition, the IFC published a first 
environmental monitoring report of the pulp mill, stating that the company was correctly 
following the necessary environmental air and water standards (Heikkinen et al., 2013). In 
2009, Botnia changed its ownership structure, and Botnia’s Uruguay-based operations were 
transferred to UPM-Kymmene Corporation (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). 
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1.4   Structure of the thesis 
 
The research will be organized in several chapters. The first chapter identifies a gap on 
stakeholder literature, and briefly introduces the phenomenon being analyzed in this study: 
stakeholder opposition. This chapter also presents the research objective and questions, and 
provides a short description of the Botnia case based on previous studies. Chapter 2 summarizes 
previous literature on stakeholder theory, presenting and comparing both early and recent 
studies on the topic. It also presents the theoretical framework that will be used during the 
research. Chapter 3 includes the research methodology and a brief description of the data 
analysis process. Chapter 4 focuses on the main findings obtained during the analysis of the 
available data. The chapter describes the Botnia case in detail, and identifies the key stakeholder 
relationships and opposition tactics emerged during the conflict. A summary of the findings 
will be included at the end of the chapter. Finally, chapter 5 provides a discussion on the key 
findings, and highlights the main contributions of this research to stakeholder literature. 
Additionally, the research will be evaluated and further research on stakeholder opposition will 
be proposed.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Research structure. 
 
Figure 1 shows the structure of the thesis by briefly summarizing the content of every chapter 
in this study, from the introduction until the final conclusions. 
 
 
  
 Discussion 
 
Conclusions 
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CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 5 
12 
 
 
 
2. STAKEHOLDER THEORY  
 
2.1  Foreign direct investment projects and stakeholders 
A Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is “an international venture in which an investor residing in 
the home economy acquires a long-term influence in the management of an affiliate firm in the 
host economy” (Contessi & Weinberger, 2009, p. 64). These FDI projects have increased 
considerably during the last few years, especially due to globalization; and today, more and 
more companies decide to develop internationalization strategies and start activities abroad. 
However, internationalization also implies some risks due to the levels of uncertainty inherent 
in projects, usually originated by unanticipated influence coming from the international 
projects’ environment and network, based on the diversity of different actors coexisting 
together (Aaltonen et al., 2010). International projects mean dealing not only with the host 
country where the project is developed, but also with all the new local stakeholders involved in 
the project; and all these new actors may differ not only one to each other, but also to the 
stakeholders existing in the company’s home country. 
In a FDI project, different and “contradicting interests of participants from the business-
government-society interface meet” (Laasonen, 2010, p.528). These international projects are 
developed in challenging, complex, and dynamic environments, involving numerous 
stakeholders, each with their own “institutionalized values, norms, practices, expectations, 
socio-cultural backgrounds and demands”, which may differ from those of the project-based 
company and its home country (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 567). The company developing the 
project needs to interact and face external influence coming from the host country and the 
project environment, usually through local stakeholders’ actions and relationships, which are a 
major source of unexpected events. These unexpected events can be defined as those situations 
not originally planned and expected during the project, and that represent alterations from the 
original project plans (Aaltonen et al., 2010). In addition, the host country and its local actors 
present cultural differences compared with the project-based company’s culture, which 
increases the likelihood of these unforeseen events occurring, and possible future conflicts. The 
higher the cultural differences are between the company and its stakeholders and the project 
actors in the host country, the more challenges the company needs to face, and the higher 
probability of unexpected events happening (Aaltonen et al., 2010). Aaltonen et al. (2010) 
reviewed the concept of “cultural distance”, which is “the degree to which the norms and values 
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of two companies differ due to their place of origin” (p. 568). However, some other distances 
were identified too affecting the relationships between the company-host country-stakeholders, 
which are cognitive distance, social distance, technological distance and temporal distance. 
According to Foss (1999), cognitive distance includes business culture and language 
differences (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 568). Social distance is related to different “organization’s 
ways of thinking and working” (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 568); technological distance refers to 
differences between technological activities (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 569); and finally, 
Holmström et al. (2006) define temporal distance as the “dislocation in time experienced by 
two actors” (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 569). All these differences show how complex 
international projects are and how distant and distinct the host country and its environment can 
be for a multinational enterprise during the performance of an international project.   
Therefore, the foreign company developing the project needs to find out how to integrate in the 
host country, and how to get adapted to the new project environment and its actors, in order to 
reduce all the existing differences and distances between the firm and the host country. 
Establishing relationships with stakeholders and understanding these actors help the company 
to get adapted into the new project environment. It is of paramount importance for the 
organization to establish effective and collaborative relationships with all local stakeholders in 
order to ensure the success of the project in the new country (Bourne & Walker; 2005). In order 
to do that, it is essential for the company to first analyze all the existing and possible 
relationships between these stakeholders to better understand stakeholders’ behaviors, avoid 
and anticipate future actions, and be able to develop and maintain long-term organizational 
relationships with the project participants. Besides, these actors might mean at the same time a 
source of advantages for the company, as they own knowledge about the host country that might 
be useful for the focal organization, and they can help legitimate the international project once 
they finally support and accept it (Aaltonen et al., 2010). Suchman (1995) describes the concept 
of project legitimacy as a generalized perception that the project of a company is appropriate 
within some “constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Aaltonen, 2013, p. 
14) and it is related to the legitimacy of the company involved in the project too. When it comes 
to ensure the project success, ensuring project legitimacy is an essential challenge that means 
obtaining social acceptability of the project through engaging with the several actors 
surrounding the (Aaltonen, 2013) 
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As a conclusion, foreign direct investment projects do not only involve exclusively the focal 
organization (multinational enterprise or MNE) and the host country, but they also include 
stakeholders such as community groups, activist groups and non-governmental organizations 
(Skippari & Pajunen, 2010). Consequently, it is of paramount importance for companies to 
understand these stakeholders’ behaviors and relationships when it comes to develop successful 
valuable projects. It is crucial for the managers of the company to understand and pay attention 
to the structure of the stakeholder network of the firm and its likelihood to provoke unexpected 
events during the international project, in order to avoid and anticipate these possible 
inconveniences and ensure the success of the project (Aaltonen et al., 2010) 
2.2  Stakeholder theory: traditional firm-orientation 
 
2.2.1 Stakeholders and stakeholder classification 
 
Traditionally, stakeholder literature has been firm-oriented, meaning that research was 
addressed and developed under the lenses of the organization, and it was focused on firms’ 
interests and objectives. After the concept of stakeholder appeared for the first time, stakeholder 
theory has studied mainly firm-stakeholder relationships, which were presented as dyadic, and 
it has investigated the issue of stakeholder management in organizations. 
Stakeholder theory supports the idea that firms should take into account the interests of all its 
stakeholders, instead of focusing only on the shareholders of the organization, as stated in early 
researches (Vinten, 2000). Regarding previous literature based on stakeholders, it is essential 
to mention that the concept of “stakeholder” was defined for the first time by Freeman (1984), 
who offered the most widely accepted definition of stakeholders, as “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objective” (Pesqueux & Damak-
Ayadi, 2005, p. 6). Hill and Jones (1992) defined stakeholders as those “who have a legitimate 
claim on the firm” (Rowley, 1997, p. 899), and stakeholder theory is mainly based on the 
concept of stakeholders’ stakes or interests (Freeman, 1984). Organizations are surrounded by 
internal and external groups, such as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, NGOs and 
communities (Jones, Felps & Bigley, 2007), which own intrinsic specific interests, claims, 
positions or stakes towards a company and its operations. Freeman (1984) differentiated three 
types of stakes: equity stakes of stakeholders who have some ownership of the organization, 
economic stakes of those groups who have economic interest in the firm (such as customers, 
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suppliers and competitors), and influencer stakes (Wolfe & Putler, 2002). Freeman (1984) also 
stated that firms need to take into account the interests of these stakeholders when taking 
strategic decisions for the company (Mainardes et al., 2012). 
An important aspect of stakeholder theory is related to its frameworks. Stakeholder theory can 
be studied and be analyzed under different approaches: the empirical stakeholder theory, 
divided into descriptive stakeholder theory and instrumental stakeholder theory; and the 
normative stakeholder theory (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). For one, Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) described descriptive stakeholder theory, and how it supports organization’s 
centrality. It shows the organization as a focal point, a centrum. It is focused on how the 
organization behaves when managing stakeholders (Mainardes et al., 2012), but it does not 
relate stakeholder management with business objectives and performance. For second, Jones 
(1995) supported instrumental stakeholder theory, and it links stakeholder management with 
better performance within the company. Thus, the objectives of the organization are related and 
dependent on stakeholder management (Mainardes et al., 2012), and relating and engaging with 
these groups have influence on the firm outcomes (Jones et al., 2007). For third, Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) discussed normative stakeholder theory. This perspective states that 
stakeholders have their own interests, and that the company has moral and ethical obligations 
related to stakeholders’ positions, together with its own interest in the firm economic success 
(Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). Every stakeholder of the firm has an intrinsic value in their 
claims, and therefore, stakeholders should not be considered only as a means to achieve better 
performance inside the organization: firms have the moral obligation of taking into account 
stakeholder interests (Mainardes et al., 2012). 
As defined before, stakeholders are actors and groups who have a claim, right or interests in an 
organization and its activities (Clarkson, 1995). However, this definition of stakeholder was 
considered too wide (Boesso & Kumar, 2009), and stakeholder theory evolved in order to 
narrow this term by developing stakeholder classifications. Stakeholders with similar interests 
might belong to the same group or classification. Many researchers have developed different 
stakeholder classification. For instance, Clarkson (1995) distinguished the following groups of 
stakeholders: primary and secondary. Primary stakeholders are those groups “without whose 
continuing participation, the corporation cannot survive” (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106) and will be 
seriously damaged. In this group, shareholders, investors, employees, customers, suppliers and 
governments might be included. The firm success highly depends on these primary 
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stakeholders, and thus, it is important to engage and keep constant and satisfying relationships 
with these actors. Clarkson (1995) defined the organization as a “system of primary stakeholder 
groups” (p. 107). Secondary stakeholders are those actors that “influence or affect, or are 
influenced or affected” by the firm, but on the contrary, they are “not essential for its survival” 
(Clarkson, 1995, p. 107; Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011, p. 50). This group includes media 
and interest groups with special interests in the company. However, even though the firm 
success does not depend on them, they can seriously damage the organization as they can 
mobilize public opinion regarding the company operations, and in many cases, delegitimize the 
firm and its projects. 
As a different example, Culpin (1998) separated stakeholders into institutional stakeholders, 
economic stakeholders and ethical stakeholders (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005, p. 6). 
Firstly, institutional stakeholders are those related to laws, regulations and inter-organizational 
entities. Secondly, economic stakeholders are those groups operating inside the market of a 
company. Finally, ethical stakeholders are those actors belonging to pressure groups, both 
ethical and political. Another classification, for instance, was developed by Lépineux (2003), 
who classified stakeholders as shareholders; internal stakeholders, such as employees and labor 
unions; operational partners, such as customers, suppliers and insurance companies; and social 
community, such as the state authorities, trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and civil society (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005, p. 7).  
Finally, Mitchell et al. (1997) developed the most important classification of stakeholders, 
closely related to stakeholder management, based on their attributes of power, legitimacy and 
urgency. This classification allows managers not only to identify but also to prioritize which 
stakeholders are more important and key for the organization, or in other words, the 
stakeholders with more salience. As the definition of stakeholder is quite wide, it is necessary 
to identify the key stakeholders for the company and to whom the company should pay more 
attention, as firm managers cannot focus on all stakeholders’ claims (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Mitchell et al. (1997) proposed a model to identify key stakeholders through the evaluation of 
stakeholder-manager relationships, both actual and potential, in order to identify the following 
attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency; defined as follows by Mitchell et al. (1997): 
 
17 
 
 
 
 Power to influence the firm, defined as “the ability of those who possess power 
to bring about the outcomes they desire” (p. 865). 
 Legitimacy of the relationship stakeholder-firm, defined as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions” (p. 866). Legitimacy combined with power can create authority. 
 Urgency of the stakeholders’ claim on the firm, defined as “the degree to which 
stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (p. 867). This concept is based 
on the following attributes: time sensitivity, or “the degree to which managerial 
delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder” 
(p. 867); and criticality, or “the importance of the claim or the relationship to the 
stakeholder” (p. 867). 
In addition, these attributes own some specific characteristics (Mitchell et al., 1997). Firstly, 
they are variable and likely to change. One group of stakeholders might have one attribute and 
lose it in future, or change to a different attribute (Mitchell et al., 1997). Besides, they depend 
on perceptions, more specifically, managers’ perceptions; and a stakeholder group possessing 
one attribute might not be conscious of that possession (Mitchell et al., 1997). The more 
attributes a stakeholder presents, the more salience the stakeholder has, and thus, the group 
represents a key actor for the company (Mitchell et al., 1997).  However, stakeholders’ 
attributes identification depends on managerial perceptions, and managers are the ones who 
perceive and decide the attributes the stakeholders have, and in turn, their salience (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). Therefore, managers have an important role, as their perceptions should not differ 
from reality, so they can really identify and engage with the key stakeholders of the company. 
Depending on the attributes that the different stakeholder groups present, the model identifies 
some stakeholder categories (Mitchell et al., 1997). First, latent stakeholders are those groups 
with low salience and owning only one attribute (dormant, discretionary, demanding 
stakeholders). Second, expectant stakeholders are those actors with moderate salience and 
owning two attributes (dominant, dependent and dangerous stakeholders). Finally, definitive 
stakeholders are those with high salience and owning all the attributes, and thus, representing 
the key stakeholders for the company as perceived by managers (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
However, stakeholders do not belong to one of these categories forever, but they might change, 
as stakeholders’ stakes and managers’ perceptions might vary over time (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
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POWER 
Thus, through this model, Mitchell et al. (1997) include and show two main characteristics of 
stakeholders: they are dynamic and likely to change, and they present dyadic firm-stakeholder 
relationships with the company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Stakeholder typology based on attributes (Mitchell et al, 1997, p. 874) 
Figure 2 shows the stakeholder typology created by Mitchell et al. (1997) based on the three 
previously mentioned stakeholder attributes of urgency, power and legitimacy. This 
classification allows managers to identify and focus on the key stakeholders for the 
organization, or in other words, those groups presenting higher salience. 
2.2.2 Stakeholder management 
Stakeholder research continued evolving, leading to the concept of “stakeholder management”. 
Stakeholders react towards firm operations and projects, and managers need to learn how to 
approach and address those groups that own the power of influencing the organization. Thus, 
stakeholders and firm show a dyadic dependent relationship, relating together in different 
positive or negative ways, and managers need to learn how to manage and influence these 
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relationships in order to ensure the firm success. Many studies showed the importance of 
managing stakeholders, as it allows managers to address stakeholders’ interest so as to 
maximize stakeholders’ positive influence and minimize the negative influence (Bourne & 
Walker; 2005), leading to improvements in the company performance and more chances of 
success in projects (Bourne & Walker; 2008). Stakeholder management might be defined as 
partnering between the firm and the firm’s stakeholders, involving different actions such as 
“identifying, assessing, prioritizing, communicating, negotiating, contracting and managing 
relationships” with relevant actors for the firm (Boesso and Kumar, 2009, p. 65). The 
stakeholder management process requires the identification of key stakeholders and their 
interests and needs (Solaimani and Bouwman, 2012). Stakeholder management also implies 
building relationships with these groups, in order to engage with them, and understand and 
reconcile their interests, meeting stakeholders’ needs and expectations with corporate priorities 
(Bunn, Savage and Holloway, 2002). However, the decision on which management and 
engagement strategy is more appropriate depends on the existing stakeholders’ interests on the 
company and the firm-stakeholder existing relationship; and the ultimate decision on which 
strategy to be used relies on the managers of the company (Mainardes et al., 2012). 
Some researchers have tried to identify some specific steps in the process of managing 
stakeholders, for instance, identifying stakeholders, differentiating and categorizing 
stakeholders according to their interests, and investigating relationships between stakeholders 
(Wang, Ge & Lu, 2012). Bunn et al. (2002) further investigated this process. They suggested a 
5-step process consisting on: identify key relevant stakeholders, describe the characteristics and 
claims of every stakeholder group, analyse and classify the stakeholders according to their 
singular attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997), examine the dynamic relationships among 
stakeholders, and finally, develop appropriate stakeholder management strategies related to the 
claims for every stakeholder group. Analysing and classifying stakeholders according to their 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997) is one of the more important 
steps, as it allows the managers of the company to prioritize and focus on key stakeholders, in 
turn, better allocating resources to cope with key stakeholders. It is important to identify the 
groups that can supply the firm or project with critical resources, bear additional risks, or have 
the power to affect the success of the project and firm performance directly (Ayuso, Rodriguez, 
Garcia & Ariño, 2007). The next step is also of paramount importance, as it is related to the 
dynamic nature of stakeholders’ relationships: stakeholders’ attributes may vary over the time 
(Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). Besides, the firm’s influence through engagement strategies 
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might also change stakeholders’ claims and positions; and at the same time, stakeholders relate 
to other stakeholders to improve their influence over the firm (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). 
Therefore, it is necessary to take into account and anticipate these changes over time when 
managing and engaging with stakeholders by trying to predict those changes, or updating the 
stakeholder analysis previously performed (Bunn et al., 2002). Bourne (2005) emphasized the 
importance of the dynamic nature of stakeholders in the process of stakeholder management 
and engagement by stating that it is necessary to update, monitor and assess the firm–
stakeholder relationships over the time as they may vary, in order to engage appropriately with 
keys stakeholders in every life cycle of the company or firm’s project. 
Researchers have also tried to list some generally accepted engagement strategies that managers 
can use to manage and influence key stakeholders’ positions and relationships, depending on 
their specific claims, the firm-stakeholder relationships, and trying to meet the interests and 
include their claims in the business. Freeman (1984) suggested a strategy matrix based on the 
stakeholders’ ability to cooperate or threaten the organization. This strategy matrix was also 
supported by other authors, such as Savage et al. (1991), Kimery and Rinehart (1998) and 
Polonsky (1996) (Polonsky & Scott, 2005). In addition, for instance, Bunn et al. (2002) 
suggested the following general management actions with stakeholders: lead, collaborate, 
involve, defend, educate and monitor stakeholders.  
At the same time, in order to relate and engage with stakeholders, stakeholder communication 
and dialogue gained attention too. Different interests of stakeholders suggest different 
communication styles, adapted to specific stakeholders’ stakes and interests in the company 
(Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). In addition, communication in firm-stakeholder relationships 
stopped being a one-way process to become a two-way symmetrical communication, where 
these groups and the organization interact together (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). Stakeholders 
have specific interests in the company, and the organization needs to respond and adapt the 
company operations to the social environment, in order to ensure firm success, engaging with 
these stakeholders in fruitful relationships. The way these relationships exist is via dialogue 
between the firm and its stakeholders, where the firm influences and involves stakeholders in 
the business, but also learns from them at the same time. Thus, stakeholders are no passive but 
active participants in the dialogue and the communication strategies of the company, and they 
feel a part of the company (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011).  Stakeholder-firm dialogue is successful 
when the firm is able to understand and adapt the dialogue and communication to the 
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stakeholders’ interests, and at the same time, these stakeholders become participants in the 
business and relate with the company (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). In addition, active and 
continuous communication with stakeholders is crucial for managers as it allows them to 
identify possible changes in firm-stakeholder relationships and positions, and thus, react in 
time. Thus, it works as a monitoring and “early-warning system” to anticipate and avoid 
changes and conflicts with stakeholders (Bourne & Walker, 2005, p. 657). 
However, communication and other engagement strategies are decided by managers of the 
organization, so in turn, stakeholder management depends mainly on managerial perceptions 
on how they perceive, prioritize, and understand salient stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
The more salience they attach to a specific stakeholder group; the more effort they will make 
to engage with that group. Managers have an essential role in stakeholder management, as they 
need to decide the appropriate engagement strategies that meet stakeholders’ interests (Boesso 
& Kumar, 2009). Therefore, the way the firm responds to social pressure is dependent on 
managerial competence, skills, practices and values, and the firm’s management ability to 
perceive and identify key stakeholders, and influence and engage with them correctly (Lotila, 
2009; Bourne & Walker, 2005). 
2.3  Stakeholder theory: towards a stakeholder-orientation 
 
2.3.1 Stakeholder relationships  
 
After the first research and years of investigation on stakeholder theory, literature experienced 
a shift towards a stakeholder-orientation. Studies started to be developed under the 
stakeholders’ perspective, and a new trend emerged examining stakeholders’ behaviors and 
relationships with each other. However, the importance of the firm as an influencer and as an 
actor relating with stakeholders was still considered.  
 
Later stakeholder literature pointed out the fact that stakeholders do not only relate with the 
organization, but also with other different stakeholders (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). 
Stakeholders are not separated actors, as they interact with other stakeholder groups, 
cooperating and creating coalitions and alliances over time through the establishment of diverse 
complex relationships (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Therefore, they present a dynamic nature in 
their relationships, which may change and update over the time (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012; 
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Aaltonen, Kujaala & Havela, 2013). Freeman (1984) already suggested that stakeholders with 
similar interests or rights might form a group (Mainardes et al., 2012). Waddock and Boyle 
(1995) identified a shift from a single community of stakeholders towards complex 
relationships within multiple different communities, which in turn, also relate with the company 
(Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005); and Bourne (2005) stated that there is a stakeholder 
structure that impacts the company rather than individual stakeholders’ influences. Therefore, 
stakeholders have influence and relate with other stakeholder groups at the same time they do 
with the company (Bunn et al., 2002).  
In order to analyse the interactions that simultaneously emerge in stakeholder environments 
between the existing actors, Rowley (1997) developed a social network perspective by applying 
concepts of the social network analysis in the examination of the stakeholders affecting an 
organization. He stated that firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually, but they 
respond to the “interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set” (Rowley, 
1997, p. 890). It is important to point out that every company faces a different set of 
stakeholders with unique patterns of influences (Lotila, 2010), and their stakeholder 
management strategies depend on an analysis of the complex group of multiple and 
interdependent relationships existing between the diverse stakeholder environment of the firm 
(Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012; Rowley, 1997). Rowley’s (1997) research moved beyond the 
analysis of dyadic individual firm-stakeholder relationships, and claimed that networks 
examine “systems of dyadic interactions, capturing the influence of multiple and interdependent 
stakeholder relationships on organizations’ behaviours” (p. 894). Rowley’s (1997) model also 
suggests that the focal organization is not the centre of the network formed by its own set of 
stakeholders, and on the contrary, the organization’s position in the network is determined by 
its own behaviour. This means that the organization is considered as a network of stakeholders, 
each one with its own set of stakeholders, creating a wide complex network around the focal 
organization (Lozano, 2005). Consequently, the centrality of the firm in the network means 
efficient communication with stakeholders (Rowley, 1997). Rowley (1997) supports the theory 
that network density and the focal organization’s centrality influence the focal organization’s 
degree of resistance to stakeholders’ pressures. As a result, this produces different types of firm 
behaviours towards stakeholders and against stakeholders’ influences, distinguishing between 
the following roles: “compromiser, subordinate, commander and solitarian” (Rowley, 1997, p. 
888).  
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Stakeholder literature, therefore, goes beyond the dyadic stakeholder-firm relationship. Studies 
show that the company interacts with several and diverse external groups at the same time, and 
in addition, these groups will relate with other stakeholders, creating different complex 
relationships and interactions in the stakeholder networks that Neville and Menguc (2006) 
recognized as “stakeholder multiplicity” (p. 377). Stakeholders influence the company directly, 
but also indirectly, as all those groups can collaborate and create alliances with others to 
increase their influence on the company and the salience of their claims; or compete against 
each other in case they own opposite claims and interests, for instance, shareholders and NGOs 
(Neville and Menguc, 2006). According to Savage, Bunn, Gray, Xiao, Wang, Wilson and 
Williams (2010), collaboration between stakeholders emerges and is facilitated due to the 
existence of some factors: appreciative linkages or shared goals, structural features of the 
collaboration and processual issues, or in other words, the level of trust between stakeholders. 
One situation where stakeholders tend to collaborate is when showing opposition towards the 
company, as the combined resulting salience after collaboration will better influence and help 
mobilize against the company. In these occasions, smaller stakeholders seek to collaborate with 
salient powerful similar stakeholders, so as to create synergistic relationships with the objective 
of increasing the legitimacy of their interests, accumulate power or increase the urgency of their 
demands, and in turn, improving the salience of their claims (Neville & Menguc, 2006). 
Besides, in a situation of conflict, stakeholders might seek to relate with other different actors, 
bringing more new stakeholders into the conflicting scenario (Ferrary, 2009). 
However, when stakeholders relate with other similar groups, these relationships are not always 
positive or satisfactory, and unsuccessful collaboration between stakeholders might happen. 
According to Gray (2004), the success of stakeholder relationships depends on how those 
groups frame and perceive what is happening around them. Therefore, if some stakeholder 
groups have the same perceptions during a conflict, it might be easier for them to engage in 
satisfactory relationships and agree on a joint solution. On the contrary, if stakeholders 
understand the conflict in different ways and their perceptions are contradictory, then, 
collaboration between those stakeholders might fail, as they might consider the other group as 
a threat. However, Gray (2004) also highlighted the possibility of “reframing” (p. 168), which 
means changing the way a stakeholder perceives the conflict to understand other perspectives 
and engage in collaborative partnerships with other actors. More often, reframing requires the 
participation of an external neutral agent as mediator (Gray, 2004). 
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Understanding stakeholder networks and structures and stakeholder relationships is of essential 
for the organization, as in turn, it means anticipating and avoiding conflicts between the 
organization and the set of stakeholders surrounding the firm, and facilitates collaboration and 
support inside the network, creating positive strong relationships (Troshani & Doolin, 2007). 
Recently, stakeholder literature has been related to value creation within the company 
(Myllykangas, Kujala and Lehtimäki; 2010). Organizations need to create value for all their 
existing stakeholders, and the means to value creation is through the establishment of successful 
and effective relationships with those groups, satisfying their needs and interests (Myllykangas 
et al., 2010). However, firstly, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of stakeholder-
stakeholder relationships, analysing how they change and how their salience evolves over time 
(Myllykangas et al., 2010). The authors identified six characteristics of stakeholder-stakeholder 
relationships, which are in turn closely linked to business value creation: history of the 
relationship, objectives of the stakeholder, interaction in the relationship, information sharing 
in the relationship, trust between stakeholders and the potential of a stakeholder to learn. They 
highlighted the need and encouraged further research on relationships between stakeholders 
(Myllykangas et al., 2010, p. 70). 
To sum up, stakeholder management is not related to individual dyadic firm-stakeholder 
relationships that need to be managed by the company anymore. Now, organizations belong to 
complex stakeholder networks, where all actors have relationships of interdependency and co-
responsibility, which may evolve and change over time. Each stakeholder depends on the other 
sets of stakeholders, and the company in not the centre anymore, but only another actor within 
its network that needs to establish and build relationships with its own wide and diverse set of 
stakeholders (Lozano, 2005). Lozano (2005) proposed that organizations cannot be considered 
as “a manager of stakeholder relations, but as a builder of stakeholder relations” (p. 72). 
2.3.2 Stakeholder opposition 
 
Organizations carrying out international projects are likely to be affected by external groups, 
which can use different strategies and tactics to influence and put pressure on the company, in 
order to force the firm to respond to stakeholders’ request (Esley & Lenox, 2006; Hendry, 
2005). Stakeholders may sometimes oppose to international projects, and they might try to 
change managerial decisions and alter and influence organizations’ international plans, 
especially to reduce their negative social and environmental consequences (Hendry, 2005).  As 
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an example of the importance of opponent stakeholders, Winch (2004) classifies stakeholders 
simply as those actors supporting or opposing the project (Aaltonen et al., 2013). Additionally, 
McElroy and Mills (2003) classified stakeholders according to their positions towards a firm 
project, recognizing: active opposition, passive opposition, noncommittal, passive support and 
active support (Aaltonen et al., 2013) 
 
These influence actors have numerous strategies to put pressure on the company: from 
cooperation and alliances with other stakeholders to increase their protest and claim salience 
(Lotila, 2010) to more specific tactics such as protests, brand bashing, letter-writing campaigns, 
lobbying, boycotts, and civil suits (Esley & Lenox, 2006; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). These actions 
are used to incentive organizations to meet stakeholders’ interests, as they can create various 
disadvantages for companies, for instance, operational costs and loss of reputation (Esley & 
Lenox, 2006). So far, not much research has been developed with the objective of understanding 
how stakeholders decide to choose and act through specific tactics and strategies (Hendry, 
2005).  
 
Frooman (1999) focused his studies on stakeholders’ influencing tactics, examining how 
stakeholders can put pressure on organizations and why these groups decide to act through 
some specific tactics (Hendry, 2005). Hendry (2005) reviewed Frooman’s (1999) framework 
based on resource dependence theory, and whose theory supported that stakeholders’ decisions 
on influence strategies depend on the power and interdependency relationships between the 
firm and the stakeholder. Frooman (1999) suggested several strategies: direct / indirect tactics, 
and withholding / usage strategies (p. 191). On the one hand, according to Frooman (1999), 
direct strategies imply that the stakeholder manipulates the resources of the firm, while through 
indirect strategies the stakeholder will utilize an ally to influence the organizational resources 
(Hendry, 2005, p. 80).  On the other hand, he defined withholding tactics as those where the 
key resource is withheld from the firm, and usage tactics as those where the firm is allowed to 
have access to key resources, but only through negotiation processes with the stakeholder or its 
allies (Hendry, 2005, p. 80). However, Hendry (2005) argues that a more complex framework 
is required, as Frooman’s model (1999) is too parsimonious. He points out that in many 
occasions, power and interdependence are not always determinant, as stakeholders might also 
try to influence the firm through collaboration with non–powerful allies due to other different 
reasons, for instance, if those groups are close and partner with the organization. In addition, 
the model does not cover the use of several influence strategies at the same time (Hendry, 2005). 
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Table 2 shows the different influence strategies identified by Hendry (2005), whose study was 
mainly bases on Frooman’s (1999) findings. 
 
Table 2. Typology of influence strategies, (Hendry, 2005, p. 80), adapted from Frooman (1999) 
 
 
Aaltonen et al. (2008) improved Frooman (1999) typology of influence strategies, and they 
identified the following resistance strategies: “direct withholding strategy, indirect withholding 
strategy, coalition building strategy, resource building strategy, conflict escalation strategy, 
creditability building strategy, communication strategy and direct action strategy” (Aaltonen et 
al., 2013, p.4).  
 
Zietsma and Winn (2007) also addressed the topic of stakeholders’ influence strategies, but also 
offering a firm’s perspective by adding possible firm responses to those tactics. They identified 
four strategies of mutual influence between stakeholders and the firm during the escalation of 
a conflict: “issue raising, issue suppressing, positioning and solution seeking” (Zietsma & 
Winn, 2007, p. 2). They also found “three dynamic processes of influence” that both 
stakeholders and firms can use to shift from one influence strategy to another: “building 
influence chains, directing influence flows, and shifting influence chains”, which quite 
frequently requires establishing relationships, alliances or coalitions between groups (Zietsma 
& Winn, 2007, p. 2).   
 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) also paid special attention to activist stakeholders, and they 
focused their research on the drivers of stakeholder actions, explaining when and why these 
groups will pressure the company. They identified two different motivations: interest-based 
motivations and identity-based motivations. On the one hand, regarding interest-related 
motivations, it is necessary to point out that stakeholders are those actors having a stake or 
interest in the company’s activities and plans, as they are affected by the firm behavior, projects, 
and decisions (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Therefore, stakeholders will act in order to 
 Is the stakeholder dependent on the firm? 
Yes-Usage No-Withholding 
 
Is the firm 
dependent on the 
stakeholder? 
Yes–Direct Direct/usage 
(high interdependence) 
Direct/withholding 
(stakeholder power) 
No-Indirect Indirect/usage 
(firm power) 
Indirect/withholding 
(low interdependence) 
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protect their specific interests (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). The stakeholder group’s degree 
of dissatisfaction is related to the likelihood of those actors mobilizing resources to protect its 
interests. This means that interests are a purpose behind a stakeholder’s actions. On the other 
hand, regarding identity-related motivations, it is essential to mention the fact that stakeholder 
groups may act even though their members realize that they are pursuing a lost cause (Rowley 
& Moldoveanu, 2003). This occurs due to collective identity, as it creates individual 
commitment and solidarity when actors value their membership in a specific group. Through 
that group membership, individuals associate themselves with the group’s social identity, and 
with the valuable and unique characteristics that distinguish them from non-members of that 
particular group (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Besides, it is important to remember that as 
stakeholders relate to other stakeholder groups too, they might own diverse interests and 
identities that overlap, as they can belong to multiple stakeholder groups at the same time. 
Furthermore, this diversity of interest and identities also determine which group they might 
choose to ally with or oppose (Ferrary, 2009). In addition, De Bakker and Den Hond (2008) 
also mentioned Rowley and Berman’s (2000) research on stakeholder mobilization. They 
supported that some conditions are necessary to boost stakeholders’ mobilization, such as the 
specific characteristics of the firm, the issues surrounding the firm operations, the industry 
characteristics and the existing stakeholders surrounding the organization’s activities (De 
Bakker & Den Hond, 2008). 
 
Later, Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) stated that secondary stakeholder mobilization and the 
tactic choice depend on the stakeholder ideological position, and not on interest-based 
motivations and identity-based motivations (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Den Hond and De 
Bakker (2007) especially focused their research on activist stakeholders, meaning those 
secondary groups showing opposition, representing a social movement, and demanding 
changes to organizations. They defined ideology as “an interconnected set of beliefs and 
attitudes relating to problematic aspects of social and political topics that are shared and used 
by members of a group, and that inform and justify choice and behavior” (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007, p. 903). This concept becomes more complex and specific due to the 
circumstances and experiences in the stakeholder group history, and it develops over time and 
through interactions with other groups. In addition, De Bakker and Den Hond (2008) also 
highlighted Tilly’s (1978) contribution explaining that stakeholders choose some specific 
tactics based and depending on the strategies that they had learned and utilized in the past.  
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Besides, Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) also classified opposition tactics into logic of 
material damage and logic of numbers (p. 909). This framework will be later utilized in the 
analysis performed in this research, as it provides an interesting classification of opposition 
tactics that might be applied in the resistance shown during Botnia case. Logic of material 
damage means increasing the cost of managerial decisions in the company (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007), so that in the long term, those decisions will not imply benefits anymore. The 
authors provide as an example of this strategy the opposition exerted against nuclear energy 
plants in Germany, where activists chained themselves to the railways, consequently, increasing 
the costs of transport in the material needed. This perspective can be understood not only as 
material damage, but also as symbolic damage (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), mainly 
affecting and harming the firm reputation. For instance, activists can alter companies’ logos in 
order to influence the customers’ perceptions of the organization. Most frequently, symbolic 
damage is followed by material damage to the firm (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). Logic of 
damage can be addressed also in a positive way through the concept of material or symbolic 
gain (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), understood as a method to reward a firm due to its 
decisions, changes or practices that are supported by the surrounding stakeholders when 
considered as beneficial. The most common tactic is through buycotts, situations when 
customers decide to purchase goods in a specific company as a method to reward the firm for 
its good practices.  Logic of numbers means participatory forms of actions (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007), affecting the legitimacy of the decisions made by the firm and decreasing in 
turn the level of support on the firm practices. The more mass participation against the firm, the 
more effective the strategy will be, leading to negative consequences on the firm. For instance, 
the main tactics included in this strategy are marches, petitions and signature collection. 
However, it is necessary to highlight that not all tactics require high participation. In many 
occasions, only collaboration with few key actors, or “elite participation” (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007, p. 911), is enough to perform effective strategies and achieve great influence on 
the firm. Therefore, this strategy requires the involvement of the key stakeholders who have 
enough power to influence the organization. As an example, the authors described the access 
to actors who possess high-quality information on the firm, or the access and use of media or 
court procedures.  
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Table 3. Typology of tactics between secondary stakeholders and the firm (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007, p. 911) 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the typology of tactics available to be utilized by secondary stakeholders 
against the firm, according to Den Hond and De Bakker (2007). They classified the tactics 
based on two different aspects: the final goal of the chosen tactic and its dependence on 
participation (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007). 
 
2.4 Summary of previous literature on stakeholder theory 
 
In conclusion, previous research on stakeholders can be classified as follows: literature reviews, 
firm-oriented articles and stakeholder-oriented articles. Traditionally, first studies presented 
firm-centricity and were based on dyadic stakeholder-firm relationships. Later, research 
evolved towards a stakeholder-orientation with the study of stakeholders and their behavior, 
and towards reviews of previous studies in order to set and summarize existing concepts 
precisely.  However, there are still many issues to clarify and improve, and much more to be 
studied in stakeholder literature. Mainly, researches are too theoretical and they show that there 
is lack and thus great need for empirical research and testing the of existing theory, in order to 
prove the validity and utility of the frameworks and provide managerial application. In addition, 
and as suggested and shown in the recent shift towards a stakeholder-orientation, stakeholder 
literature is in need for further study on the area of stakeholder interactions, opposition, and 
stakeholder-stakeholder relationships (Myllykangas et al., 2010).  
 
Intended outcome of Use of 
Tactics 
Dependence on Participatory 
Forms of Actions is High 
(Mass Participation) 
Dependence on Participatory 
Forms of Actions is Low 
(Elite Participation) 
Material damage Boycott Blocking of gates, sabotage, 
occupation of premises, 
internet activism (hacktivism), 
lawsuits 
Material gain Buycott Cooperation 
 
Symbolic damage Writing letters/emails, petitions, 
marches, rallies 
Shareholder activism, street 
theater, negative publicity, 
research 
Symbolic gain Voluntary action Positive publicity, cooperation 
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Therefore, nowadays, stakeholder theory is stuck in theoretical frameworks and approaches, 
and there is lack of empirical studies on the field. This blockage needs to be overcome, and as 
a solution, four different future approaches for research are suggested: 
 
 Research based on reviewing all the concepts and literature studied so far, in 
order to stop and set existing concepts clear, and examine deeper those 
concepts and frameworks in order to generalize and provide real applications 
for managers. 
 Research based on empirical testing of existing concepts and frameworks, in 
order to prove their validity and provide useful examples for managers.  
 Research based on combining stakeholder theory with other streams of 
literature, in order to evolve towards new different approaches and 
perspectives.  
 Research based on stakeholder behavior and interaction, in order to continue 
the recent trend using a stakeholder-orientation. However, it is important to 
remember the role and influence of the company on stakeholders even in 
stakeholder-oriented studies.  
Figure 3 shows and summarizes the different orientations on stakeholder theory, and the future 
recommended steps to overcome the blockage that this field of study experiences. 
    
Figure 3. Suggested approaches to overcome the blockage in stakeholder theory 
 
This study will provide a significant progress on stakeholder theory as it will follow some of 
these different approaches. Firstly, it will provide empirical testing through the analysis of a 
real case study: Botnia case in Uruguay; and secondly, it will focus on studying stakeholder 
theory under the perspective of stakeholder- orientation. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 Qualitative approach 
 
This research utilizes a qualitative approach to analyze the Botnia case. Qualitative research is 
mostly utilized to analyze and understand culture, society and behavior through the examination 
and synthesis of people’s words and actions (Hogan, Dolan & Donnelly; 2011). According to 
Marshall and Rossman (2006), qualitative research is a “broad approach to the study of social 
phenomena” (Hogan et al., 2011, p.4). It focuses on social and personal interactions, relations, 
links and processes between people (Hogan et al., 2011). Thus, all these characteristics make 
qualitative analysis especially interesting and suitable for this research on the study of 
stakeholder-stakeholder relationships and opposition. 
 
Contrary to quantitative research, the qualitative approach does not deal and work through 
numbers, but analyzes mainly non-quantitative data and words (Saldana, 2011), allowing the 
researcher to focus on qualities and features that a quantitative approach might fail to recognize 
and quantify (Hogan et al., 2011). In addition, qualitative research involves the researchers in 
the research process, as they are in charge of collecting the data, and they have the possibility 
to interpret the data by using previous theoretical frameworks and also by including their own 
reflections on the research actions, influencing the way they depict and understand data (Hogan 
et al., 2011). Besides, and as stated by Flick (1998), as the study is not focused on single 
variables or numbers, the issue under examination can be studied in all its complexity, including 
the possibility of further exploration in the future (Hogan et al., 2011). In conclusion, and due 
to all these above-mentioned reasons, a qualitative approach seems to be more adequate when 
addressing this study on stakeholder-stakeholder relationships.  
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
In a qualitative research, the following data collection means can be utilized: observation, 
interviews, case studies, personal experiences, and documents; the last ones being presented in 
a traditional written way or in technology devices and online media (Hogan et al., 2011). 
According to Merriam (2009), documents can be defined as a “wide range of written, visual, 
digital, and physical material relevant to the study” (p. 139). Media and mass communication 
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are good sources that provide appropriate documents when studying and analyzing society, 
groups and culture (Merriam, 2009). Documents do not only depict social reality, but they also 
contribute to shaping and portraying the practices, behaviors and relations between people 
(Hogan et al., 2011), and therefore, they seem to be a good data source for this research. 
 
In this study, data were collected from media, and it consists of documents and texts from 
newspapers. Observation and interviews were not utilized, as the study addresses a past event 
where multiple and diverse actors were involved, and those data collection methods seemed too 
complex for this case. This material was easily accessible (Merriam, 2009), saving time when 
collecting all the information on the case presented in this study. The data were not created 
specifically for the research and it existed independently and before the moment of conducting 
this study. As a result, these documentary data are more objective, as the researcher can barely 
influence the already existing material, which positively for this study, is a product of the 
context in which they were originated (Merriam, 2009). However, documents present also some 
limitations. As they already exist and were not created for study purposes, some important 
information relevant to the study might be missing. In addition, as data consist of newspaper 
articles, it might be difficult to determine their accuracy and they might contain biased 
information provided by the writer that unintentionally might affect the study (Merriam, 2009). 
 
The documentary data utilized in this research consists of articles and news from the 
Argentinean newspaper “El Clarín”, collected from the year 2005 to 2009 and related to this 
Botnia case. However, the initial sample was too wide, consisting in 509 articles, and it was 
reduced to a sample of 96 articles, containing the most relevant articles identified every month 
from January 2005 until December 2009.  
 
3.2.1 Data reduction 
 
A final sample containing the most relevant articles for this research was obtained after going 
through a data reduction process. A list presenting all the articles included in the final sample 
can be found in the Appendix 1 of this study.  
 
The selection of the most relevant articles was made as follows: the most relevant articles of 
every month are those where the key stakeholders (Botnia, Uruguay, Fray Bentos, Argentina 
and Gualeguaychú) appear more frequently. It might not seem erroneous to believe that those 
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articles where all the key stakeholders appear more often are going to explain better and in more 
detail their behaviors; especially, how they relate with each other.     
 
The selection of the key stakeholders was made after reading and analyzing previous studies 
regarding this international conflict surrounding Botnia project, by choosing the most 
frequently mentioned stakeholders. Besides, the choice was mainly based and supported by two 
academic articles analyzing Botnia case: “Managing Stakeholder Dialogue: The Case of Botnia 
in Uruguay” (Heikkinen et al., 2013) and “Global Dispute on Sustainable Business: Analyzing 
MNE-Stakeholder Relationships in Local Media Text” (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). In the first 
article, following stakeholders are identified: Botnia, Uruguayan Government, Argentinean 
Government and the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG) 
as the main opponent organization. In the second article, key stakeholders are identified 
according to their salience and involvement in the case (supporters, opponents and neutral 
stakeholders). The stakeholders with highest levels of salience (definitive and expectant) and 
supporting and opposing positions were chosen, as they can be considered as the most important 
stakeholders showing or facing and resisting opposition. Therefore, Fray Bentos was also 
included as a key stakeholder for this research.  
 
This selection of the key stakeholders might be considered as a risk, as some important actors 
might have been ignored or not included. However, this obstacle was solved through an 
exhaustive study and thorough analysis of all the previous studies performed around Botnia so 
as to develop a profound and complete understanding on the case. Similar to this research, 
previous studies on Botnia case have also been done by examining in detail the conflict around 
these selected stakeholders, as they were also chosen as key actors previously. Therefore, it 
does not seem erroneous to consider them as key stakeholders for this case too, and 
consequently, proceed to a data reduction based on the frequency of appearance of those actors.  
 
Therefore, every article was carefully analyzed in order to count how many times each of those 
key stakeholders was mentioned. The appearance of every stakeholder was recorded and listed 
in all the articles, and in every month, during the period being analyzed: January 
2005―December 2009. The appendix 2 of this research shows the tables where the appearance 
of every stakeholder was counted and recorded every month. The articles where all these key 
stakeholders appear more frequently in every month were chosen and considered relevant, and 
thus, included in the final sample. The selection of the most important articles was done 
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according to the following rule: in months containing less than three articles, only one key 
article was chosen. In months containing between 4–20 articles, the two articles repeating more 
frequently the key stakeholders were chosen. In months presenting between 21–30 articles, 
three key articles were chosen; and finally, in months consisting of more than 31 articles, the 
four most important articles were chosen. Table 4 summarizes the rule applied in the process 
of data reduction. 
 
Table 4. Rule followed in data reduction 
 
Additionally, in cases where several articles seemed to be relevant at the same time, as they 
were presenting the same high amount of key stakeholders, the articles where all the main 
stakeholders appeared were chosen, ignoring the equals where some stakeholders were absent. 
If this rule did not apply, as all the key stakeholders were included in all the articles, the decision 
was made after a lecture of the conflicting texts and according to their content, choosing the 
article which seems to be more focused on opposition and stakeholder relationships in the 
information provided, and thus, more useful for this research. 
 
Table 5 shows how many relevant articles were chosen in every year. As a result, the final 
sample consists of 96 articles collected between 2005 and 2009.  
 
                     Table 5. Comparison between the original sample and final sample 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF 
ARTICLES IN THE 
ORIGINAL SAMPLE 
NUMBER OF 
ARTICLES CHOSEN 
IN FINAL SAMPLE 
2005 35 11 
2006 156 23 
2007 170 26 
2008 80 18 
2009 68 18 
TOTAL 509 96 
  
  
NUMBER OF ARTICLES PER MONTH  NUMBER OF ARTICLES CHOSEN 
Less than 3 articles 1 key article chosen 
4-20 articles 2 key articles chosen 
21 – 30 articles 3 key articles chosen 
More than 31 articles 4 key articles chosen 
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As observed in table 5, the years 2006 and 2007 include more relevant articles in comparison 
with the other years being studied, as they were key important years during the conflict. It is 
important to highlight the absent of articles during the first months in 2005, which shows that 
the conflict started to capture the Argentinean media attention during April 2005. In addition, 
it seems also interesting to point out the fact that months such as June, July and August usually 
include no articles about the conflict, or a less amount of collected articles compared with other 
months. The Appendix 3 of this research presents a summary of the articles chosen in the final 
sample and the appearance of every key stakeholder in those articles. 
 
3.2.2 The role of media 
 
As previously mentioned, data for this research were collected from media texts available in 
the Argentinean newspaper “El Clarín”. Media is a powerful communication means, accessible 
and available for everybody, and with an important influence on the audience (Kujala et al., 
2009). It might be considered as a connection and a bridge between the public and companies, 
as media provides and offers information about organizations and their behaviors and actions 
(Kujala et al., 2009). However, and as supported by Crane and Livesey (2003) media articles 
are developed and written by humans, who have the power to decide which topics are worth to 
be presented or not (Kujala et al., 2009). In addition, media also decides how the issues will be 
presented, and it might happen that some important information can be ignored, lost, or 
presented under the writer’s perspective (Kujala et al., 2009). Even though media is supposed 
to be an impartial means of communication, it is developed by humans, and there is always a 
risk that they might have inherent biases (Hogan et al., 2011) as they can be interested only in 
certain perspectives and points of view (LeCompte, 2000). Li (2009) stated that frequently 
newspapers articles present a national bias, thus, positioning their opinions to support the 
country (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).  
 
To sum up, even though media offers and reproduce reality and describe different situations 
and contexts, providing wide coverage, it also presents some disadvantages.  As media articles 
are written by humans, they might contain biased information and omit other important content, 
depending on the decisions of the writer, who can also alter the information offered to move 
the audience’s opinions. In this research, data from “El Clarín” may not be exactly objective, 
as the content might support the Argentinean side during the conflict, and some information 
negatively affecting the reputation of the country might have been omitted, affecting as a 
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consequence the impartiality of the results. Therefore, in order to overcome this difficulty, 
further studies on this topic are suggested through the analysis of data from other newspapers 
in different countries, especially on the Finnish and Uruguayan sides. Besides, it might be 
interesting to complete this study using additional and different sources of data, for instance, 
through interviews with some of the actors involved in the conflict.  
 
3.3  Analysis process 
 
3.3.1 Qualitative content analysis 
 
Different approaches can be identified on how to develop qualitative research, for instance, case 
study research, phenomenological research, ethnographic research, grounded theory research, 
narrative research, content analysis research and discourse theoretical research (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2015; Bengtsson, 2016; Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013; Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). In this research, and given the documentary data available, the qualitative research will 
be conducted through qualitative content analysis, which seems to be the most appropriate 
option when analyzing existing available texts (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  
 
As defined by Krippendorff (2004), qualitative content analysis is a “research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts to their context” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 9), or 
more specifically, as explained by Downe-Wambolt (1992), “from verbal, visual, or written 
data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 9). The main 
objective is to reduce the amount of material in a way that key contents and concepts remain 
(Iffland, Berner, Dekker & Briken, 2015; Stemler, 2001; Elo, Käänäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, 
Utriainen & Kyngäas, 2014). This allows the researcher to better analyze and go through the 
data, in order to describe and provide understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Elo et 
al., 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
 
Three different approaches of qualitative content analysis have been identified: conventional, 
directed and summative (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This study will be conducted under a 
conventional content analysis, approaching an inductive perspective instead of deduction or 
abduction during a first order analysis of the available data (Gioia, Carley & Hamilton, 2012). 
This means that the research process will not be started from theoretical propositions, and the 
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theoretical results will be obtained after analyzing and going through the empirical material 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015), starting with the specific or particular and moving to the 
general (Elo et al., 2008; Saldana, 2011).  
 
However, in order to ensure rigor in the inductive data examination, additionally, a second order 
analysis will be performed too (Gioia et al., 2012). It will follow a deductive approach, and a 
theoretical framework will be applied to the available empirical material of this study. Through 
the utilization of a first and a second order analysis, data would be more carefully scrutinized. 
In addition, it facilitates the creation of a data structure, where data results can be visually 
represented more easily (Gioia et al., 2012). Gioia et al. (2012) defined and described this data 
structure as “the anatomy of the coming theory” (p. 24). This means that data structure, 
consequently, allows and enhances a data examination and a presentation of the results more 
theoretically oriented (Gioia et al., 2012).    
 
Even though qualitative content analysis seems to be the adequate analysis method for this 
research, it is important to point out that it might present some limitations. Firstly, as the 
analysis depends mainly on the researcher in charge of the study and the researcher’s 
perceptions and understanding, the results might be unintentionally biased. Secondly, the 
analysis must focus only on the written available data. As a consequence, if some important 
relevant information is not mentioned in the material, then it cannot be included and analyzed 
(Brewerton & Millward, 2001).   
   
3.3.2 Data analysis 
 
The data will be analyzed through a qualitative content analysis, therefore, following some 
specific steps and characteristics common to this qualitative method. Content analysis attempts 
to decrease the amount of data, going through the available texts and words and reducing them 
into specific categories based on codes (Stemler, 2001). Krippendorff (1989) identified six main 
steps in this process: design, unitizing, sampling, coding, drawing inferences, and validation. 
Firstly, it is necessary to get familiar with the context of the research and especially the data, 
so some units of analysis can be identified inside the available data. Those units can be 
classified into specific codes that can be easily interpreted and related to the object of study, 
finding patterns and categorizing data. As a result, the phenomena can be described and 
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understood, and some new knowledge and results are produced. As last step, the study needs to 
be validated in order to prove its trustworthiness (Bengtsson, 2016; Vaismoradi et al., 2013).  
 
Hence, qualitative content analysis consists mainly on coding and categorizing data. Saldana 
(2011) defines codes as words or small phrases labeling units of analysis that capture the 
essence and relevant information of those specific pieces of data and allow later re-organization 
into categories for further analysis. Stemler (2001) presents Weber’s (1990) definition of 
category as “a group of words with similar meaning or connotations” (p. 3), and argues that 
categories must be “mutually exclusive and exhaustive” (p. 3). It is important to always take 
into account that coding and categorizing processes must be developed in accordance with the 
research objective and phenomena being studied (Merriam, 2009; Bengtsson, 2016); and it 
would be advisable to keep memos with thoughts and notes emerged during the analysis process 
(Merriam, 2009).  
 
Data analysis will start with a first order analysis, which follows an inductive approach. 
Emergent open coding will be utilized, and codes will be determined after previous examination 
of the data and not before (Stemler, 2001). Next, these codes will be classified into categories 
according to how they are connected, developing meaningful groups that need to be defined 
and, subsequently, examined in order to better understand their relationships and describe the 
phenomena studied and generate knowledge (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo et al, 2008).  
 
More concretely, the first order analysis will start with an initial reading of the documentary 
available data, in order to familiarize with the context (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) and develop a 
case study overview as presented in the articles of the newspaper. Next, all the stakeholders 
involved in the case study will be identified from data, together with and their positions and 
interests. These stakeholders will be classified as opponent, supporter or neutral actors during 
the dispute.  
 
After listing all the stakeholders involved in Botnia case, the next step will be identifying the 
proper key stakeholders for this research, in order to answer the research objective through data 
analysis: examine stakeholder relationships and opposition. On the one hand, during the 
selection of the final sample, the key stakeholders were chosen based on those actors considered 
essential in the conflict in other previous studies on Botnia case. However, as the study will 
examine both stakeholder relationships and opposition, it might seem coherent to think that data 
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analysis should focus specifically on those stakeholders that: a) showed opposition during the 
escalation of the conflict through different strategies and tactics; b) faced opposition during the 
conflict; and c) related frequently to other actors through positive (supporting) or negative 
(opposing) relationships. Therefore, it is necessary to identify particularly those stakeholders 
relating with other actors, and that used or faced opposition during the conflict, as they might 
differ to those actors categorized as key stakeholders in order to narrow the data. The 
identification of these stakeholders can be addressed through a table. Table 6 shows stakeholder 
relationships and opposition during Botnia conflict. The table is based on the data available in 
the final sample, consisting of 96 articles, and it was created after a second reading of the final 
data. The table identifies opposing (appearing in the table as “Opp”), neutral (defined as not 
taking sides and appearing in the table as “N”) and supporting relationships among all the 
stakeholders of Botnia case (appearing in the table as Supp). The relationships among actors 
that could not be found in data will be referred to as not available (N/A). 
 
Table 6. Stakeholder relationships and opposition during Botnia conflict. 
  
A -> B  
B -> A 
A Bot 
nia 
Urug Fray  
Bentos 
Arg CEAG Finla
nd 
ENCE 
 
King  
Spain 
World  
Bank 
Hague 
ICJ 
Merco 
sur 
EU 
B  Supp 
N 
Op+ Su 
N 
Opp 
N 
Opp 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
Supp 
N/A Botnia 
Urug. N 
Supp 
 Op+ Su 
Supp 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
N 
N 
N 
Supp 
 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Fray 
Bentos 
N 
Op+Su 
Supp 
Op+Su 
 Opp 
Opp 
Su+Op 
Su+Op 
N 
N 
N 
Op+ Su 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Arg N 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
 Su+Op 
Su+Op 
N 
N 
N 
Opp 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
CEAG N 
Opp 
Opp 
Opp 
Oppo 
Opp 
Su+Op 
Su+Op 
 N 
N 
N 
Opp 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
Finland N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
 N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
ENCE 
 
N 
N 
Supp 
N 
Op+Su 
Neutral 
Opp 
N 
Opp 
N 
N 
N 
 N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
King 
Spain 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
World  
Bank 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Hague 
ICJ 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A  
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Merco 
sur 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 N/A 
N/A 
EU N/A 
Supp 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
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Therefore, the study will focus only on the key stakeholders who frequently showed or faced 
opposition, and those who frequently related together during the bilateral conflict. These main 
actors are Botnia, the Uruguayan government, local people from Fray Bentos, the Argentinean 
government, and the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú 
(CEAG). Therefore, the following sections focused on analyzing stakeholder relationships and 
opposition will be based on those specific stakeholders. Even though the stakeholder ENCE 
also suffered some opposition during the conflict, it will not be considered as key stakeholder 
for this study, as the main objective is to analyze only the conflict around Botnia. In the case of 
the European Union, it will not be included as key stakeholder in the research as it only showed 
little support towards Botnia, but did not show further opposition or related to any of the other 
actors involved in the conflict.  
 
Furthermore, this chart also demonstrates that the first stakeholder election utilized to reduce 
and narrow data was appropriate for this study, as the stakeholders who were categorized as 
important in previous studies are the same as those actors actively participating in the conflict 
by relating, showing and facing opposition. Thus, the stakeholders selected to reduce the initial 
data are the same as the stakeholders chosen to be analyzed in the following sections of this 
study.  
 
Additionally, the next step during the first order inductive analysis will be identifying the 
existing relationships between the key stakeholders and firm, and among all the key stakeholder 
groups too. The relationships will be categorized into neutral, supporting and opposing 
relationships; and they will be further examined and discussed.  
 
A second order analysis will be performed to study stakeholder opposition, following a 
deductive approach. Thus, a previous theoretical framework will be applied to the data. This 
framework was created by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) and consists of a classification of 
opposition tactics utilized by secondary stakeholders with the objective of showing influence 
and resistance against the firm, categorized into “logic of numbers” and “logic of gain/damage”, 
both “symbolic” or “material”. The objective of this second order analysis is to approach the 
data under a more theoretical perspective. 
 
The main goal of the second order deductive analysis will be examining stakeholder opposition. 
Thus, this analysis will start by describing which tactics were utilized by stakeholders in order 
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to show opposition during the conflict. Next, the analysis will compare how these tactics might 
differ when stakeholders use them in different situations: first, showing resistance against the 
firm and the project; and second, showing resistance against other stakeholder groups. 
Simultaneously, Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) study on stakeholder opposition tactics will 
be applied while analyzing the data, in order to further study opposition under theoretical lenses 
through the application of a previous existing theoretical framework. Finally, differences 
between the tactic choices of every stakeholder will be examined. 
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Data analysis process 
 
To summarize how data analysis will be approached, figure 4 shows the data analysis process, 
including both the first and second order analysis. 
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4.  STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS AND OPPOSITION IN 
BOTNIA CASE 
 
4.1  Main events of the case (2005―2009) 
 
4.1.1 Year 2005: The pulp mill establishment 
 
After years of negotiations addressed to obtain the authorization from the Uruguayan 
government, the Spanish company ENCE and the Finnish company Botnia decided to locate 
their pulp mills in the city of Fray Bentos, located close to the Uruguay River, which is the 
border between Argentina and Uruguay. As a result, the projects soon needed to face protests 
and demonstrations from environmental organizations and activists in the neighbor country 
Argentina, and also from some local organizations in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos at the 
beginning of the project. Therefore, even though the companies promised several benefits to 
Uruguay, such as an improvement in the economy and the creation of new jobs, the projects 
were still seen as a huge environmental risk by some actors.  
 
Mainly, the demonstrators denounced the following possible negative impacts: water pollution 
in the Uruguay River, acid rain, and health problems due to bad smell. Consequently, 
Uruguayan local people and organizations from Fray Bentos, together with other Argentinean 
local people and Argentinean organizations, decided to start to protest and demonstrate against 
the construction of the pulp mills. They decided to block the San Martín Bridge that connects 
Uruguay-Fray Bentos and Argentina-Gualeguaychú, as a strategy for opposing against the pulp 
mill projects that will consequently “murder” the Uruguay River. This protest was mainly 
organized by the environmental group CEAG “Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly 
of Gualeguaychú” in Gualeguaychú, the area mainly affected by the new projects, together with 
the Argentinean region of Entre Ríos. The CEAG also denunciated that during the negotiations 
for these construction projects, the Uruguayan government did no respect the Uruguay River 
Agreement on the joint use and protection of the water, signed in 1975 by Uruguay and 
Argentina. The Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú stated that, 
according to the Agreement, any projects that might imply negative consequences in the river 
water and environment should be discussed and approved by both countries: Argentina and 
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Uruguay. Therefore, as Argentina had not been consulted, the country considered those projects 
as illegal, and demanded the relocation of the pulp mills to the Uruguayan government. The 
government of Uruguay firmly refused to modify the projects and supported both companies, 
Botnia and ENCE, as they fulfilled all the legal requirements needed to ensure the safety of the 
river and its environment in both regions. In addition, the Uruguayan chancellor reminded the 
fact that in Argentinean territory there were already four pulp mills operating. 
 
In July, and due to the Argentinean request, the World Bank announced that the companies 
would not receive the funding needed for the continuation of their projects until the elaboration 
of a Cumulative Impact Study (CIS) by the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation 
(IFC). This loan cancellation, thus, paralyzed both projects, which were already under 
construction but suddenly without access to financing.  
 
Consequently, Uruguay decided to cancel its participation in the joint committee created 
together with Argentina with the intention of studying the environmental impact of the activity 
of the projects on the river water and its environment. As a result, the bilateral relations between 
both countries were within the limit. In addition, this conflict became a “national issue” in 
Argentina, as stated by the President Kirchner and high representatives of the government. The 
Argentinean government decided to join forces and collaborate with local people in order to 
take appropriate actions against the companies and demand suspension of the construction 
projects until the Cumulative Impact Study could be finished and released.  
  
The World Bank and its subsidiary the International Financial Corporation decided to visit 
Argentina, its affected region of Entre Ríos, and the companies involved in the conflict, in order 
to evaluate the environmental impact of those projects. Meanwhile, the Argentinean Citizens 
Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú prepared a massive protest in Gualeguaychú with 
high levels of participation. In addition, in October, the Finnish Company Stora Enso 
announced its intention to locate another pulp mill in Uruguay, also close to the Uruguay River. 
Uruguay soon showed its optimism towards the project, as Finland was considered as one of 
the most environmentally friendly countries in Uruguay, and the project will bring new jobs 
and benefits to the economy of the country.  
  
While the World Bank and the IFC representatives were investigating the projects and their 
environmental impacts in Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos, the Uruguayan President Tabaré 
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Vázquez decided to join and coordinate actions with Botnia to face jointly all the upcoming 
demands from Argentina. Additionally, Entre Ríos government decided to organize new 
demonstrations and start legal actions involving The Hague ICJ. Besides, the bilateral relations 
between both countries deteriorated, as in Argentina, the Argentina Custom House paralyzed 
key exports to Fray Bentos which were essential to continue with the pulp mill construction.  
 
Later this year, the IFC announced that the Cumulative Impact Study (CIS) results would be 
published in December, and both countries defended their positions: Argentina wanted the 
construction projects to be paused until the CIS results were published, and Uruguay supported 
that the construction projects should continue. However, the Argentinean government, as a way 
to ease up the bilateral conflict, stated that its position might change and instead of denying the 
pulp mills, they might accept them with the condition of a firm’s assurance that the Uruguay 
River will suffer no harm. In Gualeguaychú, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly 
of Gualeguaychú started partial and total roadblocks as a tactic to protest in the main border 
bridges connecting the Argentinean cities of Gualeguaychú and Colon with Uruguay. Uruguay 
showed immediately its opposition against this method, as the roadblocks might damage the 
tourism and economic sector of the country. According to the Uruguayan government, they 
represented a violation of the Mercosur Agreement that allows and ensures free circulation and 
movement in Mercosur countries. 
 
Table 7 presents all the key events happened during Botnia case in 2005, based on the analysis 
of the final sample. 
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Table 7. Key events during Botnia case, year 2005 
 
 
4.1.2 Year 2006: The beginning of the conflict 
 
In Argentina, the CEAG intensified the roadblocks in the Argentinean cities of Gualeguaychú, 
Colón and Concordia during summer days, which were considered important for tourism. The 
objective was to prevent circulation between both countries as a tourism boycott against 
Uruguay. Meanwhile, Greenpeace Argentina also supported that the pulp mills might have 
negative impact on the surrounding environment. On the contrary, Uruguay firmly supported 
the companies, claiming that the projects will be carried out under the most responsible 
measures and methods to prevent negative environmental impact.  
 
In addition, the Argentinean and the Uruguayan chancellors discussed their positions in a 
meeting. Uruguay showed its commitment and support towards the projects and its concerns 
about the roadblocks, stating that the Argentinean government should start actions to stop the 
activists and prevent more possible roadblocks; and Argentina wanted the projects to stop until 
no negative environmental impact could be demonstrated. In Uruguay, the government decided 
to create a committee involving all the existing political parties in the country with the objective 
QUARTER MONTH KEY EVENTS 
 
2005  
1Q 
Jan. No articles available 
Feb. No articles available 
March No articles available 
 
2005  
2Q 
April - Argentinean local people and organizations, together with some local people from Fray 
Bentos, protest against the “murder” of the Uruguay River by ENCE and Botnia. 
May - CEAG reports a breach in the Uruguay River Agreement and negligence of the Uruguayan 
government. 
June No articles available 
 
 
 
 
 
2005  
3Q 
July - Due to the Argentinean request, the World Bank cancels loans to the projects until a CIS is 
performed by the IFC. 
- As consequence, Uruguay refuses to participate in a joint committee with Argentina to study 
the impact of the projects. 
Aug. - The conflict becomes a “national issue” for the Argentinean government, who decides to join 
efforts with local people and try to cancel the projects until the CIS is finished. 
Sept. - The World Bank and IFC will visit the Argentinean region affected by the pulp mill projects 
and the companies involved.  
- In Gualeguaychú, the CEAG prepares a massive protest. 
 
 
 
 
 
2005  
4Q 
Oct. - Stora Enso might plan to locate a new pulp mill in Uruguay. 
- President Tabaré will collaborate with Botnia to face all demands, and Entre Ríos prepares 
protests and legal actions in The Hague ICJ. 
Nov. - Argentina Custom House paralyzes exports heading to Uruguay, which were needed to 
continue the construction projects. 
Dec. - The Argentinean government states that the pulp mills will be accepted only if no 
environmental negative impact is ensured. 
- Roadblocks in bridges connecting Uruguay and Argentina begin, considered as a violation 
of the Mercosur Agreement by Uruguay. 
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of coordinating and joining forces in order to solve the bilateral conflict with the neighbor 
country Argentina. 
 
The roadblocks continued in Gualeguaychú during important summer days, and consequently, 
the bilateral relations between Argentina and Uruguay fully deteriorated, so all the efforts made 
by the Argentinean and the Uruguayan governments to ease up the conflict were in vain. From 
Argentina, only trucks with a court order were allowed to cross the border bridges to Uruguay. 
Uruguay claimed that, as a result, tourism had decreased around 50% in the country and the 
economy was really suffering the consequences of the roadblocks and the demonstrations. 
However, the construction of Botnia pulp mill continued without any complications, and in 
Fray Bentos, the project was definitely accepted and supported due to the new available jobs 
created by the firm. As the bilateral relations deteriorated, the conflict continued: on the one 
side, Argentina decided to appeal to The Hague ICJ; and on the other side, Uruguay complained 
in the Organization of American States (OAS) about the roadblocks. 
 
As a method to ease up the bilateral conflict, Botnia declared that the firm might be willing to 
negotiate with Uruguay and stop the construction for a short period. Therefore, the presidents 
of both countries, after a meeting, agreed on the suspension of the construction project and the 
roadblocks during 90 days in order to negotiate and solve the conflict during the break period. 
However, Uruguay stated that the country might still ask for a compensation regarding the 
roadblocks and their negative economic consequences to the country. As a result, Botnia 
definitely agreed on the suspension of the construction projects for a maximum of 90 days in 
order to encourage dialogue between both countries, and the governments agreed on the 
creation of a bilateral joint committee to cooperate and closely study the environmental impact 
of the projects in the surrounding environment. However, Botnia suddenly decided not to stop 
the construction project for 90 days, and as a result, Uruguay decided to cancel the negotiation 
processes with Argentina. Consequently, and according to Argentina, the only approach to 
solve the bilateral conflict between the countries seemed to be in The Hague ICJ. The 
Argentinean government also denounced that the firm had not presented sufficient information 
about the specific operations of the pulp mill and their possible impact on the environment. 
Contrary to the Argentinean perspective in the bilateral conflict, The European Union expressed 
its support towards Botnia, which was considered an innocent victim in the conflict, criticizing 
at the same time the Argentinean opposition and showing trust in the Finnish company due to 
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its past positive records. The European Union also highlighted that this bilateral conflict might 
prevent other foreign countries from investing in Uruguay or Argentina in the future. 
 
Argentina definitely appealed in The Hague ICJ, demanding suspension in the construction of 
both pulp mills until The Hague ICJ’s final resolution; a resolution that might take years. The 
country denounced that Uruguay had not respected the Uruguay River Agreement, that the 
information provided by the firms was no sufficient, and that the pulp mills might have negative 
fatal consequences in the river environment. The country denounced that Uruguay had 
authorized both projects without consulting Argentina as agreed in the Uruguay River 
Agreement, and that the government had even authorized the construction of a harbor 
specifically oriented to Botnia use in a unilateral decision. At the same time, Botnia made its 
position clear: the bilateral conflict was between Argentina and Uruguay so the company was 
not willing to intervene, and the construction of the pulp mill would not be paused due to the 
difficulties of a suspension, as a great amount of stakeholders were involved. However, the 
company also declared its willingness to provide more information about its operations and 
impacts if needed, even though, according to Botnia, the best way to show that the pulp mill 
was not going to affect negatively the environment was demonstrating in situ the safety of the 
pulp mill once the company started its operations. 
 
During the trial, on the one hand, Argentina tried to convince The Hague ICJ that both Botnia 
and ENCE projects might harm the environment, and they were considered an assault to the 
Human Right of living in healthy conditions. Therefore, the country demanded a suspension in 
the construction projects until The Hague ICJ’s final resolution. On the other hand, Uruguay 
defended against those accusations saying that both projects were carried out following 
environmentally friendly standards and without negative impact on the environment, and 
consequently, there were no reasons to stop the projects and the construction would not be 
paused. At this moment, the bilateral relations between Argentina and Uruguay were totally 
broken. 
 
With nonexistent relationships between Argentina and Uruguay, Argentina stated that as a way 
to re-open dialogue between the countries, they might accept suspension in the construction 
projects for only 30 days together with more complete and accurate information about the firms’ 
operations. Uruguay claimed for a compensation for the losses the country suffered due to the 
Argentinean roadblocks, and Argentina had to face a plaint presented by Uruguay in Mercosur 
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due to the roadblocks and their negative economic consequences. Uruguay accused Argentina 
of passivity, as the Argentinean government did not act accordingly to prevent and solve the 
roadblocks. Finally, The Hague ICJ stated that there was no need for suspending the 
construction projects, as there were no negative consequences in the environment. 
 
The Spanish company ENCE finally announced that its pulp mill would be relocated in a 
different place in Uruguay instead of Fray Bentos, therefore, easing up the conflicting situation 
between Argentina and Uruguay. However, the company stated that the decision was not related 
to the existing bilateral conflict between the countries, and the relocation was determined as 
two large firms presenting those great dimensions together might not be viable. Both 
Argentinean and Uruguayan governments supported this decision, and Uruguay immediately 
decided to help the firm in all the procedures and formalities for the relocation of the pulp mill. 
Because of this decision, Argentina, and especially the CEAG, declared that the pressure 
exerted on ENCE had been effective and thus, more pressure might be exerted to force Botnia 
to relocate its pulp mill too. The CEAG also threatened with new roadblocks in the border 
bridges, as a symbol to protest against the passivity of the Argentinean government, the World 
Bank, Botnia and the Uruguayan government. In addition, they also threatened with river-
blocks, to protest against the harbor built to support Botnia operations in Fray Bentos, with the 
objective of paralyzing all the shipments from Argentina to the firm.  
 
Finally, The World Bank accepted to give funding to Botnia for its project, as the final 
Cumulative Impact Study definitely showed that the pulp mill would not affect negatively on 
Gualeguaychú and would bring positive benefits for the economy in Uruguay. In Argentina, 
they feared that this decision might also influence The Hague ICJ’s final resolution. Therefore, 
the Argentinean government tried to delay the loan sending a letter to the World Bank and 
suggested that The Spanish King Juan Carlos and his representative could act as mediators to 
solve the bilateral conflict between both countries. During the mediation process leaded by The 
Spanish King, Uruguay continued blaming the Argentinean government in The Hague ICJ for 
its passivity regarding the roadblocks and demanded some solutions to the problem. In addition, 
the Uruguayan government decided to remove all the soldiers controlling Botnia facilities, as it 
might harm the firm reputation, and it might also work as a symbol to ease up the bilateral 
conflict, hoping that the Argentinean government might fight against the roadblocks too. 
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Table 8 shows all the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2006, based on the 
information collected in the final sample. 
 
Table 8. Key events during Botnia case, year 2006 
 
 
 
QUARTER MONTH KEY EVENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006  
1Q 
Jan. - Roadblocks organized by CEAG continue, supported by Greenpeace Argentina, while 
Uruguay supports the projects.  
- Uruguay shows its concerns about the roadblocks, requesting Argentina to stop them and 
create a committee to solve conflict. 
Feb. - Roadblocks continue, and only trucks with court order will be allowed to cross the bridges, 
reducing tourism in Uruguay in 50%. 
- Fray Bentos supports the construction of the pulp mills due to the creation of new jobs. Thus, 
Argentina plans to appeal to The Hague ICJ while Uruguay criticizes the roadblocks in key 
bridges. 
March - Both countries agree on stopping the projects and roadblocks for 90 days to negotiate a 
solution to the bilateral conflict 
- Botnia will stop the construction during max. 90 days. Both countries agree on a bilateral 
committee to study the impact of the projects and ensure use of environmentally friendly 
measures. 
 
 
2006  
2Q 
April - Botnia will not stop the project, so Uruguay stops negotiations.  Argentina appeals to The 
Hague ICJ as a way to solve the conflict. 
- Botnia recognizes that Finnish government is part of the project. 
- EU supports Botnia due to the company positive past records and its environmentally friendly 
methods and measures. 
May - Argentina appeals in The Hague ICJ: Uruguay did not respect the Uruguay River Agreement 
and there is lack of information on the environmental impact of the projects. 
- Botnia will stay neutral in the conflict, but will provide more information if needed to Argentina 
to show no negative impact. 
June - Argentina requests in The Hague ICJ a stop in the projects; Uruguay refuses. Both countries 
show no willingness to find solution.   
 
 
 
 
 
2006  
 3Q 
July - Argentina will accept as successful resolution a 30-day stop on the construction projects and 
more information about their impact.   
- Argentina faces a plaint in Mercosur from Uruguay due to the roadblocks, as the government 
did not mobilize to prevent them.  
Aug. No articles available. 
Sept. - ENCE will be relocated in Uruguay. The countries support the decision. 
- Argentina states that its pressure in ENCE was effective and will increase the pressure in 
Botnia project. 
2006  
 4Q 
Oct. - CEAG threatens with river-blocks due to passivity in governments, firms and the World Bank. 
They complain that the harbor was built for Botnia’s use under a unilateral decision by Uruguay. 
- The World Bank approves the loan to Botnia. Argentina fears this decision will influence The 
Hague ICJ’s final resolution. 
Nov. - Argentina tries to delay the loan from the World Bank to Botnia. The King of Spain acts as a 
mediator in the bilateral conflict. 
- Argentinean president Kirchner sends letter to World Bank, but the loan will be approved as 
the CIS shows no impact in Gualeguaychú. 
Dec. - Uruguay appeals in The Hague the passivity of Argentinean government during the 
roadblocks. Argentina fears the resolution, as The Hague denied in July the stop of the 
construction projects. 
- Uruguay removes the soldiers around Botnia, as the firm said it damages its reputation, as a 
symbol to solve the conflict.  
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4.1.3 Year 2007: The bilateral conflict 
 
During the mediation process leaded by The Spanish King, one suggestion was proposed as a 
solution to the conflict: a forestry theme park built in the middle of the river, between 
Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos, including a great variety of different trees. This theme park 
would hide the sight of Botnia pulp mill, and especially its chimney, from Gualeguaychú and 
its local people. Besides, the theme park would act as protection from pollution in the 
environment. In addition, at the beginning of the year, The Hague ICJ rejected to intervene after 
the Uruguayan request to start actions and stop the roadblocks in Argentina. 
 
Botnia definitely announced that the pulp mill would not be relocated as there were no threats 
or signs of pollution in the environment. This decision brought several consequences on the 
positions of each country. On the one hand, Argentina considered the firm as inflexible and 
uncompromising. On the other hand, Uruguay and some sectors of the Argentinean government 
considered the CEAG as obstinate and intransigent as the firm, as roadblocks continued in spite 
of the Uruguayan request: negotiations and dialogue between the countries might continue only 
if the roadblocks were stopped. In addition, Botnia announced that the Finnish government, as 
the firm, would stay neutral and not participate or intervene in the negotiations. In 
Gualeguaychú, all businesspersons also showed their opposition against the roadblocks 
organized by the CEAG, as it was firmly thought that the most effective solution to the conflict 
should be through a meeting between both presidents and through diplomacy. However, they 
also showed their opposition towards Botnia, as they believed that there might be sulfur 
pollution in the long term, and estate business and food companies might suffer negative 
consequences and abandon the city due to soil pollution. 
 
The Argentinean president visited Fray Bentos with the intention of easing up the conflict, but 
Uruguay also made its position in the bilateral conflict clear: the country would not be willing 
to negotiate if the roadblocks continued, and they only offered as a possible solution a 
committee for the joint monitoring on the environment to control the pulp mill effects. El Clarín 
Newspaper also visited Botnia facilities, where the pulp mill would soon start to operate. Botnia 
managers declared that the firm was willing to provide all the information required to show that 
the pulp mill operations followed environmentally friendly standards and they protected the 
environment using high quality technologies. The firm ensured that the water returning to the 
Uruguay River was not polluted, and highlighted all the benefits of the project in Uruguay, such 
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as more jobs and better life quality in Fray Bentos, and an improvement in the Uruguayan 
economy.  
 
In addition, the Argentinean government requested a renegotiation of the Uruguay River 
Agreement together with Uruguay to set some production limits to Botnia, as the country feared 
higher production levels in the pulp mill in the future. This was considered as a step towards 
dialogue between the countries, as it meant that Argentina had finally recognized and accepted 
that the pulp mill was not going to be relocated. However, the Argentinean Citizens 
Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú did not agree on the government’s decision and 
decided to continue with the roadblocks in the border bridges. The conflict was seriously 
aggravated when Botnia stated that Uruguay had never officially requested the company to 
pause the construction for 90 days, as the country had agreed one year ago with Argentina with 
the objective of negotiating and stopping the roadblocks. In addition, the president of the 
company declared that the existing Committee in the Uruguay River (CARU), where both 
countries are involved, should be provided with the needed resources for a joint monitoring of 
the impact of the project on the river by Uruguay and Argentina. However, the firm recognized 
one mistake: the lack of communication with Gualeguaychú and the areas of Argentina affected 
by the pulp mill at the beginning of the project. Nevertheless, even though the firm understood 
that now the communication efforts were late, they showed willingness to start dialogue with 
all the affected areas. 
 
Later in 2007, The Secretary of State in Spain for Latin America visited Argentina and met 
President Kirchner to enhance the mediation efforts of Spain. In addition, and as an important 
step towards dialogue, both the Uruguayan and Argentinean presidents had a meeting in New 
York, where again Argentina demanded the relocation of the pulp mill and Uruguay urged 
Argentina to stop the roadblocks as a condition to negotiate. In addition, Argentina also covered 
the issue of the creation of a joint committee to control pollution in the river waters and the 
renegotiation of the Uruguay River Agreement. Uruguay declared that Botnia should start 
operating to demonstrate that there is no pollution threat. Meanwhile, the CEAG started a 
protest against the Argentinean president, threatening with more roadblocks. The roadblocks 
were also affecting tourism in Argentina, and traffic and movement inside the country.   
 
Regarding The Hague ICJ process, Uruguay counterclaimed the Argentinean plaint in The 
Hague ICJ affirming that the Uruguay River Agreement had been respected, and responding 
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that Jorge Batlle, the Argentinean president when Uruguay first started to negotiate the 
authorization for Botnia project, was aware of all the process. With these arguments, the country 
ensured that the Agreement had not been broken, and in addition, Uruguay reaffirmed the lack 
of negative environmental impact of the projects. Later, diplomats from both countries met in 
New York to cover all the issues included in the Madrid Declaration: the relocation of Botnia 
pulp mill, the stop in the roadblocks, the violation of the Uruguay River Agreement and the 
joint assessment of the project impact. Uruguay also declared that the sooner Botnia could start 
its operations, the sooner they could demonstrate there was no environmental negative impact. 
 
Meanwhile, the CEAG organized a roadblock in the bridge connecting Gualeguaychú–Fray 
Bentos to protest against the Argentinean government due to its passivity in the bilateral 
conflict, followed by other roadblocks in the Argentinean cities of Colon and Concordia. The 
Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú demanded a blockage in the 
shipments to Botnia coming from Argentina, as the CEAG considered that the harbor was built 
illegally under a Uruguayan unilateral decision. The Argentinean government claimed that the 
roadblocks were simply damaging Argentina, without affecting Botnia.  At the same time, the 
Uruguayan President Tabaré inaugurated the harbor built to support Botnia operations, while 
several organizations from Gualeguaychú and still a Uruguayan minority protested against the 
harbor.  
 
With the objective of easing up the conflict, the government of Uruguay allowed a 
demonstration in Fray Bentos involving participants such as the CEAG and other organizations 
from Entre Rios. However, the country prepared a fence surrounding Botnia and a control 
operation to separate the demonstrators from the pulp mill. In Fray Bentos, citizens tried to 
differentiate themselves from the Argentinean activists by showing Uruguayan flags. During 
that demonstration, the passive attitudes of the Argentinean and Uruguayan presidents were 
criticized, together with the severe and strict controls performed by Uruguay on the 
demonstrators. At the same time, the Argentinean government finally accepted that Botnia was 
going to stay in Fray Bentos, and declared that the pulp mill might not harm the environment 
as much as stated by the country at the beginning of the conflict. With the bilateral conflict still 
affecting the relations between Argentina and Uruguay, both countries definitely accepted that 
the conflict could be solved only by accepting The Hague ICJ’s final resolution, as diplomacy 
might not work due to the irreconcilable positions of every country. However, the resolution 
might be delayed due to changes in some of the current members of the Courts. In addition, 
53 
 
 
 
even though some of the roadblocks continued, this movement was not supported by the 
Argentinean government anymore, and they feared that actions to stop the roadblocks might 
increase the intensity of the protests. As a result, the CEAG requested the Argentinean president 
to visit the city to discuss possible solutions.  
 
Finally, Uruguay authorized Botnia to start its operations after presenting all the required 
documents, and Botnia started to operate immediately. At the same time, and because of the 
authorization, Uruguay decided to close the border and block the main entrance Gualeguaychú-
Fray Bentos and Colón-Fray Bentos in order to prevent protests against the pulp mill. Therefore, 
both the Uruguayan government and other activists protesting against Botnia suddenly blocked 
almost all the entrances connecting both countries. Consequently, the relations between both 
countries were definitely broken, and the mediation leaded by The King of Spain was 
unsuccessful.  Due to the continuing protests, Uruguay decided to close all borders with 
Argentina and let the pulp mill show its innocence through its own activities. Meanwhile, in 
Argentina, Cristina Kirchner was elected new president, and the country tried to find new 
evidences to fight against Uruguay in The Hague ICJ while waiting for the final resolution. In 
addition, Cristina Kirchner strongly criticized the Uruguayan decision of allowing the start 
Botnia operations during a meeting with The Spanish King Juan Carlos. In December, Uruguay 
re-opened the borders, and in Fray Bentos the first reports about bad smells coming from Botnia 
appeared. Roadblocks continue in Gualeguaychú, Colon and Concordia organized by the 
Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. In Gualeguaychú, the CEAG 
also sent a letter to the Argentinean government to block all shipments from Argentina to 
Botnia, and the Uruguayan citizens living in Gualeguaychú started to demand more information 
about the pulp mill operations and their possible environmental impact.  
 
Table 9 shows the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2007, based on the 
information of the final sample. 
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Table 9. Key events during Botnia case, year 2007 
 
 
QUARTER MONTH KEY EVENTS 
 
 
 
2007 
1Q 
Jan. - During the mediation process, one suggestion is offered: a forestry theme park in river, between 
Fray Bentos and Gualeguaychú. The Hague will not intervene in the roadblock conflict. 
Feb. - Botnia will not be relocated and Finnish government will not intervene. Botnia and CEAG seen 
as inflexible actors increasing tension. 
- Businessmen from Gualeguaychú oppose to both roadblocks and Botnia. They fear soil pollution 
and companies leaving the region.  
March - Uruguay will not negotiate if roadblocks continue. It offers as solution a joint monitoring to control 
the environmental impact. 
- El Clarín visits Botnia. The firm will provide information that proves no negative impact and it 
explains its benefits in Fray Bentos. 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
2Q 
April - Argentina suggests a renegotiation of the River Agreement to set production limits to Botnia, 
accepting that the pulp mill will not be relocated. 
- Botnia claims that Uruguay never asked a stop in the construction. The firm is open to dialogue. 
They recognize no engagement with Gualeguaychú in the beginning. 
May - The Secretary of State in Spain for Latin America visits Argentina as a way to enhance the 
mediation of Spain in the bilateral conflict. 
- Meeting: the relocation of Botnia, renegotiation of the Uruguay River Agreement and joint 
monitoring of the river. Uruguay sets as a condition to negotiate the stop of roadblocks. 
June - CEAG protests against the Argentinean president, threatening with more roadblocks. It will also 
affect Argentinean tourism and traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
3Q 
July - Uruguay claims in The Hague the Agreement was not violated, as Argentina was aware of Botnia 
since the beginning of the project.  
- Diplomats of both countries meet to discuss the Madrid Declaration: relocation of the pulp mill, 
roadblocks, violation of the Uruguay River Agreement, and joint monitoring of the impact. 
Aug. - CEAG protests against President Kirchner’s passivity in the conflict, and demands blocks in 
shipments heading to Botnia harbor. 
- President Tabaré inaugurates the harbor built for Botnia operations, while organizations from 
Gualeguaychú protest. 
Sept. - A protest from Gualeguaychú and Entre Rios will be allowed in Fray Bentos under a control 
operation to protect the pulp mill.  
- The protest in Fray Bentos criticized both presidents due to passive attitudes during the conflict. 
The roadblock was opened to allow the protest cross the bridge, and Uruguay kept controls on 
the demonstrators.  
- Botnia is ready to operate. The countries face the consequences of the conflict: Argentina 
recognizes that Botnia will stay and might not pollute as claimed before, and Uruguay faces 
roadblocks and a joint monitoring with Argentina on the river environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
4Q 
Oct. - The solution to the conflict is The Hague resolution, as diplomacy does not work due to 
irreconcilable positions in each country. 
- Uruguay authorizes Botnia to start operations and they will not negotiate if roadblocks continue. 
CEAG requires Kirchner a visit to discuss about the conflict and the possible solutions. 
Nov. - Argentina criticizes Uruguayan decision to allow the start of Botnia operations in a meeting with 
the Spanish King  
- Botnia starts to operate. Uruguay closes connections between Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos 
to prevent conflicts. Argentina tries to find new evidences to present in Hague. The bilateral 
relations are definitely broken. 
- Uruguay closes Colón Bridge to avoid CEAG to cross to Fray Bentos. Thus, two of the three 
bridges connecting the countries remain blocked.  
- Uruguay closes all accesses from Argentina to Fray Bentos to prevent demonstrations in front 
of the pulp mill.  
Dec. - Uruguay opens accesses when the protests begin to disappear, and in Fray Bentos there are 
reports of bad smells from Botnia. 
- Roadblocks continue, also trying to prevent shipments from Argentina to Botnia. Uruguayan 
citizens living in Gualeguaychú demand more information about the operations of the pulp mill. 
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4.1.4   Year 2008: Soothing the conflict 
 
At the beginning of the year 2008, Botnia invited some Argentinean journalists to visit the pulp 
mill with the objective of demonstrating that, even though the operations were at full capacity, 
there was no negative impact on the environment and the operations met all the environmental 
requirements. The firm also regretted that, due to the conflict, Argentina could not benefit from 
Botnia, for instance, through shipments of machinery and creation of jobs in the country. At the 
same time, Argentina presented more evidences in The Hague ICJ showing how Uruguay had 
definitely broken the Uruguay River Agreement when authorizing both projects, when building 
the Botnia harbor, and by using huge amounts of water from the river.  
 
In Gualeguaychú, the roadblocks and demonstrations continued even with the opposition from 
the Argentinean government and some local people of the city, as the Argentinean Citizens 
Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú claimed that the pollution, if not now, might appear 
in the long term. The CEAG demanded a meeting with the Argentinean President Cristina 
Kirchner, who had opposed against the roadblocks and supported that the conflict should be 
solved through The Hague ICJ’s final resolution. In Uruguay, the President Tabaré organized 
some political changes by naming Gonzalo Fernández as the new chancellor, who always 
criticized Botnia’s neutral perspective and the roadblocks. At the same time, both countries 
needed to face specific challenges: in Uruguay, Botnia experienced some incidents without 
providing further accurate information; and in Argentina, the government’s priority consisted 
on preventing the CEAG’s power and its roadblocks. 
 
Later, during the festival organized by Botnia in Fray Bentos, Uruguay prepared strong safety 
and control measures fearing conflicts and protests. However, the border bridges were 
controlled, but not blocked. In Argentina, the President of Botnia and some managers were 
supposed to testify in the Argentinean Court due to an environmental pollution attempt, but in 
Botnia it was declared the firm was not aware of the plaint. In April, the CEAG organized a 
protest in the bridge connecting San Martin and Fray Bentos demanding the relocation of 
Botnia, but as a main difference, this time the bridge was not completely blocked and movement 
was allowed. Even though the demonstration mobilized less people than at the beginning of the 
conflict, it still was a success. However, in Argentina, Cristina Kirchner again claimed that the 
conflict should be solved after The Hague ICJ’s resolution.  
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It was in this year when, for the first time since the roadblocks started, a judge ordered the 
opening of a blocked bridge for a particular case. In Gualeguaychú, the citizens’ opinions on 
the roadblocks started to divide: some people opposed to the roadblocks as they considered this 
tactic useless, and others were firmly supporters as the tactic represented a symbol of the fight 
against pollution and Botnia. In addition, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of 
Gualeguaychú started to organize tours addressed to tourists who were interested in visiting the 
blocked bridge and knowing more about the conflict around the pulp mill. At that moment, the 
bridge seemed to be abandoned and was fully controlled by the CEAG, and only some cars 
were allowed to cross the bridge. The Argentinean President, after a meeting with the 
Uruguayan Chancellor, agreed on trying to stop the roadblocks in the bridge connecting 
Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos. In addition, Mercosur refused the Uruguayan claim and denied 
that Uruguay had suffered severe fatal negative economic consequences due to the roadblocks, 
even though the organization showed its completely opposition against the roadblocks, 
considered as illegal. After the Argentinean government expressed its intention to stop the 
roadblocks, the Uruguayan President Tabaré felt optimist about finding a solution for the 
conflict. Furthermore, a study from the University of Buenos Aires confirmed that Botnia 
operations were not polluting the air quality. However, the study did not analyze water quality 
yet, and more complete studies might be needed in the future. 
 
In November, Botnia was finally operating at full capacity in Fray Bentos without suffering any 
consequence from the roadblocks. In Argentina, the operations of the company were said to be 
higher than the joint operations of all the pulp mills existing in the country. Regarding the 
roadblocks, even though they had continued for two years, they lost the government support 
and were hardly criticized by Mercosur. In addition, Gualeguaychú and even the CEAG started 
to be divided into those who supported that the roadblocks should end or at least become more 
flexible, and those who fully supported that the roadblocks should continue as a symbol of the 
environmental fight. Besides, the governor of Entre Rios publicly expressed his opposition 
against the roadblocks and recognized no current pollution caused by the pulp mill, while the 
CEAG stated that pollution might appear over time. In December, as the Argentinean ex-
president Néstor Kirchner was the candidate as General Secretary in the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR), Uruguay totally refused to accept his presence and threatened 
to leave the organization. 
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Table 10 shows the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2008, based on the 
information of the final sample. 
 
Table 10. Key events during Botnia case, year 2008 
 
 
4.1.5   Year 2009: Seeking a diplomatic solution 
 
At the beginning of the year, the Uruguayan Environmental Minister claimed that the country 
would be able to accept more pulp mills in the Uruguay River, as he found no negative 
consequences in Botnia activities, adding that no more monitoring on the river conditions is 
needed. In addition, the governor of Entre Rios finally agreed on meeting the Argentinean 
Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. During this meeting, he discussed his 
contradictory opinion with the CEAG: he supported the pause of the roadblocks as they were 
affecting the Argentinean economy and tourism, while the Argentinean Citizens Environmental 
QUARTER MONTH KEY EVENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
1Q 
Jan. - Botnia meets Argentinean journalists to show that it operates with no negative impact and 
meets all environmental requirements. 
- Argentina shows more evidences in The Hague ICJ about the Uruguayan breach on the 
Uruguay River Bilateral Agreement.  
Feb. - CEAG demands to meet Cristina Kirchner, who supports the conflict ends with The Hague ICJ 
resolution and repulses roadblocks. 
- There are political changes in Uruguay to soothe the conflict. The power in Botnia and the 
CEAG, together with tension, increase.  
March - Uruguay prepares safety measures in Botnia Festival in Fray Bentos. The border bridges will 
be controlled, but no blocked.  
- The President of Botnia and some managers are supposed to testify in the Argentinean Court 
due to an environmental pollution attempt, but in Botnia they are not aware of this issue. 
 
2008 
2Q 
April - CEAG organizes a demonstration in the bridge connecting San Martin and Fray Bentos 
demanding the relocation of Botnia: the bridge will not be blocked and movement is allowed. 
- The demonstration, with less participation, was still a success.  
May - Finland plans more investments in the forest industry in Uruguay. 
June No articles available 
 
 
2008 
3Q 
July No articles available 
Aug. - In Gualeguaychú, local people are divided into opponents of roadblocks and supporters, as 
they are seen as a protest symbol.  
Sept. - CEAG prepares tours for tourists to visit the bridge and see the pulp mill. 
- Cristina Kirchner might agree on stopping roadblocks, and Mercosur resolves that Uruguay 
did not suffer negative impact after roadblocks, even though it condemns those actions. 
 
 
 
2008 
4Q 
Oct. - Tabaré feels optimist as Kirchner will try to stop roadblocks. 
- The University of Buenos Aires presents a study showing that Botnia does not pollute air. 
Water quality was not analyzed yet. 
Nov. - Botnia operates at full capacity in Uruguay, not affected by roadblocks. 
- After 2 years of roadblocks, the CEAG movement definitely loses government’s support. Even 
though environmental awareness is supported, roadblocks should end or become more flexible. 
Dec. - Uruguay threatens with abandoning USAN if ex Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner is 
elected General Secretary. 
- Entre Rios Governor shows opposition against the roadblocks. CEAG claims there will be 
cumulative pollution in long term. 
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Assembly of Gualeguaychú refused to cease the key symbol of their fight against pollution: the 
roadblocks. In addition, Uruguay asked the Argentinean government for actions to prevent the 
roadblocks and not only words, as the General San Martin bridge connecting Gualeguaychú 
and Fray Bentos had been blocked for two years, even though studies showed that air and water 
quality remained acceptable after the pulp mill had started to operate. 
 
During this year 2009, some stains in the Uruguay River became Argentina’s main concern, 
even though Botnia and Uruguay said that they were only seaweeds. However, after some water 
analysis, the results clarified that the stains were definitely seaweeds. This issue raised some 
awareness about the current state of the Uruguay River, which had been forgotten for long time, 
as Argentina had no plans, studies or policies to protect, analyze and improve the quality of the 
water. The only responsible body was the Committee of the Uruguay River (CARU), which 
was always dependent on both countries’ request. Therefore, the legislation over the waters of 
the river had been forgotten, and fertilizers and sewage waste had always polluted the river 
without any kind of control and prevention. As a result, the NGO Green Cross decided to 
perform some studies on the quality of the waters close to Botnia in both sides of the river: 
Argentina and Uruguay. 
 
For the first time, and after more than two years of roadblocks, there was a fatal accident where 
a motorbike rider died after crashing into the trailer blocking the entrance to the bridge 
controlled by the CEAG. The Finnish researcher Jussi Pakkasvirta decided to express his 
opinion, and analyzed and presented the consequences of the bilateral conflict in each country 
in an academic article. According to his opinion, on the one side, Uruguay’s mistake was mainly 
forgetting about the neighbor country at the beginning of the project. However, on the other 
side, even though the project experienced some minor opposition in Fray Bentos, the country 
successfully managed to obtain absolutely support to the project due to the various economic 
benefits to the country. Regarding Botnia, its main mistake was only analyzing legal and 
technical issues, but not the political or cultural aspects of the project, ignoring possible 
emotional responses towards the project. In addition, there was lack of open discussion and 
communication with Argentina at the beginning of the project, where the excellent 
environmental standards of the company were not enough to convince the Argentinean side. 
Jussi Pakkasvirta also highlighted the fact that Argentina showed an attitude of fear towards 
foreign companies, and the main mistake of this country was that the government chose the 
easy approach for the conflict of supporting the popular and local feelings against the project. 
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Finally, Finland also suffered some criticism, as its strategy was even considered as pure 
neocolonialism. The country suffered the consequences of loss of jobs in the forest industry in 
the country. Besides, the country experienced a loss of self-confidence, as they were not seen 
in Argentina by its typical stereotype of being a rational, smart, honest and innovative country. 
Furthermore, the conflict also brought nationalistic feelings in the country.  
 
In Argentina, the CEAG decided not to open the border bridge for the elections in Uruguay, 
even though some demonstrators supported the idea of showing some mercy to avoid being 
considered as extremists. Consequently, some Uruguayan people living in Argentina were not 
allowed to cross to vote in the elections, even though the CEAG had allowed some citizens to 
cross the bridge some days ago to attend a football match. 
 
During the second round in The Hague ICJ’s trial, Argentina tried to defend the presented 
evidences, complained about bad smell coming from Botnia, and denounced a bad location of 
the pulp mill in an important area for tourism in the country. Uruguay also defended its position 
by assuring that they had consulted Argentina when the country decided to start the project and 
collaborate with Botnia, and therefore, the country had not broken the Uruguay River 
Agreement. Uruguay also highlighted that the pulp mill had no negative consequences on the 
river, and denounced that the existing current pollution that the river was suffering was the 
result of the agriculture activities in Argentina. As usual, the country also criticized the 
Argentinean government passivity on the issue of the roadblocks.  
 
In October, the CEAG definitely agreed on not opening the bridge for the elections happening 
in Uruguay, supporting the decision with the following arguments: firstly, the Uruguayan 
residents in Argentina were able to use other alternative open bridges; and secondly, the CEAG 
did not support any of the candidates of the Uruguayan elections, as they fully supported Botnia. 
In addition, Uruguay complained in The Hague ICJ by declaring that Argentina had 
intentionally misunderstood and used some environmental studies for its own benefit to fake 
the results and show pollution in the river, which actually was non-existent, by using in purpose 
wrong terms during the speech in front of The Hague ICJ. 
 
At the end of this year, Botnia finally exported to Argentina for the first time, to the Argentinean 
Company Celupaper. In addition, the candidate to the Uruguayan elections Mujica stated that 
his first trip as president would be to Argentina to solve conflict. Argentina also claimed to be 
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willing to find a solution to the bilateral conflict, instead of only waiting for The Hague ICJ’s 
resolution, even though roadblocks continued in Gualeguaychú. With Mujica as new President 
of Uruguay, the government confirmed that its main priorities would be stopping the roadblocks 
and finally trying to solve the conflict. 
 
Table 11 summarizes the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2009, based on 
the information collected in the final sample. 
 
Table 11. Key events during Botnia case, year 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
QUARTER MONTH KEY EVENTS 
 
 
 
2009 
1Q 
Jan. - Uruguayan Environment minister claims that the country would be able to accept more pulp 
mills in the Uruguay River. 
- Governor of Entre Rios meets CEAG to discuss about roadblocks. CEAG considers those as 
a symbol of the fight against pollution.  
- Uruguayan government demands Argentinean government to start actions to stop the 
roadblocks. 
Feb. - Stains appear in the Uruguay River, but Botnia and Uruguay support they are seaweeds. 
Water analysis will give answers. 
- Argentina, Uruguay and Botnia, after water analysis, agree that the stain was just seaweed. 
March - The Uruguay River has been forgotten for long time: there are no studies to control and 
improve its water, and it is highly polluted by sewage waste and fertilizers. 
- Green Cross will analyze water quality in the Uruguayan and Argentinean sides of the river 
close to Botnia. 
 
 
2009 
2Q 
April - Motorcyclist dies after crashing into a trailer blocking the bridge. 
May - Finnish researcher analyzes the consequences of the conflict: it has affected the self-steam 
and nationalism feelings of Finland. 
June - CEAG will not open the roadblocks during the Uruguayan elections, even though some of 
demonstrators in CEAG were in favor. 
 
 
2009 
3Q 
July No articles available 
Aug. No articles available 
Sept. - Argentina defends its position during the second round in The Hague ICJ, focusing on bad 
smell and bad location of Botnia in an area for tourism. 
- Uruguay defends its position claiming that they did not break the Agreement, that there is no 
existing current pollution, and they blame Argentina for not preventing the roadblocks. 
 
 
2009 
4Q 
Oct. - CEAG will not open the bridge for the Uruguayans citizens with the intention to vote in the 
upcoming Uruguayan elections. 
- Uruguay reports an intentional misuse of environmental impact studies by Argentina to fake 
and show pollution in the river. 
Nov. - Botnia’s first export to the Argentinean company Celupaper. 
- Mujica, candidate in the upcoming Uruguayan elections, promises to visit Argentina if he wins 
the elections as his first official trip. 
Dec. - After Mujica’s success in elections, the stop of the roadblocks is the government’s priority, and 
countries will try to solve the conflict. 
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4.2 Stakeholders and relationships of Botnia case 
 
4.2.1   Identification of stakeholders 
 
During the first order analysis of data, the following 12 stakeholders were identified as 
participants during Botnia case. This list includes the key stakeholders for the study, together 
with other actors that appeared frequently during the project of Botnia and the consequent 
bilateral conflict created between Argentina and Uruguay.  
 
Botnia:  
The Finnish company decided to invest in Uruguay and start a construction project of a pulp 
mill in the City of Fray Bentos, in Uruguay. The main priority of the firm during the escalation 
of the conflict was the completion of the construction project to start to operate the pulp mill in 
Uruguay as soon as possible. Thus, the company firmly supported the project, as they affirmed 
that the best technologies and environmentally friendly methods were being used in order to 
prevent negative impact in the Uruguay River and its surroundings. However, the firm needed 
to face strong opposition against the project from several stakeholders for long time.  
 
Botnia had neutral relationships with the external stakeholders involved in the project and the 
conflict. However, the company presented closer relationships with the Uruguayan 
government, as they were necessary in order to start the pulp mill operations. In addition, the 
company received the funding for the project from the World Bank after a cumulative impact 
study of the project, even though the relationships were simply professional and neutral. The 
company also made great efforts trying to relate and engage with Argentina after the pulp mill 
started to operate, especially in Gualeguaychú, in order to demonstrate that the project was 
environmentally friendly and careful with the environment. 
 
The Uruguayan government:  
The government of the country firmly accepted, facilitated and supported the construction of 
two pulp mills in the Uruguayan city of Fray: Botnia and ENCE. Thus, Uruguay kept a 
supporting position towards Botnia project. This supportive position was based on several 
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reasons: the economic benefits that the projects would bring to the country and the creation of 
new jobs in Fray Bentos, with a consequent improvement in the life quality of the city.   
In addition, on the one hand, the Uruguayan government kept unsuccessful and negative 
conflicting relationships with the Argentinean government and the CEAG, mainly due to their 
contradictory points of view during the conflict. On the other hand, the government supported 
the local people of Fray Bentos when facing the opposition exerted by the neighbor country 
Argentina. The Uruguayan government had neutral relationships with The Hague ICJ after the 
Argentinean plaint to defend its position, and it was the responsible for the participation of 
Mercosur in the conflict after denouncing the roadblocks in Gualeguaychú, even though their 
relationship presented mainly neutral nature.  
 
Local people of Fray Bentos:  
A great part of this stakeholder group showed some doubts about the projects at the beginning 
of the conflict, fearing negative impact on the environment, but soon they accepted Botnia pulp 
mill due to the several benefits for the city. Consequently, later, they needed to face strong 
opposition from Argentina, and especially, from Gualeguaychú. Thus, this actor presented two 
different positions towards Botnia project, first as opponent and later as supporter. Even though 
some minor groups opposed to the pulp mills at the beginning of the projects, they soon realized 
of the several benefits that the projects could bring to the city and decided to support definitely 
the construction of the pulp mills. 
Fray Bentos had great support from the Uruguayan government, as they needed to face jointly 
the opposition from the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. Even 
though at the beginning of the project some local people from Fray Bentos joined and 
collaborated with the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú’s 
protests, later, the city showed its opposition against this movement.  
 
The Argentinean government:  
The government of the country always showed resistance and opposition against the projects 
in the neighbor country of Uruguay, as negative environmental effects were feared, especially 
in the Uruguay River. Included within this stakeholder group, the Entre Rios government should 
be especially mentioned and highlighted. Including the conflicting areas of Concordia, San 
Salvador, Gualeguaychú and Colón; the government of Entre Ríos maintained a similar position 
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than the Argentinean national government during the dispute, even though it showed a stronger 
opposition against Botnia project at the beginning of the conflict. 
Thus, the Argentinean government firmly showed its rejection and non-acceptance of the 
projects, fearing negative impact on the environment and the Uruguay River and demanding a 
relocation of the pulp mill and a suspension of the construction projects. Even though the 
government later accepted that Botnia was not going to be relocated and would stay in Fray 
Bentos and they decided to focus on solving the bilateral conflict with Uruguay, they still 
showed some resistance and distrust towards the company.  
 
The Argentinean government presented conflictive relationships with the Uruguayan 
government, characterized by distrust and incompatible positions during the conflict. In 
addition, the government was the responsible of the participation of several external actors in 
the bilateral conflict, such as The Hague ICJ and The World Bank and the IFC, in order to 
support its opposition against the pulp mills. On the one side, Argentina tried to freeze the 
funding to projects until no pollution consequences were demonstrated; and on the other side, 
the country denounced Uruguay in The Hague ICJ. Besides, the Argentinean government 
decided to collaborate and support the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of 
Gualeguaychú’s protests and roadblocks at the beginning of the project, even though later the 
country showed its opposition against the CEAG and its radical protest tactics. 
 
Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG):  
This activist group appeared as the main opponent of the construction projects as they claimed 
they will bring negative environmental consequences in the long term, and they always showed 
hostility during the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. Thus, this group 
represented the main opposition in Botnia project, organizing several protests and roadblocks 
against the company and the pulp mill, and asking for the relocation of the pulp mill even at the 
end of the conflict, when the firm was already operating at full capacity.  
In addition, the CEAG maintained conflictive relationships with both the Uruguayan 
government and the local people of Fray Bentos due to their contradictory positions and 
opinions during the conflict around Botnia. Besides, at the beginning of the conflict, the 
Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú was supported by the 
Argentinean government, who decided to collaborate with the organization. However, after 
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Botnia started its operations and the countries struggled to find a solution to the conflict; the 
Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú lost the government support 
and was criticized by its obstinacy and inflexibility. In Argentina, the CEAG was also supported 
during the duration of the conflict by other activist organizations and NGOs existing in the 
region of Entre Ríos and opposing to the pulp mill. The CEAG was supported by some local 
people in Fray Bentos, but only at the beginning of the construction projects.   
 
The Finnish government:  
Finland showed a neutral position during all the construction project of Botnia, in spite of the 
fact that the bilateral conflict had been created between two close countries as Argentina and 
Uruguay due to the decisions of the Finnish company Botnia. Thus, even though the Finnish 
government defended the innocence of Botnia and expressed their trust in the firm, Finland 
decided to stay in a neutral position towards other actors during the project and the later 
escalation of the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. 
Additionally, Finland had no relationships with other stakeholders involved in Botnia project 
and the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. 
 
Spanish company ENCE:  
The Spanish company ENCE decided to locate a pulp mill in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos. 
However, later and during the escalation of the conflict, they decided to relocate the pulp mill 
in a different city. 
The Spanish company ENCE kept a neutral position and showed no opposition or support 
towards Botnia project. However, they firmly supported their own project as it was considered 
environmentally friendly. Later, the firm decided to relocate its pulp mill in a different city of 
Uruguay instead of Fray Bentos, where Botnia was being constructed, and they stated that the 
decision was not made or influenced by the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. 
The company explained this decision by claiming that two companies with similar size could 
not co-exist together. 
 
As Botnia, ENCE enjoyed the support of the Uruguayan government, who helped and 
authorized its construction project, which was financed by the World Bank. However, the firm 
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needed to face opposition from the Argentinean government and the Argentinean Citizens 
Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú until its decision to relocate the pulp mill. 
 
King of Spain:  
The Spanish King and his representative acted as mediators, facilitating negotiations between 
Argentina and Uruguay during the bilateral conflict. However, the mediation process resulted 
unsuccessful to solve the dispute. 
Despite the efforts to solve the conflict, The King of Spain showed no specific position towards 
the project of the company, as his main priority was trying to solve the bilateral conflict between 
Uruguay and Argentina. Thus, the King of Spain only related to Uruguay and Argentina, trying 
to enhance negotiations and dialogue between both countries ir order to solve the existing 
bilateral conflict. However, The King always kept a neutral position as mediator and facilitator, 
without taking sides, and he did not relate with any other stakeholders.  
 
The World Bank and its International Finance Corporation (IFC):  
The World Bank acted as an external actor during the escalation of the conflict, and its 
participation in the conflict was requested by Argentina. The organism was responsible for 
funding both construction projects, and in charge of analyzing and studying the cumulative 
impact of the projects through its subsidiary the International Finance Corporation.  
However, even though The World Bank and the IFC were in charge of funding the projects, 
they showed no specific support towards the pulp mills. Only due to rational and existing 
evidences after a cumulative impact study (CIS) about the projects, both organisms agreed on 
financing the pulp mills and declared that there will be no negative consequences on the 
environment caused by the firm’s operations. 
 
The World Banks and its subsidiary IFC had no specific relations with others stakeholders 
involved in the project, excepting Argentina when the country tried to freeze the funding 
addressed to the pulp mill and demanded the CIS. Thus, the World Bank kept neutral position 
and always acted following rational decisions based on existing evidences. 
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The Hague ICJ (International Court of Justice):  
This external actor was forced to participate in the bilateral conflict due to the Argentinean 
plaint against Uruguay regarding the construction projects. Later, also Uruguay presented 
charges against Argentina due to the roadblocks organized in Gualeguaychú and defended the 
country against the accusations made by the neighbor country.  
The Hague ICJ kept a neutral position during the construction project and the bilateral dispute, 
and its main tasks were only analyzing the conflict and finding a final resolution. However, and 
due to the existing evidence after the CIS, The Hague ICJ declared that there were no negative 
consequences on the environment caused by the firm’s operations.  
 
The Hague ICJ related only with both countries Argentina and Uruguay, but always showing a 
neutral professional and rational position. The Hague ICJ considered that the process in the 
court was simply a means to solve the conflict. However, The Hague ICJ’s resolutions had great 
influence on each country’s actions and positions. Regarding Argentina, The Hague ICJ denied 
its first petition of suspension of the construction projects, as there was no environmental 
negative impact. Regarding Uruguay, The Hague ICJ resolved not to intervene in the conflict 
about the roadblocks. 
 
Mercosur:  
This external actor entered into the conflict due to the Uruguayan request to solve the problem 
of the roadblocks organized by the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of 
Gualeguaychú in Gualeguaychú. 
Mercosur kept always a neutral position during the projects and was focused only on the 
bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay existing at that moment. Thus, Mercosur had 
only close relationships with the Uruguayan government, as the country denounced the 
roadblocks being organized in Gualeguaychú as a protest against the project. However, it 
always maintained a neutral position and decided not to intervene, as there were not severe 
consequences in the Uruguayan economy, even though the roadblocks were considered illegal.  
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European Union (EU):  
Even though no intervention was requested by any of the countries involved in the bilateral 
conflict caused by the pulp mill projects, the European Union showed its support towards 
Botnia and criticized the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. The European Union 
considered Botnia as an innocent victim trapped in the bilateral dispute between Argentina and 
Uruguay, and additionally, it highlighted the excellent past historical records of the firm. 
The European Union had no close relationships with the stakeholders involved in the project 
and the bilateral conflict, even though the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay 
was criticized and was considered as a limitation towards future investments in the countries. 
 
Table 12 summarizes the 12 stakeholders described in this section 4.2.1, focusing on their 
interests, their position towards Botnia project. The table also includes the main arguments 
utilized by each stakeholder group and the actions they used during the conflict. 
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Table 12. Stakeholder interests during Botnia case. 
 
STAKEHOLDER INTEREST POSITION 
TOWARDS 
FIRM 
MAIN ARGUMENTS ACTIVITIES 
BOTNIA Start operations. 
Keep a positive 
neutral reputation 
- Demonstrate no 
environmental impact 
through operations. 
No actions at the beginning.  
Visits and interviews at the 
end of the conflict with 
opponents.  
URUGUAYAN 
GOVERNMENT 
End bilateral conflict, 
but keeping the 
project in Fray 
Bentos. 
 
Support Project authorization 
followed legal procedures. 
Argentina accepted the 
project. 
Collaboration with Botnia: 
providing authorization and 
building a harbor. 
Dialogue and diplomatic 
meetings with Argentina. 
FRAY BENTOS First: relocation of 
project. 
Later: keep project in 
the city.  
First: Opposition 
 
Later: support 
First: fear of negative 
environmental impact.  
Later: support economic 
benefits of project. 
First: demonstrations against 
pulp mill. 
Later: positioned as opposing 
against demonstrators. 
ARGENTINEAN 
GOVERNMENT 
End of bilateral 
conflict and 
relocation of project. 
Reduce 
environmental 
impact. 
Opposition Fear of negative 
environmental impact of 
the project. 
Violation of River Bilateral 
Agreement by Uruguay. 
Support demonstrations 
against project. 
Dialogue and diplomatic 
meetings during dispute with 
Uruguay. 
CEAG Cancellation or 
relocation of the 
project. 
Opposition Refuse to accept project 
due to negative 
environmental impact. 
Roadblocks and 
demonstrations. 
FINNISH 
GOVERNMENT 
Not taking sides in 
the bilateral conflict. 
Neutral Keep positive reputation: 
countries do not take side 
in firms’ issues. 
Avoid any type of actions or 
comments. 
ENCE Start firm operations.  Neutral Relocation of the firm in a 
better place for the 
company success. 
Keep neutral during bilateral 
dispute. 
Relocation of the firm. 
KING OF SPAIN  End bilateral dispute 
with Argentina and 
Uruguay. 
-  End dispute through 
mediation and a 
diplomatic solution. 
Mediation process through 
meetings and diplomatic 
dialogue. 
WORLD BANK Allow loan to project 
if there is no negative 
environmental impact 
found. 
 
Neutral Acceptance/ cancellation 
of loan until its cumulative 
impact study results are 
shown. 
Study and clear up the 
situation in a beneficial way 
for the World Bank. 
No negative impact found, so 
they accept loan to the 
project. 
THE HAGUE 
ICJ 
End bilateral dispute 
through legal formal 
methods, and being 
impartial. 
Neutral Need for being impartial.  
No taking sides on 
petition to stop 
construction or 
roadblocks 
Analyze the arguments to 
prepare a final resolution to 
end dispute. 
MERCOSUR End bilateral dispute. 
Analyze the 
roadblocks. 
- Analyze negative 
economic consequences 
of roadblocks in Uruguay. 
Analyze roadblocks. 
They were declared illegal. 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
End bilateral dispute. 
Support the 
European partner. 
Support Botnia seen as a victim of 
a conflict between two 
countries. 
Support excellent 
previous records of the 
firm. 
Dialogue. 
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4.2.2   Stakeholder relationships during the conflict 
 
 
The analysis of stakeholder relationships will be based on the stakeholders identified as key 
actors for the research in the section 3.3.2, which are Botnia, the Argentinean government, the 
Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, and the CEAG.  
 
The following relationships between the key stakeholders were identified: support through 
positive relationships, opposition through negative relationships; and neutral, characteristic in 
stakeholders that decided not to take sides during the conflict.  
 
Regarding stakeholders linked by supporting relationships, an example can be found in data on 
the relations between Argentinean government and the CEAG at the beginning of the conflict, 
when the president raised the conflict around the construction of the pulp mill in Uruguay as a 
“national issue” (article 5, 23/08/2005). The Argentinean president stated that the government 
would “coordinate actions with municipalities, regional governments and civil society” (article 
5, 23/08/2005), allowing the CEAG to protest and start the roadblocks without any obstacles. 
Another example can be identified in the relationships between the Uruguayan government and 
Botnia, as at the beginning of the conflict the president announced that Uruguay will 
“coordinate actions with Botnia to overcome the demands and complaints from Argentina” 
(article 8, 19/10/2005). As the focus of this study is opposition, supporting relationships 
emerged with the objective of exerting higher opposition will be further examined in the 
following chapters. 
 
Within opposing stakeholder groups, data provides a clear example in the controversial and 
conflicting relationships between the governments of Argentina and Uruguay, described in 
some occasions in data as “diplomatic tension” (article 5, 23/08/2005) and even as the “lowest 
status in the relationships between Argentina and Uruguay in 200 years” (article 56, 
10/11/2007). As the focus of this study is on opposition, these relationships will be presented 
in detail in the following chapters. 
 
Regarding neutral relationships between stakeholders, only those actors who decided not to 
take sides during the conflict were neutral, and this position can be identified in Botnia. A clear 
example of this relationship is shown in data, when the president of the company stated that 
“Botnia is not a part of this dispute” (article 22, 21/05/2006). He mentioned that “a private 
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company can only discuss with the government of the country where the firm is located, and in 
other cases, governments should be the ones discussing with each other during the conflict” 
(article 5, 23/08/2005).  
 
Figure 5 represents the stakeholder relationships of Botnia case through a stakeholder map. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Stakeholder map of Botnia case 
 
When analyzing the relationships existing between the firm and its stakeholders, data shows 
that the company kept the same neutral position over time, even after the year 2007, when 
Botnia tried to develop slightly closer relationships with its opponent stakeholders. As an 
explanation of this stable relationship, it can be observed that the firm maintained the same 
goals during the dispute: the end of the construction work and the start of the pulp mill 
operations. Besides, the ultimate interest of the company is to operate and keep a good 
reputation despite the conflict, without taking sides and focusing on the firm’s most convenient 
position: neutrality.    
 
However, regarding the relationships of the stakeholder groups involved in the dispute with the 
firm, relationships based on opposition and support are identified. On the one hand, in the case 
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of supporting stakeholders, it is possible to mention the example of Uruguay and its direct 
supporting relationships with Botnia, as a way to oppose simultaneously indirectly against the 
Argentinean government and the CEAG. On the other hand, opposing relationships were 
mainly identified in Argentinean government and the CEAG opposing indirectly against the 
firm. However, Argentinean key priority changed during the conflict from protesting against 
the pulp mill and demanding a relocation to finding a solution to the bilateral conflict that 
emerged during the project. Thus, the country forgot the dispute around the firm, and gave more 
importance to the bilateral conflict emerged with Uruguay.  
 
When focusing on the perspective of relationships among the main stakeholder groups, one of 
the key differences with the previous analysis of firm – stakeholder relationships is the absence 
of neutral links, as stakeholder groups related only through opposing and supporting linkages. 
On the one hand, regarding opposing relationships, they mainly emerged due to different 
conflicting interests between actors. In the case of Argentina and Uruguay, the first actor 
wanted to stop the construction work and the relocation of the pulp mill, while the second actor 
supported the location of Botnia in Fray Bentos. Even though the groups tried to find solutions 
to its different points of view, the positions were so conflicting that the opposing relationships 
lasted almost all the dispute without any changes. On the other hand, regarding supporting 
relationships between stakeholders, they emerged due to similar interests and goals, as the 
example of the Argentinean government and the CEAG, and Fray Bentos local people and the 
CEAG, while they collaborated together to oppose against the project and its negative 
environmental consequences, demanding a relocation of the pulp mill. In previous literature, 
Freeman (1984) already suggested that stakeholders with similar interests might form a group.  
 
 
In addition, most frequently, not all these relationships stayed stable over time, but they 
presented some changes during the escalation of the conflict. The turning point was identified 
during 2007, as that is the moment when several stakeholders change their positions, interests 
and relationships with other actors. As an example, the Argentinean position in the conflict 
changed radically during 2007. At the beginning of the conflict Argentina decided to support 
civil society actions addressed to stop Botnia, allowing the CEAG to perform roadblocks in the 
bridges connecting both countries as a protest. Even though Argentina did not publically offer 
support to the roadblocks, the passivity and little interest shown to stop this method could be 
understood as the country adopting an assistant and accomplice role (article 26, 23/07/2006). 
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However, as during this year and after Mercosur declared the roadblocks “illegal” (article 33, 
10/12/2006), Argentina started to show discomfort towards the roadblocks, and data even states 
that “roadblocks started to lose participation on the Argentinean side of the river” (article 63, 
02/02/2008). The government claimed that “the roadblocks divide Argentina and do not harm 
Botnia; the fight should be different” (article 48, 21/08/2007). In addition, the activists are 
described as “intransigent people who do not participate in the main plot” (article 37, 
02/02/2007) and it was thought that the roadblocks used by CEAG might negatively influence 
The Hague ICJ resolution and hinder negotiations to find a solution to the dispute. The 
opposition towards the CEAG methods became stronger during the following years, especially 
after the changes in the Argentinean government with the election of Cristina Kirchner as 
president. She firmly agreed on a bilateral solution through The Hague ICJ and on the “need 
for stopping the roadblocks to solve the dispute” (article 73, 03/10/2008), as the method was 
considered irrational and used by a group of “angry environmentalists” (article 60, 30/12/2007). 
According to the Argentinean president, those methods “were not the solution to the conflict” 
(article 83, 06/02/2009). Consequently, the CEAG firmly criticized this change, stating that the 
Argentinean government seemed to be “deaf and mute” (article 29, 17/10/2006).  
 
Additionally, at the beginning of the conflict, some Fray Bentos local people opposed the pulp 
mill construction in the city, joining forces with Argentina in its fight against the project as they 
shared the same fear of negative environmental impact caused by the firm’s operations. 
However, they soon realized about all the positive economic impact of the project in the city 
and suffered the negative consequences derived from the roadblocks. Thus, they began to 
criticize the opposition methods being used by the CEAG and decided to support Botnia project 
instead. Data reflect this change perfectly by stating first that “Argentinean and Uruguayan 
people hugged and joint forces in a protest against the construction of the pulp mill” (article 1, 
29/04/2005). Later, data present that “nowadays, it is difficult to find in Fray Bentos someone 
who does not criticize their historical neighbors in Gualeguaychú, as the roadblocks have 
continued now for three weeks” (article 15, 26/02/2006).  
 
Another change can be identified within the CEAG itself, as the members’ positions started to 
be divided, especially during 2008, between supporters of the roadblocks and supporters of 
using “different methods” (article 70, 23/08/2008) or “making the roadblocks more flexible” 
(article 76, 23/11/2008). A last change can be identified in Botnia. Even though the firm always 
kept the same neutral position and distance towards the actors participating in the conflict, the 
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company later tried to calm down the situation through few small “interviews” (article 5, 
23/08/2005) and “visits to the pulp mill” (article 61, 23/01/2008), already working in that year. 
The President also expressed his willingness to “dialogue” and to communicate “all the required 
information” to convey a feeling of “tranquility” in Argentina (article 40, 30/03/2007). 
 
However, some actors kept the same position during the escalation of the conflict. This is the 
case of the Uruguayan government, who supported Botnia during the dispute, and claimed that 
negotiations with the neighbor country of Argentina would not be possible if the roadblocks 
continued existing in the bridges connecting both countries. Uruguay always supported Botnia 
though different actions over time, for instance, by “authorizing Botnia to start operations 
easily” (article 2, 15/05/2005) and by the “construction of a Harbor for Botnia” (article 49, 
30/08/2007). In addition, data repeated several times the Uruguayan decision of “not 
negotiating with Argentina while the roadblocks in the international bridges continue” during 
all the duration of the conflict (article 39, 23/03/2007).  
 
Another good example might be found on those members of the CEAG who supported to keep 
the roadblocks as a protest during all the conflict, even though they knew that the tactic was not 
supported by government anymore (article 48, 21/08/2007) or was not affecting the firm (article 
15, 26/02/2006). In data, when one of the members is asked about a pause or change in the 
roadblocks, the answer is “stopping the roadblocks would mean demobilizing the Assembly” 
(article 14, 01/02/2006)”, showing how determined they were to continue with this tactic even 
though they realized they were pursuing a lost cause. This can be explained as members had a 
commitment towards the group, and additionally, they started to associate themselves with the 
group’s identity; therefore, supporting and feeling bounded to the group and their actions.  
 
4.3 Stakeholder opposition 
 
 
4.3.1 Stakeholder opposition tactics 
 
 
The analysis of stakeholder opposition will be based on the stakeholders identified as key actors 
for the research in the Section 3.3.2, which are Botnia, the Argentinean government, the 
Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, and the CEAG.  
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Opposition in stakeholder relationships was analyzed following a theoretical framework. This 
framework was developed by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) and it examines and classifies 
opposition tactics of secondary stakeholders.  The authors divided the tactics into the following 
strategies: “logic of numbers” and “logic of gain/damage” (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007, p. 
909). “Logic of numbers” includes mass participation tactics, where high levels of participation 
are needed; and elite participation, meaning collaboration with few actors which are key for the 
firm, and thus, powerful enough to affect the company and its projects. “Logic of damage” 
involves both material and symbolic damage, including those tactics that have physical negative 
impact in the firm or harm the company’s reputation. Finally, “logic of gain” can be divided 
into material gain and symbolic gain, and they represent those tactics that stakeholder utilized 
with the objective of rewarding the firm and to encourage the company to keep a specific 
supported behavior. This tactic does not represent opposition itself, but the practice is 
considered a method to influence the firm behavior and activities. 
 
The main opposition tactics identified during the escalation of the conflict were demonstrations, 
meetings, dialogue, roadblocks, stakeholder collaboration and the involvement of other 
stakeholders in the conflict. These opposition tactics identified from data can be classified 
according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) framework on stakeholder opposition. 
 
Table 13 presents a summary of the tactics used by the key stakeholders during Botnia case, 
also classified according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s framework (2007). 
 
 Table 13. Stakeholder opposition tactics based on data and Den Hond and De Bakker’s 
classification (2007) 
 
STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE BAKKER, 2007)  TACTIC IDENTIFIED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
LOGIC OF 
NUMBERS 
MASS 
PARTICIPATION 
Demonstrations and protests 
ELITE 
PARTICIPATION 
Stakeholder involvement  
 
LOGIC OF DAMAGE 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL DAMAGE 
Roadblocks 
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC DAMAGE 
Meetings 
Dialogue 
Stakeholder support & collaboration 
 
 
LOGIC OF GAIN 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL GAIN 
 
Not identified 
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC GAIN 
 
Stakeholder support & collaboration 
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The demonstrations and protests can be categorized as “logic of numbers” through mass 
participation, as high levels of participation were required for the success of those tactics. 
Usually, the more people and participation the tactic can attract, the more effective it will be. 
These demonstrations are shown in data through protests developed mostly by the CEAG, 
where demonstrators arranged peaceful multitudinous and symbolic actions such as massive 
marches, singing anthems, reading manifestos, water protests and signature collection (article 
1, 29/04/2005).  
 
“Logic of numbers” through elite participation can be identified in the involvement of other 
stakeholders in the dispute, for instance, actors such as The Hague ICJ and Mercosur. Even 
though these actors were not participants of the conflict, they were required to participate due 
to their reputation and their power to influence. The objective was to better protect the 
stakeholders’ interests when opposing against other actors. An example can be found in the 
effort made by the Argentinean government to involve The Hague ICJ in the dispute to 
“encapsulate the conflict” and its clarification through The Hague ICJ’s future resolution 
(article 53, 03/10/2007). Additionally, this tactic can be found on the efforts made by Uruguay 
to involve Mercosur and its members in the dispute due to the roadblocks (article 20, 
22/04/2006). Besides, data described the involvement of the World Bank in the dispute due to 
the Argentinean petition for a freeze on the loan for the project. Argentina wanted to involve a 
powerful actor which was not related to the project (article 3, 12/07/2005), seeking its support 
and participation, in order to stop the roadblocks. 
 
The roadblocks were a clear example of “logic of material damage”, as these tactics had clear 
impact on the Uruguayan economy, and a negative impact that could be measured. This method 
was they key opposition tactic utilized by the CEAG, by “cutting access to the key bridges 
connecting both countries: Argentina and Uruguay” (article 1, 29/04/2005). It was considered 
as an effective “peaceful” strategy by the CEAG (article 48, 21/08/2007), but raised huge 
opposition and criticism in governments due to its aggressiveness and the negative economic 
consequences of this method in the long term (article 26, 23/07/2006).  
 
In contrast, meetings and dialogue can be classified as “logic of symbolic damage”, as they 
were formal, official and diplomatic tactics whose main goal was to affect in a symbolic way 
to other actors’ reputation. Meetings are described as tactics utilized to discuss and agree on 
different solutions and terms during the dispute, and used mainly by governments. For instance, 
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data showed a meeting where representatives of the Uruguayan and the Argentinean 
government were participating, and another meeting involving the presidents of both countries 
in New York (article 43, 15/05/2007). In addition, dialogue was widely used too, and in many 
occasions with the objective of protecting stakeholders’ interest and defend against other actors’ 
arguments and accusations. Data shows clear examples, for instance, when the Uruguayan 
government complained about the roadblocks by comparing them with the “commercial 
blockade used by EEUU against Cuba” (article 16, 16/03/2006). Dialogue was also used as a 
key strategy during the process in The Hague ICJ, where countries tried to convince the parts 
involved in the conflict by using several arguments. For instance, Argentina denounced a 
“violation in the Agreement of the Uruguay River by Uruguay” (article 21, 05/05/2006); and 
Uruguay counterattacked stating that Argentina had “once accepted the Botnia project” and was 
therefore aware of the consequences of the project (article 46, 19/07/2007). Additionally, the 
stakeholders’ supporting relationships emerged with the objective of showing opposition can 
be also classified as “logic of symbolic damage”. This collaboration can be understood as a 
symbolic way to exert opposition against other actors, and therefore, it can be also interpreted 
as “logic of symbolic damage”. The objective was to obtain some extra support during the 
escalation of the conflict, and in turn, become stronger when indirectly opposing against the 
firm or other actors. For example, the collaboration between Argentina and CEAG at the 
beginning of the conflict emerged in order to oppose against the project (article 5, 23/08/2005), 
and even though Argentina did not participate actively in the CEAG opposition tactics, the 
supporting relationships between both actors acted as an opposition strategy to harm other 
stakeholders’ reputation and decisions. Thus, this collaboration is not considered as logic of 
numbers through “elite participation”, as the government did not participate in the CEAG 
aggressive methods of protest and their joint efforts were merely symbolic. 
 
Regarding “logic of material gain”, this strategy cannot be identified in Botnia case. Contrarily, 
“logic of symbolic gain” was utilized during the escalation of the conflict. This strategy can be 
illustrated in the support showed by Uruguay towards Botnia. Uruguay always firmly supported 
the firm towards all the accusations made by Argentina (article 8, 19/10/2005). Even though at 
the same time the Uruguayan government was opposing indirectly against the Argentinean 
accusations through this collaboration, this relationship can be also understood as a method 
used by the Uruguayan government to support Botnia, thus, influencing the firm to continue 
with the project.  
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4.3.2 Stakeholder–firm opposition 
 
 
The firm decided to keep a neutral position towards its stakeholder, and therefore, opposition 
tactics were rarely utilized. However, at the end of the project, Botnia tried to show the 
opponents that there was no negative impact in the firm operations through few visits and 
interviews, always with the objective of keeping a good reputation in the company (article 61, 
23/01/2008). Therefore, the firm used tactics such as meetings and dialogue, categorized as 
“logic of symbolic damage” according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) framework. 
 
However, stakeholders utilized multiple opposition tactics against the firm. These tactics were: 
demonstrations and protests (logic of numbers through mass participation: Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007); roadblocks (logic of material damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); the 
involvement of other actors in the dispute (logic of numbers through elite participation: Den 
Hond & De Bakker, 2007); and the supporting relationships and collaboration with other 
stakeholder groups participating in the conflict (logic of symbolic damage: Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007). It can be identified from data that the stakeholders’ decision on using these 
actions was made based on the high impact and consequences emerging from these methods, 
both material and symbolic effects, and also by the possibility of attracting people’s attention, 
especially media, on the case.  
 
Protests and demonstrations were oriented indirectly to the firm, and they were addressed and 
involved the government at the same time. In other words, stakeholders could oppose indirectly 
against the firm’s project through protests, which were directly oriented against governments. 
Similarly, roadblocks were utilized against the firm only in an indirect way, as they were mainly 
addressed to oppose governments, the actor who suffered the negative consequences directly. 
Stakeholder support and collaboration was also a tactic exerted indirectly against the firm, as 
this strategy required initially supporting relationships emerged among stakeholders in order to 
exert a joint opposition. Stakeholder involvement was utilized as a tactic too, and it can be 
considered an indirect opposition against the firm, as the participation and influence exerted by 
external actors was required. Finally, the relationships between Uruguay and Botnia, 
categorized as “logic of symbolic gain”, emerged and were practiced in a direct way. Even 
though these relationships do not represent opposition, they were a method to directly and 
positively influence the firm.  
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Consequently, all the opposition strategies seemed to be oriented indirectly against the firm, 
mostly using government as an intermediary, who was the main receiver and they key affected 
by those tactics. In other words, opposition was always exerted indirectly against the company 
through direct protests against the government. Additionally, the company stated that the 
operations were barely influenced by any of the tactics being used (article 15, 26/02/2006; 
article 75, 10/11/2008). Only the supporting relationships between Uruguay and Botnia were 
direct, even though they do not represent opposition but only positive influence towards the 
firm.  
 
Table 14. Stakeholder-firm opposition, Botnia case 
 
STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE 
BAKKER, 2007)  
TACTIC 
IDENTIFIED IN 
THE RESEARCH 
FIRM – 
STAKEHOLDER 
OPPOSITION 
STAKEHOLDER – FIRM 
OPPOSITION 
LOGIC OF 
NUMBERS 
MASS 
PARTICIPATION 
Demonstrations 
and protests 
- Indirect 
ELITE 
PARTICPATION 
Stakeholder 
involvement  
- Indirect 
LOGIC OF 
DAMAGE 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL 
DAMAGE 
Roadblocks - Indirect 
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC 
DAMAGE 
Meetings Direct  
Dialogue Direct  
Stakeholder 
support & 
collaboration 
- Indirect 
LOGIC OF 
GAIN 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL GAIN 
 
Not identified 
-  
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC GAIN 
 
Stakeholder 
support & 
collaboration 
- Direct 
 
 
Table 14 summarizes the opposition tactics used under a firm-stakeholder perspective, 
identifying if those strategies were exerted directly or indirectly against the firm. 
 
4.3.3 Stakeholder-stakeholder opposition 
 
 
Regarding opposition tactics used among the key stakeholder groups, all the previously 
identified tactics were utilized when opposing against other actors: demonstrations and protests 
(logic of numbers through mass participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); roadblocks 
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(logic of material damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); meetings and dialogue (logic of 
symbolic damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); the  involvement of other actors in the 
dispute (logic of numbers through elite participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); and the 
supporting relationships and collaboration with other stakeholder groups participating in the 
conflict (logic of symbolic damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). 
 
On the one side, demonstrations and protests were utilized by environmental organizations and 
local people to complain directly against the Uruguayan government. As the Uruguayan 
government was considered responsible for accepting and authorizing the pulp mill 
construction, this actor was also seen as responsible for stopping the project. Thus, all the 
protests addressed against the project were mainly oriented against the Uruguayan government 
first, who suffered the most all the consequences of these opposition tactics. Roadblocks were 
used by environmentalists and local people too, and they were addressed directly against 
Uruguayan government, the actor who most suffered the negative economic impact from the 
roadblocks. On the other side, meetings and dialogues were utilized directly, only by 
governments, in order to oppose against each other during the escalation of the conflict and try 
to solve the dispute. Finally, while supporting and collaboration tactics were used by local 
people and environmental organizations, the tactic of the involvement of other actors were 
mainly used by governments in order to oppose against each other. However, both perspectives 
were used in an indirect way: seeking support from intermediaries and other actors, both related 
or not related to the conflict, in order to oppose a third part. 
 
Focusing on the reasons behind the stakeholders’ choice on the strategy to use, it can be 
determined that demonstrations and protests were chosen by local people and environmental 
organizations due to their high impact and capability for attracting everybody’s attention to the 
conflict. In the case of dialogue and meetings, they were mainly used by governments as a way 
to seek for solutions to the conflict and defend every actors’ positions against accusations. 
Regarding the roadblocks, local people and environmentalists decided to apply them due to 
their fast and high material impact, which can be seen and visually assessed. Finally, regarding 
the involvement and collaboration with other actors, this was chosen because of their ability to 
attract important actors to the conflict, and especially, obtain support from other powerful 
stakeholders to improve the salience of their claims and have greater impact.  
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In the particular case of aggressive strategies, it seems interesting to highlight the differences 
on the perceptions around the roadblocks. Even though it was considered as an aggressive 
strategy by Uruguay due to its high impact on the economy, the Assembly using the method 
considered this tactic as peaceful instead, as direct violence was not employed, and every 
complaint was seen as an overreaction.  
 
All the strategies and tactics mentioned above were utilized directly against other actors and 
stakeholders, with the exception of the collaboration and involvement of other actors. These 
last tactics were utilized indirectly against stakeholders, as they require using other actors and 
the participation of intermediaries in the process.  
 
Table 15. Stakeholder-stakeholder opposition, Botnia case 
 
STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE 
BAKKER, 2007)  
TACTIC IDENTIFIED IN THE 
RESEARCH 
STAKEHOLDER– 
STAKEHOLDER OPPOSITION 
LOGIC OF 
NUMBERS 
MASS 
PARTICIPATION 
Demonstrations and protests Direct 
ELITE 
PARTICPATION 
Stakeholder involvement  Indirect 
LOGIC OF 
DAMAGE 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL 
DAMAGE 
Roadblocks Direct 
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC 
DAMAGE 
Meetings Direct 
Dialogue Direct 
Stakeholder support & 
collaboration 
Indirect 
LOGIC OF 
GAIN 
LOGIC OF 
MATERIAL GAIN 
 
Not identified 
 - 
LOGIC OF 
SYMBOLIC GAIN 
 
Not identified 
 
-  
 
Table 15 summarizes the tactics used by stakeholders in order to oppose against other 
stakeholder groups, and shows whether they were utilized in an indirect or direct way. 
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4.4 Summary of stakeholder relationships and opposition 
 
During Botnia case and the escalation of the bilateral conflict around the construction of the 
pulp mill, 12 stakeholders were identified as main participants: Botnia, the Uruguayan 
government, Fray Bentos, the Argentinean government, the CEAG, Finnish government, 
ENCE, King of Spain, World Bank, The Hague ICJ, Mercosur, and the European Union. From 
these different groups, and after analyzing their position towards the firm, as well as their 
interests and their relationships, some key stakeholders were selected for further analysis of 
their relationships and opposition tactics. These key actors were Botnia, the Uruguayan 
government, Fray Bentos, the Argentinean government, and the CEAG. 
 
The stakeholder relationships were analyzed and the following types were identified: 
supporting relationships, opposing relationships and neutral relationships. More specifically, 
the only actor who keeps a neutral position is the firm, due to the importance of maintaining a 
good reputation and image in front of its surrounding environment, and barely changing its 
position over time. Other stakeholder groups present relationships based on opposition and 
support. Supporting relationships emerge in groups presenting similar interests or with the 
objective of exerting joint opposition. Opposing relationships appear when stakeholders have 
different and conflicting stakes and interests.  
 
In addition, while the firm keeps a stable position during the duration of the conflict, the other 
stakeholder groups maintain more complex and dynamic relationships that vary over time. 
These changes are consequence of variations in the stakeholder groups’ interests and goals, or 
variations in the context, understood as the environment surrounding the actors. These changes 
occur more frequently in stakeholder-stakeholder relationships. This highlights and shows 
clearly the dynamic nature existing in stakeholder relationships (Kujala et al., 2012; Mitchell 
et al., 1997, Aaltonen et al., 2013). However, not all stakeholders suffered changes during the 
dispute. Some groups kept the same position over time, and even the protection of their interests 
became a way of life. 
 
Stakeholder opposition was analyzed next. The main opposition tactics identified as used by 
the key stakeholders were: demonstrations and protests, meetings, dialogue, roadblocks, 
involvement of other actors in the dispute, and supporting relationships and collaboration 
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among stakeholders. These tactics were further analyzed through the framework provided by 
Den Hond and De Bakker (2007), categorizing opposition tactics into “logic of numbers” 
through mass participation or elite participation, and “logic of gain/damage”, both symbolic 
and material (p. 909).  
 
Except for meetings and dialogue, which were no utilized, the other tactics were used indirectly 
by stakeholders in order to show opposition to the firm, with the governments appearing as 
mediators during these tactics. Only the positive influence of Uruguay towards Botnia was 
exerted directly. Additionally, even though the firm kept a neutral position, Botnia used 
meetings and dialogue directly as a method to attract their opponents and turning them into 
supporters.  
 
Regarding stakeholder-stakeholder opposition, while governments decided to use meetings, 
dialogue and the involvement of other actors; local people and environmental groups chose 
roadblocks, demonstrations and collaboration with other groups as main tactics. This is 
explained as they key goal of governments was to solve the dispute and keep a good reputation, 
while local people and environmental groups were focused on attracting people to the protests 
against the project, and seeking high negative impact on the firm as consequence of the tactics. 
Finally, local people and NGOs were the actors exerting higher opposition against the firm, 
even to irrational extent, and governments and official authorities maintained a more rational 
neutral position in spite of the fact that they presented higher levels of power and influence on 
the firm than locals or small environmental organizations. This can be explained as 
governments usually are more afraid of a possible loss of reputation, while local people and 
activists have no concerns on reputation losses, even fighting to win lost causes (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003). Additionally, opposition among stakeholder groups was exerted in a direct 
way, excepting those strategies that specifically required the participation of additional actors, 
such as collaboration and the involvement of other stakeholders in the dispute. 
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Table 16. Summary of stakeholder opposition 
 
 
STRATEGY 
FIRM-STAKEHOLDER STAKEHOLDER- 
FIRM 
STAKEHOLDER-
STAKEHOLDER 
TACTIC OPPOSITION TACTIC OPPOSITION TACTIC OPPOSITION 
Logic of 
numbers: 
mass 
participation 
Not 
utilized 
- Protests Indirect Protests  Direct 
Logic of 
numbers: 
Elite 
participation 
Not 
utilized 
- Stakeholder 
involvement 
Indirect Stakeholder 
involvement 
Indirect 
Logic of 
material 
damage 
Not 
utilized 
- Roadblocks Indirect Roadblocks Direct 
 
Logic of 
symbolic 
damage 
Meetings Direct Not utilized - Meetings 
 
Direct 
Dialogue Direct Not utilized - Dialogue 
 
Direct 
Not 
utilized 
- Stakeholder 
collaboration 
Indirect Stakeholder 
collaboration 
Indirect 
Logic of 
material gain 
Not 
utilized 
- Not utilized - Not utilized - 
Logic of 
symbolic 
gain 
Not 
utilized 
- Stakeholder 
collaboration 
Direct Not utilized - 
  
Table 16 presents a summary of the tactics utilized by stakeholders in the Botnia case, 
categorizing opposition as direct or indirect, according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) 
classification of influence strategies. 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
5.1 Development of opposition and contributions to theory 
 
 
The stakeholder relationship scenario is a complex issue during the development of the Botnia 
case. The stakeholder relationships can be mainly classified as opposing, supporting or neutral 
relationships. However, stakeholders’ interests change and evolve over time, and stakeholder 
relationships emerge and are used in different contexts with different goals.  
 
The opposition showed by stakeholders during the conflict also varies over time. In addition, 
different opposition tactics are utilized by different stakeholder groups and with different 
objectives. The main opposition tactics identified are demonstrations, meetings, dialogue, 
roadblocks, stakeholder collaboration and the involvement of other stakeholders in the conflict.  
 
However, these tactics can be identified as performed at two different levels: indirectly and 
directly, depending on who is the final receiver of the tactics and how they affect the final 
recipient. On the one hand, direct strategies affect straight to the actor they are opposing to. For 
examples, this can be seen in the protests organized by CEAG against both the Uruguayan and 
the Argentinean governments. On the other hand, indirect strategies are used to show resistance 
against one actor through a protest addressing a different stakeholder or participant in the 
conflict. For instance, CEAG used protests addressed to the Uruguayan and Argentinean 
government as a method to oppose against the Botnia project. Data stated that the Assembly 
asked the Argentinean president to “develop a stronger policy in the bilateral conflict around 
the pulp mill construction” (article 48, 21/08/2007) and to “prohibit access of ships heading the 
illegal harbor built for Botnia through Argentinean water” (article 48, 21/08/2007), demanding 
the government to take actions against the firm. Additionally, Uruguay claimed and complained 
in Mercosur that the roadblocks used by the CEAG caused severe “economic losses” (article 
26, 23/07/2006). 
 
Most frequently, opposition strategies are utilized directly against other stakeholders. However, 
the involvement of other actors in the dispute and collaboration tactics are used indirectly 
against stakeholders too, as they first required support with other actors. In contrast, opposition 
tactics are utilized indirectly against the firm and its project, as local people and environmental 
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groups might not have enough power to oppose directly against the firm. Thus, they showed 
their resistance and opposition by using governments as mediators. Neville and Menguc (2006) 
already recognized how stakeholders can influence the firm directly or indirectly, through 
alliances among stakeholders with the objective of becoming stronger when showing resistance 
towards the firm. However, data shows how stakeholders can also influence other stakeholders 
directly or indirectly through alliances and collaboration. For instance, the Uruguayan 
government utilized Mercosur to oppose against the CEAG’s roadblocks. Therefore, Neville 
and Menguc’s (2006) claim can be extended to opposition between stakeholder groups too.   
 
Additionally, Neville and Menguc (2006) identified that opposition can be exerted directly or 
indirectly through alliances between groups. This research addresses the utilization of 
supporting and cooperative relationships as an opposition tactic, thus, drawing close 
connections between the two main topics being covered in this study: stakeholder relationships 
and opposition. Stakeholders can engage in positive supporting relationships, that later can be 
used as an opposition tactic. Therefore, positive relationships based on collaboration between 
stakeholders can be maintained with the objective of showing opposition; and more concretely, 
by joining forces, stakeholders can exert a more intense and effective resistance towards the 
firm project, and also against other stakeholder actors. Hence, there is a significant association 
between supporting relationships and joint opposition. 
 
Finally, the main contribution of this research is the demonstration of how previous literature 
focused on stakeholder-firm opposition and certain frameworks can be also applied to better 
understand stakeholder-stakeholder opposition. Previous studies on stakeholder resistance and 
influence had addressed the topic of stakeholder opposition towards the firm (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003; Aaltonen, 2013; Aaltonen et al., 2013). This research further examines that 
issue, and moreover, it contributes to stakeholder literature by providing further insights on the 
topic of stakeholder opposition against other stakeholder groups. Some of the previous studies 
following a firm-stakeholder approach can be extended and applied into a stakeholder-
stakeholder opposition perspective, as demonstrated in this research through the application of 
Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) classification of opposition tactics. Den Hond and De 
Bakker’s (2007) framework was designed to be applied in opposition tactics used by 
stakeholders against the firm. However, as demonstrated in the study, this framework can also 
be applied under a stakeholder-stakeholder perspective, and be utilized to categorize the 
strategies utilized by stakeholders to show opposition against other stakeholder groups. 
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Additionally, Neville and Menguc’s (2006) study supporting that stakeholder might influence 
the firm through direct or indirect methods can also be extended towards a stakeholder-
stakeholder perspective. As demonstrated in this research, stakeholders also oppose against 
other actors in both direct and indirect ways.  
 
Finally, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) and their study on secondary stakeholder mobilization 
based on identity can also be applied to Botnia case and stakeholder-stakeholder opposition. 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) recognized identity as a driver of mobilization against the firm. 
However, in Botnia case, the CEAG continued with the protests to oppose the firm, but 
additionally, to oppose against government’s passivity during the conflict (article 29, 
17/10/2006), even though they knew that all support from the authorities was lost and their 
actions would not have consequences or changes in the government’s attitude. Nevertheless, 
the CEAG continued opposing and criticizing the Argentinean government through several 
demonstrations. Consequently, the theory developed by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) could 
be expanded, and identity might be a driver of mobilization not only against the company, but 
also against other stakeholder groups too. 
 
Therefore, this study shows how previous theories developed on the field of stakeholder-firm 
opposition can be extended and practiced also under a stakeholder-stakeholder opposition and 
perspective, especially in the area of resistance tactics. Therefore, this research provides a 
significant contribution and extend the understanding on the field of stakeholder opposition, 
that might be further analyzed and supported in future research through the application of 
different studies and frameworks to study and understand stakeholder-stakeholder relationships 
and opposition.     
 
5.2  Managerial implications  
 
Mainly, this study shows how foreign direct investment might easily lead to conflicts, which 
might evolve and become real wars not only against the company but also against other actors. 
These international projects do not only bring fear and distrust in the stakeholder set of the firm, 
but they also raise emotional responses that need to be taken into account. Botnia accepted that 
one of its mistakes was not engaging in time with all the stakeholders of the project. Therefore, 
the case might represent a great example to show the importance of managing, communicating 
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and engaging with all the stakeholders of the firm since the beginning, in order to avoid and 
anticipate future conflicts. As Jussi Pakkasvirta (article 87, 10/05/2009) highlighted, 
stakeholders need to be identified before the project, and it is necessary to engage in an open 
discussion with them in order to avoid problems due to lack of information.  
 
In addition, the research identified some opposition tactics, especially focusing on cooperation 
between stakeholders as a resistance strategy. The study also highlighted that opposition tactics 
can be exerted directly or indirectly against other actors. This might encourage managers to 
further analyze these tactics and tried to identify stakeholder relationships at early stages of the 
project. This way, managers can try to anticipate the utilization of these tactics and prevent 
possible problematic situations that might negatively affect the project, thus, ensuring the 
project success 
 
5.3  Evaluation 
 
Firstly, in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the research, it is necessary to be honest and 
recognize all the limitations that the study implies through self-criticism (Elo et al., 2014). 
However, even though the research presents some limitations, all the obstacles have been 
overcome as far as possible in order to ensure its scientific nature, its quality and its 
trustworthiness (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), 
a framework including the concepts of reliability, validity and generalizability can be used to 
assess the quality of a qualitative research. Reliability can be ensured when the research seems 
consistent. This can be demonstrated as data was analyzed not only through an inductive 
approach, but also by applying successfully other existing theories, and always analyzing data 
under an objective perspective to provide impartial results that can be extended and used in 
further studies. Validity was ensured as results were reflected and approached under both an 
inductive and a theoretical perspective, as well as providing examples from data and previous 
studies. Besides, the findings answer precisely the research questions formulated in the study. 
Finally, regarding a generalization of the results, further research is encouraged on the topic by 
applying different existing frameworks and analyzing similar cases.     
 
Regarding the limitations of this research, firstly, it is important to highlight that the available 
data consisted of newspaper articles from Argentina. Therefore, the information described 
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might be biased, and it might offer mainly the Argentinean perspective on the conflict. One 
example that shows this limitation is the utilization of generalizations in data. For instance, El 
Clarín presented Fray Bentos local people as a whole group opposing towards the project at the 
beginning of the project. However, as read in other articles and as presented in the Finnish data 
used in other studies on Botnia case, only a small part of the local people living in the city were 
opposing against the pulp mill construction, while the rest recognized immediately the positive 
economic impact on the city since the beginning of the project. This obstacle was overcome by 
keeping an impartial perspective of the project during data analysis, avoiding taking sides with 
any of the actors involved, and maintaining a neutral and objective attitude and position. There 
is no conflict of interests in the research or support to any of the actors involved in the case 
study, and the analysis will be as accurate and impartial as possible.    
 
Secondly, the procedure used to reduce the amount of data available and the decision of 
focusing mainly on key stakeholders might influence negatively the relevance of the results 
obtained. When reducing data, some important information significant for the project might 
have been left behind; and when focusing only on key stakeholders, some important actors 
during the dispute might have been ignored. This obstacle was overcome by developing an 
initial knowledge around the conflict through the analysis and review of previous studies and 
articles around the dispute, in order to familiarize with the case in advance. 
 
In addition, the results of this research are mainly based on this specific case, and they are an 
outcome of analyzing the specific data collected around this conflict. Consequently, the results 
might not be generalizable to other cases or contexts. However, this obstacle might be overcome 
through analyzing the topic of stakeholder opposition in different cases and by applying other 
different previous frameworks on this phenomenon in future studies and research. This way, 
results can be compared and it might be possible to ensure a generalization. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that data might have been altered slightly due to translation 
issues (El et al., 2014). As initial data were presented and were collected in Spanish, some 
information might have been missed during the translation into English. However, this obstacle 
was overcome by translating meticulously all the information provided in this research, and by 
presenting excellent Spanish language skills as a mother tongue. 
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In addition, plagiarism will be avoided and credibility will be ensured by citing every reference 
utilized in the research (Saldana, 2011; Bengtsson, 2016; Elo et al., 2008, Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2015). 
  
5.4  Further research 
 
After the development of this study, it is interesting to encourage researchers to further 
investigate on the topic of stakeholder relationships and opposition tactics through a stakeholder 
perspective. Besides, it is recommended a closer examination on the connections and link 
between these two areas: stakeholder relationships and stakeholder opposition. More case 
studies and examples are needed on this field in order to provide results that are generalizable 
and representative.  
 
Besides, the research identified multiple changes in stakeholder relationships and opposition, 
showing the dynamic nature of stakeholders. This issue was not fully covered in this study, and 
it might represent a topic worth to be explored in future research. 
 
Finally, during this research, other previous studies were successfully extended and were 
applied to this particular case of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships and opposition. This 
confirms that some previous frameworks on stakeholder-firm opposition might be well 
applicable under a stakeholder approach. Consequently, it might be interesting to apply other 
theories and frameworks developed on the field of stakeholder-firm relationships and 
opposition under a full stakeholder perspective and under a stakeholder-stakeholder approach, 
in order to support the relevance of this contribution through different examples. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: List of articles included in the final sample 
 
Article 1: 29/04/2005 – Argentinos y uruguayos, unidos en un abrazo contra la instalación de 
papeleras. 
Article 2: 15/05/2005 – Uruguay no dará marcha atrás contra la instalación de plantas 
celulósicas. 
Article 3: 12/07/2005 – No habrá dinero para las papeleras sobre el Uruguay. 
Article 4: 15/07/2005 – Tensión diplomática por las papeleras sobre el Uruguay. 
Article 5: 23/08/2005 – El Gobierno pidió que Uruguay frene la construcción de las papeleras. 
Article 6: 26/09/2005 – El Banco Mundial va a inspeccionar las papeleras en el río Uruguay.  
Article 7: 09/10/2005 – Anuncian la posible instalación de otra papelera en Uruguay. 
Article 8: 19/10/2005 – Tabaré Vázquez pondrá la piedra fundamental de una de las 
papeleras. 
Article 9: 11/11/2005 – Frenan un envío a una de las papeleras. 
Article 10: 27/12/2005 – Papeleras: el Gobierno insiste con la suspensión de las obras. 
Article 11: 30/12/2005 – Cortes por las papeleras: demoras de hasta 3 horas para cruzar a 
Uruguay. 
Article 12: 14/01/2006 – Caos en los puentes internacionales en el primer recambio turístico 
del verano. 
Article 13: 17/01/2006 – Tensión diplomática: tras la reunión del consejo de ministros. 
Article 14: 01/02/2006 – Conflicto en Uruguay: otro capítulo de la disputa por las plantas en 
Fray Bentos. 
Article 15: 26/02/2006 – El conflicto con Uruguay: la situación de las plantas de celulosa en 
Fray Bentos. 
Article 16: 16/03/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: contactos en Montevideo y la papelera 
finlandesa. 
Article 17: 27/03/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: antes de la cumbre presidencial. 
Article 18: 09/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: entrevista exclusiva con el canciller Jorge 
Taiana. 
Article 19: 21/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: características de una de las plantas en 
Fray Bentos. 
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Article 20: 22/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: advierten sobre el impacto en futuras 
inversiones en la región 
Article 21: 05/05/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: presentaciones por las papeleras ante la 
Corte Internacional de Justicia. 
Article 22: 21/05/2006 – Entrevista a Erkki Varis, presidente de la papelera Botnia. 
Article 23: 09/06/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: la demanda contra Uruguay en la Corte 
Internacional de Justicia de La Haya. 
Article 24: 11/06/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: la demanda para detener la construcción 
de las papeleras.  
Article 25: 07/07/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: primera etapa del juicio ante la Corte 
Internacional de Justicia 
Article 26: 23/07/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: después del revés en el Tribunal 
Internacional de La Haya. 
Article 27: 22/09/2006 – Clarín había anticipado que se iba de Fray Bentos. 
Article 28: 24/09/2006 – El conflicto con las pasteras. 
Article 29: 17/10/2006 – Proponen hacer un corte fluvial para bloquear el Puerto de Botnia. 
Article 30: 18/10/2006 – Fuerte aval a la instalación de las pasteras. 
Article 31: 15/11/2006 – Financiamiento clave para la planta de la pastera finlandesa en 
Uruguay. 
Article 32: 18/11/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay por las papeleras: Kirchner había enviado 
una carta al Banco Mundial pidiendo su postergación. 
Article 33: 10/12/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: Clarín accedió al adelanto de la 
presentación que hará el lunes 18 ante la Corte de Justicia. 
Article 34: 18/12/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: Hoy comienza una audiencia en La Haya 
por los cortes de ruta. 
Article 35: 07/01/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: el proyecto de levantar una isla para que 
no se vea la chimenea de Fray Bentos. 
Article 36: 23/01/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: más de 4 años de puja por las papeleras 
uruguayas. 
Article 37: 02/02/2007 -  El conflicto con Uruguay: declaraciones desde Finlandia a una radio 
argentina. 
Article 38: 05/02/2007 – Por primera vez desde que estalló el conflicto con Uruguay hablan 
los hombres de negocios. 
Article 39: 23/03/2007 – El frente externo: visita del presidente uruguayo a Fray Bentos. 
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Article 40: 30/03/2007 – Clarín recorrió las instalaciones de la empresa finlandesa en Fray 
Bentos.  
Article 41: 11/04/2007 – Una iniciativa que el gobierno llevará la semana que viene a la mesa 
de dialogo en España. 
Article 42: 17/04/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: entrevista a Erkki Varis, presidente de la 
empresa finlandesa.  
Article 43: 15/05/2007 – Luego de entrevistarse con el canciller Jorge Taiana. 
Article 44: 31/05/2007 – No hay apuro argentino por forzar una definición antes de octubre. 
Article 45: 19/06/2007 – Ambientalistas. 
Article 46: 19/07/2007 – Lo aseguró ante el Tribunal de La Haya, como respuesta al reclamo 
argentino. 
Article 47: 31/07/2007 – Buenos oficios de España en el conflicto argentino – uruguayo. 
Article 48: 21/08/2007 – Interrupción de una vía clave para la economía del Mercosur. 
Article 49: 30/08/2007 – El conflicto por las papeleras: a pesar del enérgico planteo de la 
cancillería argentina. 
Article 50: 02/09/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: tensión por el reclamo de entrerrianos en 
Fray Bentos. 
Article 51: 03/09/2007 – El conflicto con Uruguay: unas 850 personas cruzaron de 
Gualeguaychú a Fray Bentos para pedir la relocalización de la planta. 
Article 52: 26/09/2007 – En foco: el tema internacional que más preocupa a Cristina 
Kirchner. 
Article 53: 03/10/2007 – ¿Una nueva salida para el conflicto entre la Argentina y Uruguay? 
Article 54: 04/10/2007 – La pastera pondrá en marcha entonces su producción. 
Article 55: 10/11/2007 – Reunión antes del inicio de la cumbre. 
Article 56: 10/11/2007 – Se agravó la crisis con Uruguay: cerró frontera y arrancó Botnia. 
Article 57: 25/11/2007 – El gobierno argentino transmitió su “preocupación y desagrado”. 
Article 58: 26/11/2007 – Crece la tensión en el conflicto bilateral. 
Article 59: 02/12/2007 – ¿Azúcar o sacarina? 
Article 60: 30/12/2007 – El conflicto por Botnia.  
Article 61: 23/01/2008 – Botnia: “Argentina perdió de ganar muchísimo dinero con nosotros”. 
Article 62: 28/01/2008 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la pastera Botnia. 
Article 63: 02/02/2008 – Al asumir, Cristina Kirchner prometió respetar lo que resuelva el 
Tribunal Internacional. 
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Article 64: 13/02/2008 – Buenos Aires y Montevideo esperarán el fallo de la Corte de La 
Haya. 
Article 65: 01/03/2008 – Frente al boicot de los asembleístas de Gualeguaychú. 
Article 66: 22/03/2008 – La Justicia argentina espera escuchar esta semana a los directivos de 
Botnia. 
Article 67: 24/04/2008 - En marcha.  
Article 68: 27/04/2008 – Gualeguaychú: una multitud marchó contra la papelera. 
Article 69: 15/05/2008 – Finlandia proyecta más inversiones en Uruguay. 
Article 70: 23/08/2008 – Gualeguaychú: una jueza ordenó que dejen cruzar el puente a un 
argentino. 
Article 71: 21/09/2008 – El interés por observar a la pastera finlandesa desde la ciudad 
entrerriana.  
Article 72: 28/09/2008 – Cristina estaría intentando levantar el corte de ruta en Gualeguaychú. 
Article 73: 03/10/2008 – El conflicto por las papeleras. 
Article 74: 19/10/2008 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la papelera finlandesa. 
Article 75: 10/11/2008 – Botnia ya produce tanta celulosa como 30 papeleras argentinas.  
Article 76: 23/11/2008 – El bloqueo del puente internacional produjo un conflicto con 
Uruguay. 
Article 77: 15/12/2008 – Reunión del Mercosur, Unasur, Calc y el Grupo Río. 
Article 78: 15/12/2008 – Dió a entender que no se permiten piquetes de “baja adhesión”. 
Article 79: 02/01/2009 – Papelera: Urribarri recibirá a los asambleístas, pero sigue el corte. 
Article 80: 08/01/2009 – Uruguay pidió al Gobierno que “traduzca en hechos” su rechazo a 
los cortes. 
Article 81: 29/01/2009 – El conflicto por la papelera Botnia. 
Article 82: 05/02/2009 – El conflicto por la pastera finesa. 
Article 83: 06/02/2009 – Había sospechas de contaminación por la presencia de la pastera 
Botnia. 
Article 84: 08/03/2009 – Tema de domingo, primera nota: la otra cara del conflicto por la 
pastera. 
Article 85: 23/03/2009 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la pastera finesa. 
Article 86: 27/04/2009 – Primer accidente mortal en el escenario de la protesta entrerriana. 
Article 87: 10/05/209 – Jussi Pakkasvirta politólogo e historiador finlandés. 
Article 88: 19/06/2009 – Decisión de los ambientalistas. 
Article 89: 16/09/2009 – Segunda jornada de presentaciones en el Tribunal de La Haya. 
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Article 90: 22/09/2009 – Presentación en el Tribunal de La Haya. 
Article 91: 20/10/2009 – Nueva polémica por el corte de la ruta 136, de cara a las elecciones 
del domingo. 
Article 92: 31/10/2009 – La cancillería rechazó la acusación y asegura que la pastera ya 
contamina. 
Article 93: 19/11/2009 – Conflicto bilateral: Botnia cierra su primera exportación a 
Argentina. 
Article 94: 27/11/2009 – Declaraciones del candidato oficialista al semanario “Búsqueda” de 
Montevideo. 
Article 95: 01/12/2009 – Buscan distender las relaciones bilaterales. 
Article 96: 09/12/2009 – Botnia: ahora de busca minimizar los roces con Tabaré por Botnia. 
  
102 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: Data reduction – tables to select the final sample. 
 
YEAR 2005: 35 articles  
(11 articles chosen) 
 
 December: 9 articles - Choose 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
1 1 14 1 3 10 29 
2 1 10 2 3 3 19 
3 1 9 2 5 4 21 
4 2 6 3 2 6 19 
5 1 3 1 0 2 7 
6 3 4 2 1 6 16 
7 1 6 1 5 1 14 
8 1 2 3 1 5 12 
9 3 9 1 2 2 17 
 
 November: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
10 1 3 0 1 6 11 
11 1 2 1 0 4 8 
12 1 7 1 5 0 14 
 
 October: 7 articles - Choose 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
13 4 10 0 3 1 18 
14 2 5 2 2 2 13 
15 1 10 1 1 5 18 
16 1 1 1 0 3 6 
17 1 3 3 0 4 11 
18 2 12 3 5 5 27 
19 1 2 0 1 4 8 
 
 September: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
20 1 5 0 1 7 14 
21 1 8 1 0 6 16 
21 6 8 1 1 0 16 
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 August: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
22 2 5 1 8 5 21 
23 2 4 3 1 10 20 
24 2 5 1 5 3 16 
 
 July: 6 articles - Choose 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
25 1 3 1 3 3 11 
26 5 4 3 1 0 13 
27 1 10 2 5 2 20 
28 1 5 3 2 5 16 
29 1 11 0 1 4 17 
30 1 9 1 5 1 17 
 
 June: 0 articles 
 May: 2 articles - Choose 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
31 1 12 3 4 1 21 
31 1 11 2 2 5 21 
 
 April: 2 articles - Choose 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHU TOTAL 
32 1 1 1 0 2 5 
32 2 13 0 4 3 22 
 
 
 March: 0 articles 
 February: 0 articles 
 January: 0 articles 
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YEAR 2006: 156 ARTICLES 
(23 articles chosen) 
 
 December: 20 articles – 2 key articles: 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
33 2 6 0 5 3 16 
34 1 1 0 0 1 3 
35 1 3 2 3 5 14 
36 3 8 1 2 6 20 
37 1 2 1 1 5 10 
38 1 6 0 4 5 16 
39 1 11 0 9 0 21 
40 2 13 1 8 0 24 
41 5 14 1 3 1 24 
42 1 9 0 7 0 17 
43 2 10 0 8 2 22 
44 1  12 1 5 0 19 
45 5 6 1 0 1 13 
46 3 1 1 0 1 6 
47 3 15 2 9 1 30 
48 1 8 1 2 5 17 
49 5 7 1 3 1 17 
50 5 10 1 1 0 17 
51 5 4 3 3 0 15 
52 1 4 2 1 0 8 
 
 November: 14 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
53 2 9 2 4 1 18 
54 2 4 1 4 0 11 
55 2 4 0 1 0 7 
56 2 3 0 7 0 12 
57 4 5 2 6 1 18 
58 2 2 1 0 1 6 
59 3 3 2 3 1 12 
60 4 11 3 7 1 26 
61 2 13 1 14 0 30 
62 1 4 1 6 0 12 
63 1 7 0 2 0 10 
64 1 5 1 3 0 10 
65 1 9 1 8 1 20 
66 1 10 0 3 0 14 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
 October: 8 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
67 1 2 0 3 1 7 
68 3 6 0 3 2 14 
69 7 5 0 5 3 20 
70 1 4 1 3 3 12 
71 2 2 2 2 0 8 
72 2 7 0 4 0 13 
73 3 3 0 0 1 7 
74 7 7 2 6 1 23 
 
 September: 5 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
75 1 9 3 6 1 20 
76 1 4 0 4 1 10 
77 1 8 1 8 1 19 
78 1 6 2 2 1 12 
79 1 7 0 7 2 17 
 
 August: o articles 
 
 July: 17 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
80 1 2 2 1 0 6 
81 1 13 1 11 3 29 
82 1 3 1 4 0 9 
83 1 5 1 9 0 16 
84 3 12 0 5 1 21 
84 1 2 2 4 1 10 
84 2 8 1 10 2 23 
85 1 5 0 7 1 14 
86 1 6 1 9 1 18 
87 2 4 0 7 1 14 
88 1 1 0 2 0 4 
89 2 6 1 8 1 18 
90 2 6 2 1 0 11 
91 2 9 1 7 2 21 
92 3 10 2 12 0 27 
93 2 8 1 9 1 21 
94 1 5 1 3 1 11 
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 June: 9 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
95 1 7 3 4 0 15 
96 2 7 3 1 0 13 
97 3 1 1 1 7 13 
98 1 13 1 7 1 23 
99 1 1 0 5 1 8 
100 2 12 1 12 1 28 
101 2 14 3 11 2 32 
102 2 8 2 10 1 23 
103 1  5 1 8 0 15 
 
 May: 18 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
104 2 9 1 8 2 22 
105 4 2 1 0 0 7 
106 3 12 2 9 3 29 
107 8 2 2 2 0 14 
108 6 9 2 2 0 19 
109 2 2 2 0 3 9 
110 6 9 2 2 0 19 
111 4 6 5 7 1 23 
112 9 5 2 3 1 20 
113 1 3 0 1 2 7 
114 1 10 2 11 0 24 
115 7 3 0 1 0 11 
116 5 7 2 5 0 19 
117 3 7 2 8 2 22 
118 4 1 1 1 0 7 
119 2 7  1 5 1 16 
120 3 24 2 12 0 41 
121 4 6 1 1 2 14 
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 April: 21 articles – 3 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
122 1 5 1 11 0 18 
123 1 8 1 6 2 18 
124 1 2 0 2 0 5 
125 4 5 2 11 1 23 
126 7 9 1 8 1 26 
127 12 8 3 1 1 25 
128 2 5 0 5 0 12 
129 3 8 0 7 0 18 
130 3 3 0 0 3 9 
131 3 2 1 0 0 6 
132 1 9 1 5 1 17 
133 2 2 1 1 2 8 
134 1 5 1 1 0 8 
135 2 13 1 4 0 20 
136 4 10 1 4 0 19 
137 1 11  1 6 2 21 
136 1 8 1 2 9 21 
137 11 21 0 6 1 39 
138 3 6 1 3 3 16 
139 1 3 0 3 0 7 
140 7 2 1 7 2 19 
 
 March: 17 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
141 2 8 1 6 1 18 
142 1 7 0 6 1 15 
143 6 12 1 9 2 30 
144 3 12 3 2 2 22 
145 2 8 1 3 2 16 
146 3 9 1 3 1 17 
147 1 9 2 3 3 18 
148 1 4 1 0 3 9 
149 7 15 2 5 1 30 
150 5 6 2 2 4 19 
151 1 9 1 5 0 16 
152 2 6 2 3 3 16 
153 1 5 0 4 0 10 
154 3 7 1 2 1 14 
155 1 6 1 1 0 9 
155 3 7 1 3 2 16 
156 2 11 1 4 4 22 
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 February: 15 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
157 1 4 1 0 0 6 
158 1 5 3 4 3 16 
159 9 7  7 1 3 27 
160 1 8 2 2 2 15 
161 3 12 3 2 2 22 
162 1 7 2 1 0 11 
163 1 10 2 2 6 21 
164 1 9 2 3 8 23 
165 2 13 2 6 1 24 
166 2 2 1 2 5 12 
167 2 6 1 4 6 19 
169 2 10 2 4 0 18 
170 3 4 0 1 1 9 
171 1 5 1 2 8 17 
172 2 11 3 8 5 29 
 
 January: 12 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
173 4 3 1 3 6 17 
174 1 8  5 1 6 21 
175 1 11 0 8 1 21 
176 2 8 2 2 1 15 
177 1 7 0 1 1 10 
178 1 18 1 7 0 27 
179 1 9 1 9 2 22 
180 2 11 5 4 10 32 
181 3 4 3 3 6 19 
182 1  8 2 5 1 17 
183 1 4 0 2 1 8 
184 1 9 3 0 8 21 
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YEAR 2007: 170 ARTICLES 
(26 articles chosen) 
 
 December: 12 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
185 3 9 0 4 6 22 
186 1 1 0 1 1 4 
187 2 2 0 0 1 5 
187 2 3 0 4 1 10 
188 1 8 1 2 4 16 
189 2 5 0 2 3 12 
190 3 8 0 4 0 15 
191 3 2 2 1 0 8 
192 2 5 0 3 1 11 
193 1 3 2 1 2 9 
194 5 8 3 1 3 20 
195 2 1 0 1 0 4 
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 November: 35 articles – 4 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
196 2 1 1 0 3 7 
197 5 9 2 4 2 22 
198 3 11 2 6 4 26 
199 1 12 2 5 9 29 
200 4 19 6 9 3 41 
201 3 2 1 3 1 10 
202 2 16 4 6 3 31 
203 6 7 3 2 1 19 
204 6 5 3 0 1 15 
205 3 5 1 1 3 13 
206 1 7 2 1 1 12 
207 7 6 3 2 1 19 
208 1 10 0 10 1 22 
209 6 5 3 3 0 17 
210 5 5 2 2 2 16 
211 4 3 5 0 2 14 
212 2 5 0 0 4 11 
213 5 10 2 2 4 23 
214 5 4 0 3 1 13 
215 1 2 0 1 0 4 
216 5 15 3 14 3 40 
217 2 6 0 5 1 14 
217 5 9 2 6 9 31 
218 4 4 0 0 3 11 
219 3 3 1 1 0 8 
220 5 11 0 12 0 28 
221 5 6 0 5 0 16 
222 4 5 0 3 4 16 
223 4 5 0 4 0 13 
224 4 6 3 3 0 16 
225 1 2 1 7 0 11 
226 6 4 0 1 0 11 
227 3 2 2 2 5 14 
228 4 9 0 6 0 19 
229 9 6 1 2 0 18 
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 October: 10 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
230 1 3 0 1 1 6 
231 4 2 0 1 2 9 
232 2 6 5 2 1 16 
233 2 5 2 4 4 17 
234 3 10 3 2 1 19 
235 7 6 1 1 5 20 
236 5 9 0 6 2 22 
237 6 7 0 1 4 18 
238 4 6 1 0 0 11 
239 3 3 1 0 5 12 
 
 September: 22 articles – 3 articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
240 3 11 0 9 3 26 
241 3 4 1 1 6 15 
242 5 4 1 0 0 10 
243 6 10 1 6 4 27 
244 2 6 1 5 0 14 
245 6 14 0 10 5 35 
246 1 4 0 5 0 10 
247 5 9 0 8 0 22 
248 2 3 1 2 0 8 
249 2 5 0 0 0 7 
250 2 5 0 0 0 7 
251 4 7 0 4 1 16 
252 3 7 2 5 0 17 
253 2 9 1 7 0 19 
254 8 7 0 4 0 19 
255 3 4 1 1 1 10 
256 6 10 2 7 0 25 
257 6 12 2 3 4 27 
258 3 7 0 4 3 17 
259 6 11 3 9 2 31 
260 3 5 4 1 2 15 
261 4 4 4 1 5 18 
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 August: 14 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLES BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
262 5 12 0 6 1 24 
263 4 6 1 1 1 13 
264 5 4 1 0 1 11 
265 7 5 3 3 8 26 
266 1 4 1 0 5 11 
267 1 1 2 0 0 4 
268 5 9 0 5 2 21 
269 2 4 1 5 1 13 
270 1 3 1 3 3 11 
271 3 6 2 1 2 14 
272 1 3 1 2 2 9 
273 2 1 3 1 0 7 
274 3 10 1 6 0 20 
275 5 3 1 3 3 15 
 
 July: 7 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
276 1 2 0 3 4 10 
277 4 21 3 10 0 38 
278 2 12 1 6 0 21 
279 1 4 2 3 1 11 
280 2 1 1 1 3 8 
281 2 1 0 3 1 7 
282 3 2 1 1 5 12 
 
 June: 1 article – 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
283 1 4 1 3 2 11 
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 May: 9 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
284 3 13 2 7 0 25 
285 2 3 0 5 0 10 
286 3 5 1 3 0 12 
287 1 2 1 1 0 5 
288 1 1 1 1 2 6 
289 2 4 1 6 0 13 
290 1 1 0 0 4 6 
291 1 5 1 4 0 11 
292 5 4 1 2 0 12 
 
 April: 16 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
293 2 4 1 2 3 12 
294 3 5 2 5 4 19 
295 2 4 0 1 2 9 
296 3 4 1 3 0 11 
297 5 12 0 5 0 22 
298 4 6 2 5 0 17 
299 2 2 0 2 1 7 
300 1 8 0 8 0 17 
301 7 8 0 4 0 19 
302 1 5 1 4 0 11 
303 5 6 0 4 0 15 
304 9 10 1 4 3 27 
305 4 6 0 10 2 22 
306 5 11 2 7 1 26 
307 1 1 3 0 2 7 
308 10 4 4 2 0 20 
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 March: 12 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
309 5 4 4 4 6 23 
310 9 5 5 3 2 24 
311 3 3 0 0 1 7 
312 2 5 1 5 0 13 
313 5 3 0 2 3 13 
314 2 4 1 1 1 9 
315 3 14 5 4 2 28 
316 2 5 2 1 2 12 
317 1 4 0 1 2 8 
318 1 3 0 1 0 5 
319 6 5 1 3 0 15 
320 1 8 1 5 1 16 
 
 February: 12 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
321 5 11 2 5 0 23 
322 2 8 0 3 1 14 
323 1 3 0 3 3 10 
324 9 8 1 1 2 21 
325 5 7 0 0 1 13 
326 2 7 2 3 1 15 
327 7 8 1 3 4 23 
328 2 8 0 4 0 14 
329 5 7 1 2 3 18 
330 8 9 4 5 3 29 
331 3 9 1 7 1 21 
332 2 7 2 2 6 19 
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 January: 20 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
333 1 7 0 2 0 10 
334 2 3 1 2 0 8 
335 1 5 0 8 1 15 
336 7 6 1 3 2 19 
337 3 7 1 4 0 15 
338 3 18 2 12 3 38 
339 1 6 1 3 1 12 
340 1 7 0 4 1 13 
341 2 3 1 3 5 14 
342 1 4 2 0 3 10 
343 1 9 0 3 3 16 
344 5 2 4 0 1 12 
345 7 2 2 0 2 13 
346 3 6 3 4 3 19 
347 1 5 0 2 4 12 
348 3 3 1 0 0 7 
349 2 7 2 7 0 18 
350 9 5 2 2 2 20 
351 6 6 1 2 1 16 
352 1 2 0 1 5 9 
 
 
YEAR 2008: 80 ARTICLES 
(18 articles chosen) 
 
 December: 8 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
353 1 1 1 1 4 8 
354 6 3 0 1 1 11 
355 3 3 1 2 3 12 
356 5 3 1 0 4 13 
357 5 6 1 2 3 17 
358 1 9 0 6 0 16 
359 2 5 2 1 3 13 
360 3 1 0 1 1 6 
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 November: 5 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
361 4 7 2 4 6 23 
362 2 3 2 1 4 12 
363 5 2 2 1 3 13 
364 9 11 2 7 2 31 
365 5 1 0 0 3 9 
 
 October: 9 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
366 2 4 0 0 5 11 
367 4 5 3 1 2 15 
368 5 6 1 3 4 19 
369 1 3 0 1 4 9 
370 2 4 0 2 5 13 
371 2 3 2 1 2 10 
372 3 3 1 2 2 11 
373 2 4 1 1 5 13 
374 1 10 1 7 2 21 
 
 September: 4 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE Botnia Uruguay Fray 
Bentos 
Argentina Gualeguaychú TOTAL 
375 4 6 1 3 4 18 
376 2 13 2 7 5 29 
377 1 7 1 3 2 14 
378 5 6 2 3 5 21 
 
 August: 2 articles – 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
379 2 1 1 1 5 10 
380 2 3 0 2 7 14 
 
 July: 0 articles 
 June: 0 articles 
 
 May: 1 article – 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
381 2 4 1 2 0 9 
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 April: 4 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
382 2 4 1 2 5 14 
381 3 5 1 3 4 16 
382 1 5 2 2 4 14 
383 1 3 0 0 1 5 
 
 March: 10 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
384 2 2 0 0 0 4 
385 1 1 0 0 0 2 
386 1 5 2 2 4 14 
387 8 4 1 6 1 20 
388 3 6 0 1 5 15 
389 2 4 0 1 1 8 
390 3 6 0 1 0 10 
391 4 3 2 1 3 13 
392 4 3 4 1 5 17 
393 7 7 2 3 2 21 
 
 February: 19 artices – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE Botnia Uruguay Fray 
Bentos 
Argentina Gualeguaychú TOTAL 
394 8 8 2 1 0 19 
395 5 4 2 1 2 14 
396 4 2 0 2 3 11 
397 2 7 2 8 0 19 
398 5 4 1 2 5 17 
399 1 3 0 2 3 9 
400 5 6 0 4 0 15 
401 4 1 1 4 4 14 
402 7 9 1 6 2 25 
403 7 5 2 1 2 17 
404 2 6 0 3 0 11 
405 5 3 1 3 2 14 
406 2 2 0 2 4 10 
407 5 2 1 4 4 16 
408 3 3 0 2 2 10 
409 1 1 0 0 0 2 
410 4 6 0 0 3 13 
411 3 3 0 0 2 8 
412 9 7 2 2 5 25 
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 January: 18 artices – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUAYCHÚ TOTAL 
413 3 3 1 0 0 7 
414 2 7 1 4 3 17 
415 2 3 1 3 1 10 
416 0 7 2 3 4 16 
417 1 6 0 4 0 11 
418 3 11 0 7 2 23 
419 7 4 2 7 1 21 
420 4 2 2 1 3 12 
421 2 2 1 0 1 6 
422 2 5 0 2 2 11 
423 1 5 0 0 2 8 
424 2 4 2 1 3 12 
425 1 4 0 1 1 7 
426 2 7 1 4 3 17 
427 2 4 1 1 1 9 
428 2 1 2 1 2 8 
429 6 0 2 0 4 12 
430 1 2 1 1 5 10 
 
 
YEAR 2009: 68 ARTICLES 
(18 articles chosen) 
 
 December: 8 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
431 1 2 3 0 0 6 
432 3 4 4 2 0 13 
433 1 7 3 1 5 17 
434 6 7 0 5 1 19 
435 2 3 0 2 0 7 
436 3 7 0 4 1 15 
437 3 7 2 4 1 17 
438 8 7 1 10 1 27 
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 November: 8 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
439 1 4 0 3 3 11 
440 4 4 0 11 0 19 
441 4 6 1 10 1 22 
442 4 1 2 3 3 13 
443 8 8 1 7 1 25 
444 1 2 1 1 2 7 
445 3 1 0 1 3 8 
446 4 1 0 0 3 8 
 
 October: 9 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
447 2 9 0 3 1 15 
448 5 16 0 14 0 35 
449 3 5 0 1 0 9 
450 2 5 0 5 0 12 
451 3 4 1 1 0 9 
452 1 8 1 6 6 22 
453 1 10 1 5 4 21 
454 2 3 1 8 3 17 
455 3 2 1 1 2 9 
 
 September: 6 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
456 4 14 2 8 2 30 
457 6 11 1 8 1 27 
458 7 7 0 8 1 23 
459 2 4 0 3 0 9 
460 5 8 0 10 0 23 
461 3 3 1 2 3 12 
 
 August: 0 articles 
 July: 0 articles 
 
 June: 2 articles – 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
462 2 3 2 1 1 9 
463 2 8 2 1 6 19 
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 May: 2 articles – 1 key article  
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
464 3 2 1 1 1 8 
465 10 14 3 12 2 41 
 
 April: 2 articles – 1 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
466 2 2 1 0 2 7 
467 1 5 1 0 2 9 
 
 March: 5 articles – 2 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
468 3 6 2 3 1 15 
469 2 4 2 1 2 11 
470 4 32 2 15 4 57 
471 3 2 0 1 1 7 
472 1 1 1 0 0 3 
 
 February: 4 articles – 2 key article 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
473 4 2 3 1 1 11 
474 1 7 1 0 0 9 
475 5 7 0 1 2 15 
476 5 6 2 3 4 20 
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 January: 22 articles – 3 key articles 
ARTICLE BOTNIA URUGUAY FRAY 
BENTOS 
ARGENTINA GUALEGUACHÚ TOTAL 
477 4 2 1 0  4 11 
478 5 7 1 2 2 17 
479 4 6 0 0 3 13 
480 4 2 1 1 3 11 
481 3 5 0 2 1 11 
482 5 2 0 0 4 11 
483 4 2 0 1 0 7 
484 1 2 1 0 6 10 
485 1 2 2 0 1 6 
486 1 5 0 1 1 8 
487 3 3 1 0 4 11 
488 4 2 0 1 1 8 
489 0 4 0 0 0 4 
490 1 3 1 0 2 7 
491 2 3 0 0 2 7 
492 1 3 2 1 3 10 
493 5 3 1 0 4 13 
494 1 3 1 1 4 10 
495 1 11 1 5 3 21 
496 2 4 0 1 2 9 
497 3 2 2 4 5 16 
498 5 7 4 0 5 21 
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APPENDIX 3. The final sample and the key stakeholders 
 
YEAR MONTH ARTICLES STAKEHOLDERS 
Botnia Uruguay Fray Bentos Argentina Gualeguaychú 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
January  0 0 0 0 0 0 
February 0 0 0 0 0 0 
March 0 0 0 0 0 0 
April 1 2 13 0 4 3 
May 1 1 12 3 4 1 
June 0 0 0 0 0 0 
July 2 2 19 3 10 3 
August 1 2 5 1 8 5 
September 1 1 8 1 0 6 
October 2 3 22 4 6 10 
November 1 1 7 1 5 0 
December 2 2 23 3 8 14 
Total 11 14 109 16 45 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
January  2 3 29 6 11 10 
February 2 11 18 10 9 8 
March 2 13 27 3 14 3 
April 3 30 38 4 15 3 
May 2 6 36 4 21 3 
June 2 4 26 4 23 3 
July 2 4 23 3 23 3 
August 0 0 0 0 0 0 
September 2 2 17 4 14 2 
October 2 14 12 2 11 4 
November 2 6 24 4 21 1 
December 2 8 29 3 12 2 
Total 23 101 279 47 174 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
January  2 12 23 4 14 5 
February 2 15 17 5 8 7 
March 2 12 19 10 7 4 
April 2 14 21 3 11 4 
May 2 5 17 3 13 0 
June 1 1 4 1 3 2 
July 2 6 33 4 16 0 
August 2 12 17 3 9 9 
September 3 18 37 5 22 11 
October 2 12 15 1 7 7 
November 4 16 59 15 35 18 
December 2 8 17 3 5 9 
Total 26 131 279 57 150 76 
 
 
 
 
2008 
January  2 10 15 2 14 3 
February 2 16 16 3 8 7 
March 2 15 11 3 9 3 
April 2 5 9 2 5 9 
May 1 2 4 1 2 0 
June 0 0 0 0 0 0 
July 0 0 0 0 0 0 
August 1 2 3 0 2 7 
September 2 7 19 4 10 10 
October 2 6 16 2 10 6 
November 2 13 18 4 11 8 
December 2 6 15 1 8 3 
 Total 18 82 126 22 79 56 
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2009 
January  3 11 25 6 7 10 
February 2 10 13 2 4 6 
March 2 7 38 4 18 5 
April 1 1 5 1 0 2 
May 1 10 14 3 12 2 
June 1 2 8 2 1 6 
July 0 0 0 0 0 0 
August 0 0 0 0 0 0 
September 2 10 25 3 16 3 
October 2 6 24 1 20 6 
November 2 12 14 2 17 2 
December 2 14 14 1 15 2 
Total 18 83 180 25 110 44 
TOTAL  96 411 973 167 558 260 
 
